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ABSTRACT 
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals regard microfinance provision as 
a developmental tool in fighting poverty and financial exclusion which are particularly rife in 
Low-Income Sub-Saharan Africa (LISSA). Therefore, this study analysed the financial 
sustainability, liquidity and outreach of LISSA Deposit-taking Microfinance Institutions 
(DTMFIs) through three objectives. The first objective investigated why the LISSA DTMFIs 
fall short in achieving financial sustainability despite having commendable deposit volumes. 
Panel data spanning 2006 to 2017 obtained through desk research from the Microfinance 
Information Exchange of 64 DTMFIs sampled across 18 LISSA countries was utilized. 
Through probit regression, the study found that the likelihood of attaining financial 
sustainability is reduced by small scale deposits, loan loss provisions, deteriorating loan 
portfolio quality and costly branch coverage. The study recommends low cost, large scale 
deposit operations; efficiency in managing operating expenses; credit enhancements; and 
restrictive deposit-taking licencing. 
The second objective assessed the relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance 
as the LISSA DTMFIs default in meeting withdrawals on deposits. The fixed panel of 64 
DTMFIs was utilized. The estimated random effects results showed that explicit deposit 
insurance is positive and significantly related to liquidity. The study concluded that designing 
and implementing explicit deposit insurance schemes mitigates liquidity risk in depository 
microfinance. Therefore, the LISSA regulators ought to include microfinance deposits in 
formulating deposit insurance policies.  
The third objective examined whether pursuing outreach and financial sustainability in 
depository microfinance exhibit a trade-off or mission drift, as this is not yet clear for deposits. 
The System Generalized Method of Moments was adopted, using the fixed panel of 64 
DTMFIs. No significant relationship was found between financial sustainability and the 
average deposit balance (outreach depth); but financial sustainability was negative and 
significantly related to number of depositors (outreach breadth). The study concluded that in 
the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector, there is neither a mission drift nor trade-off in 
outreach depth, but a trade-off exists in outreach breadth. Therefore, it is recommended that 
the DTMFIs segment their markets and develop appropriate deposit products for each market 
segment and also leverage on cost-efficient deposit-taking methods such as the use of agents 
and mobile phones. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study  
 
The global rate of extreme poverty has been declining since 1991, but more than 400 
million people continue to live below the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) (Chikalipah, 2017; World Development Indicators (WDIs), 2017). 
Poverty is mainly rife in the Low-Income Countries (LICs) of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
henceforth Low-Income Sub-Saharan Africa (LISSA)1. Hence, the provision of microfinance 
to the poor and low-income households has long been regarded as an esteemed tool for poverty 
alleviation, financial inclusion and economic development amongst the world’s poorest 
countries (Dokulilova, Janda and Zetek, 2009). Microfinance is the provision of financial 
services mainly in micro-amounts; microdeposits, microcredit, micro-insurance, microleasing, 
money transfer services, diaspora remittances and foreign exchange (Chikoko and Kwenda, 
2013).  
According to Agarwal and Sinha (2010), microfinance provision produces immediate 
results; it empowers women, youths and micro-entrepreneurs through financial access. As a 
result, the United Nations considered microfinance provision in the primary goal of the 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of eradicating extreme poverty in all its forms across 
the world by the year 2030. This international policy was motivated by the pioneering 
microfinance model of Professor Muhammad Yunus, the Grameen Bank; which has 
successfully provided microcredit to the poor in Bangladesh since the 1970s. In the early days 
of modern-day microfinance provision, the traditional consensus of most microfinance 
stakeholders was that Microfinance Institutions (MFIs)2 are poverty-oriented institutions 
whose primary mission is outreach; serving the poorest in their vast numbers through 
subsidised microcredit. The subsidies and donations from the Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and the national governments kept the MFIs liquid and financially 
sustainable, thereby ensuring their short term and long-term survival in serving the poor with 
microcredit (Bogan, 2012).  
 
1 Detailed information on the LISSA countries is given in Section 1.2 and Chapter 2. 
2 Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are either Deposit-taking Microfinance Institutions (DTMFIs) accepting 
deposits for intermediation into loans or Credit-only Microfinance Institutions (COMFIs) advancing credit only. 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, microfinance provision emphasised more on subsidised 
microcredit and less effort was made on mobilising deposits (Rozas and Erice, 2014). As a 
result, some microfinance stakeholders referred to deposits3 as the “forgotten half” of 
microfinance (Helms, 2006, p. 24). Therefore, to spearhead the uptake of deposit products and 
services by the poor and low-income households, many microfinance regulators across the 
world extensively issued out deposit-taking licenses to MFIs (Riquet and Poursat, 2013). As 
focus by MFIs on deposit-taking increased, Gonzalez and Meyer (2009) observed that the poor 
and low-income households seemed to derive more utility from consuming deposit products 
than microcredit products. Consequently, there has been a phenomenal growth in the volume 
of deposits and the number of depositors, most notably in SSA. Between 2009 and 2015, SSA 
was the second world’s leading region in terms of mobilising microfinance deposit volumes, 
and these exceed the gross loan portfolio volumes to date (Microfinance Information Exchange 
(MIX) and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2013; MIX, 2019). 
As a result of the growth in deposit volumes in SSA and other world’s regions, some 
researchers have argued that deposits are a means of achieving financial sustainability or self-
sufficiency of Deposit-taking Microfinance Institutions (DTMFIs) (Brom, 2009; Dokulilova et 
al., 2009; Ek, 2011; Hulme and Aran, 2011; Millson, 2013; Kaloo, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 
2016a). Financial sustainability is the “capacity to obtain revenues to cover the transactional 
expenses, operational (administrative) expenses and financial (interest) expenses” (Shaoyan 
and Duwal, 2012, p. 234). Accordingly, financial sustainability has become the main gauge for 
measuring the success rate of both DTMFIs and Credit-only Microfinance Institutions 
(COMFIs) as it guarantees their longevity in serving the poor and low-income households with 
micro-financial services. According to Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch (2009a), MFIs have 
to be self-sufficient institutions that rely on deposit financing as government funding, 
subsidised loans, grants and donations have been dwindling since the ushering in of the 2000s. 
The decline of subsidised microfinance models gave rise to commercialisation of microfinance 
whereby the MFIs had to look for other sources of capital such as deposits, funding from 
Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs), debt and equity funding in search for financial 
sustainability (Ledgerwood and White, 2006). In addition, some empirics such as de Sousa-
 
3 Deposits in microfinance are either voluntary (deposits that are intermediated into loans) or mandatory (deposits 
that are collateral security for loans and are not intermediated) (Robinson, 2004; de Sousa-Shields and King, 2005; 
Brom, 2009). Hereafter, the deposits refer to voluntary deposits, unless otherwise indicated. 
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Shields and Frankiewicz (2004), Muriu (2011) as well as Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer (2012) 
wrote that the interest payable on deposits boosts financial sustainability as it is relatively 
cheaper than the interest payable on commercial and wholesale funds. Thus, deposits form a 
cheap source of finance for microfinance service providers but still, these financial institutions 
have to remain afloat into the future if they are to attract deposits as well as other sources of 
commercial finance. 
Bayai and Ikhide (2016a) affirmed that deposits have become the main source of 
financing for MFIs in all the world’s regions except in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) where there is a heavy reliance on equity funding. On the contrary, Quayes (2012, p. 
3421) argued that “with very few exceptions, a microfinance institution does not rely on 
deposits as its primary source of funds”. Roodman and Quereshi (2006) additionally argued 
that deposits are a preferable funding option for DTMFIs in achieving financial sustainability 
due to the few conditions attached to them; furthermore, they present less managerial stress 
than the wholesale and capital market funds. This realisation has also incited more researchers 
to conclude that deposits are a stable financing option for DTMFIs that strive to be financially 
sustainable (Ledgerwood et al., 2006; Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). However, some 
researchers are opposed to this view as they argue that the high costs of mobilising small 
average deposit balances suppress the financial sustainability of DTMFIs (de Sousa-Shields 
and King, 2005). Deposits are also linked to regulatory costs and deposits must accumulate 
beyond a certain threshold before they can edify financial sustainability (Robinson, 2004; 
Ledgerwood and White, 2006). Furthermore, the study by Brom (2012) revealed that some 
deposit products are volatile as they are highly transitory and often reduce the chances of 
attaining financial sustainability. Nevertheless, de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz (2004) 
cautioned that looking into deposits as a source of funding does not mean that MFIs should 
revoke their traditional sources of funding.  
Ditcher and Harper (2007) estimated that out of the approximately 10 000 MFIs that 
were operational in the year 2007 across the world, only 3 to 5 % had attained full financial 
sustainability. It has also been postulated that MFIs with annual reported losses of 5 % are 
unsustainable (Rosenberg, Gaul, Ford and Timilova, 2013). Despite the commendable growth 
in the deposit volumes in SSA and their advantages, the SSA’s depository microfinance sector 
as a whole is replete with records of DTMFIs that have been ailing and folding as they fall 
21 
 
short in attaining financial sustainability4. Boateng, Nortey, Barnie, Dwumah, Achaemponh 
and Ackom-Sampene (2016) gives an account of 50 financially unsustainable Ghanaian 
DTMFIs that folded in 2013. The situation was acute in the eastern, central and western parts 
of SSA as revealed by the empirical works of Riquet and Poursat (2013). Due to failure to be 
self-sufficient, a number of DTMFIs were placed under curatorship for a while in the LISSA 
countries between the years 2001 and 2011: Benin, 2; Burkina Faso, 1; Mali, 3; Niger, 2 and 
Togo, 3 (Riquet and Poursat, 2013).  
Karim, Hanouch, Ketley and Sibande (2011) also observed that both DTMFIs and 
COMFIs in the southern parts of SSA struggled to achieve financial sustainability between the 
years 2000 and 2010 as their Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) ratio averaged 87.7 %. The 
benchmark OSS is 100 % (Bogan, 2012). One of the most notable cases of the disappearance 
of financially unsustainable microfinance providers amongst the LICs in the southern parts of 
SSA is the Zimbabwe case, where the number of licensed microfinance providers dropped to 
less than 150 in 2013, from a peak of more than 1600 in 2003 (Chikoko and Kwenda, 2013; 
Dube and Matanda, 2015). Thus, the crumbling of DTMFIs is a cause for concern for 
policymakers and the rest of the microfinance stakeholders as the role of the DTMFIs in 
poverty alleviation and embracing financial inclusion of the vast unbanked poor and low-
income households with deposit products and other financial services is continually threatened.  
Another noticeable feature in the depository microfinance sector of SSA is that not only 
do the DTMFIs fall short in long term financial performance by failing to reach the financial 
sustainability mark; they also struggle in recording good short-term financial performance. 
This is the case because the LISSA DTMFIs have been found wanting in meeting withdrawals 
on deposits in full or part and timeously due to lack of operating with adequate levels of 
liquidity. Liquidity reflects the availability of cash to meet the short-term financial obligations 
of the DTMFIs (CGAP, 2009; Wambui and Wanjiru, 2016). Advancing loans and paying 
withdrawals on deposits with interest reflects the demand for liquidity while receiving loan 
repayments with interest and mobilising deposits reflects the supply of liquidity (Miamidian, 
2005; Ogol, 2011; Gietzen, 2017). Thus, despite having deposits as a source of liquidity, 
empirical studies reveal that DTMFIs fail to balance the supply and demand of liquidity (Ogol, 
 
4 This statement does not mean that there are no financial sustainable DTMFIs in SSA as there are some which 
are financial sustainable (Vanroose and D’Espailler, 2013).   
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2011) predominantly when there is panic by depositors to withdraw all their funds (Brom, 
2009; 2012).  
Empirical evidence shows that there have been threats of deposit runs in the depository 
microfinance sector of some SSA countries in the past and current decades as there has been a 
prevalence of records of depositors losing their funds to defaulting and disappearing DTMFIs. 
During the decade 2001 and 2011, 29 DTMFIs in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States 
(CEMAC)5 disappeared with depositors’ funds (Riquet and Poursat, 2013). In these economic 
groupings, many DTMFIs from the LICs such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo, 
sank into oblivion with depositor’s funds. Boateng et al. (2016) provide an account of 50 
defaulting Ghanaian DTMFIs in 2013. This happened because most of the countries in the SSA 
countries are devoid of deposit insurance schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2015; 
Mecagni, Marchettini and Maino, 2015; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016a). The 
situation is worsened by the fact that the protection of microfinance deposits through adherence 
to capital adequacy standards based on the Basel Accords’ recommendations is also very 
minimal in SSA (Mecagni et al., 2015). This further indicates that depositors’ funds in this 
region are highly exposed to liquidity risk. Thus, defaulting DTMFIs and those that have sunk 
into oblivion with deposits from the poor and low-income households make microfinance 
provision to become a poverty perpetuation tool in SSA, especially amongst the LICs. 
It is inevitable to focus on the long-term survival of the DTMFIs as measured by the 
financial sustainability threshold and their short-term financial performance as measured by 
their liquidity positions without focusing on outreach; the poverty alleviation agenda of 
microfinance provision (Guntz, 2011; Amin, Qin, Rauf and Ahmad, 2017; Huq, Azad, Masun, 
Wanke, and Rahman, 2017). Thus, microfinance provision is premised on the ‘double bottom 
line’ approach; financial performance and social performance. Through outreach, MFIs aim to 
provide a wide array of financial services (breadth of outreach) to the poorest folk (depth of 
outreach) (Abera, 2010; Barbosha, 2013). Between 2005 and 2017, DTMFIs in SSA recorded 
commendable outreach statistics mainly through deposit-taking than through microlending. In 
2005, the number of depositors stood at 4 100 000 and has been growing at an alarming rate 
since then till it reached a peak of 26 700 500 in the 2017-2018 fiscal year. It is also worth 
 
5 According to the International Monetary Fund (2016a), the WAEMU states are; Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; and the CEMAC states include; Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad; Congo, Republic of; Equatorial Guinean, Gabon. 
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mentioning that the number of depositors exceeds the number of active borrowers. Lafourcade, 
Isem, Mwangi and Brown (2005, p. 4) dubbed this phenomenon, “the African exception” as 
this feature is not observed in other world’s regions. As mentioned earlier, the deposit volumes 
also exceed the volumes of the gross loan portfolios since the year 2009. (MIX, 2006; 2019). 
Despite these records of impressive outreach statistics, empirical literature reveals that there is 
an on-going and inconclusive debate on the nexus between outreach and financial sustainability 
of MFIs (Abdulai and Tewari, 2017b; Amin et al., 2017; Huq et al., 2017).  
Empirical writers argue that the outreach and financial sustainability nexus exhibits 
relationships that are positive, neutral and negative (Huq et al., 2017). The first group of 
researchers contends that where a positive relationship between outreach and financial 
sustainability exists, it means that intensifying outreach breadth through the provision of a wide 
array of financial products and services to a large number of clientele results in increased 
profitability which boosts financial sustainability (Zerai and Rani, 2013; Chikaza, 2015).  
The second group of researchers is convinced that there is a neutral relationship (no 
trade-off) between outreach and financial sustainability. This group argues that increasing 
outreach to the poorest (depth of outreach) does not impede working towards attaining financial 
sustainability (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Amin et al., 2017). 
However, the third group of researchers argues that serving the poor is costly and this erodes 
profitability. In this case, the outreach-financial sustainability relationship is negative 
suggesting that there exists a trade-off in pursuing financial and social performance goals 
(Hermes, Lensink and Meesters, 2011; Xu, Copestake and Peng, 2016; Huq et al., 2017; 
Reichert, 2018). Therefore, this has prompted MFIs to shift focus from the poorest clients who 
want small average balances of microfinance products and services, which is costly, to the 
better-off poor who want large average balances of microfinance products and services, which 
is less costly and motivated by the need to pursue financial sustainability. This phenomenon is 
called mission drift in microfinance literature (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2007; 
Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011; Hermes et al., 2011; Kar, 2013; Hermes and Hudon, 2018). 
However, Dokulilova et al. (2009, p. 2) disputed that “the poor are viable customers as long as 
their financing is appointed in their right way”.  
It has also been argued that the outreach-financial sustainability relationship varies 
across locations and depends on the variables used to measure outreach (Kipesha and Zhang, 
2013; Yeshi, 2015), model specification (Kipesha and Zhang, 2013) and the goals to be 
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achieved (Churchill and Marr, 2017). In light of the aforementioned arguments, Bayai and 
Ikhide (2016b, p. 285) argued that “the exact nature of trade-offs in microfinance differ across 
regions, but meaningful trade-offs need to be recognised and weighted everywhere”.  
1.2 Low-Income Sub-Saharan Africa: A Brief Overview 
 
The World Bank (2019, p. 43) reported that: 
“…today, the global poverty rate is at its lowest point ever - a testament to the success                             
of development efforts by the international community to end extreme poverty and promote 
shared prosperity. But progress is slowing, with poverty remaining high or even increasing in 
some places, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa”.  
Extreme poverty which is the lack of income and access to life’s basic needs such as 
water, health, education, food, electricity and means of production, is predominant in SSA 
because it has 27 out of 34 of the world’s LICs (World Bank, 2018). According to the 2017 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, LICs have a Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita of US$1 025 or less, using the Atlas calculation methodology. The LISSA countries 
include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros; Congo, 
Democratic Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, The; Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  
The low level of the GNI per capita in the LISSA countries is one of the reasons for the 
high percentage of people that survive on US$1.90 a day (the international poverty line 
according to the World) in LISSA6: Madagascar, 77.8 %; Burundi, 77.7 %; Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 77.1 %; Malawi, 70.9%; and Liberia, 68.6 %. Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix 
(2015) noticed that extreme poverty in the LISSA countries is due to the extremely low 
minimum monthly wages earned by the working population. Data from the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) (2019) reveals that the minimum monthly wages in LISSA ranges 
from as little as US$2 to a maximum of US$148 and the average minimum monthly wage for 
the region is US$537. Furthermore, abject poverty in LISSA is perpetuated by the fact that the 
 
6 The World Bank also classifies all the LISSA countries (excluding Zimbabwe) as Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs) that are eligible for concessional funding from the International Development Association 
(IDA) to help boost economic growth and poverty alleviation programs (refer to Appendix 1). 
7 Burundi and Uganda have the lowest minimum monthly wages while Comoros has the highest.  
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percentage of people living in rural areas in LISSA is also high, at more than 80 % in countries 
such as Burundi, Malawi, Uganda, Gambia, Niger and South Sudan. Moreover, statistics from 
the 2017 Global Findex database reveal that financial access as measured by the average 
percentage of people who have accounts in financial institutions and access to borrowing and 
savings facilities from financial institutions stands at 24.5 %, 7.9 % and 11.1 %, respectively. 
These statistics indicate that a larger part of the LISSA population is financially excluded.  
1.3 Statement of the problem 
 
Attainment of financial sustainability in the depository microfinance sector which 
guarantees its long-term survival has become a cause for concern, especially in Africa where 
the financial sustainability drive is more rampant (Ek, 2011). Several empirical writers have 
argued that deposits are a means of attaining the financial sustainability of DTMFIs as they are 
repayable at a low cost than the alternative sources of finance (Bogan, 2012; Barbosha, 2013; 
Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a). On the contrary, some strands of empirical evidence show that 
several LISSA DTMFIs in Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Democratic Republic; Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger and Togo and in some parts of Southern 
Africa, failed to attain financial sustainability between the years 2001 and 2013 when they 
could leverage on the lowly priced deposit funds (Karim et al., 2011; Riquet and Poursat, 2013; 
Boateng et al., 2016). In Zimbabwe, the microfinance regulators recently placed one DTMFI 
under curatorship due to viability concerns (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), 2020a). 
Following the collapse of MFIs over time, some researchers have reasoned that investors 
should not even attempt to engage in microfinance activities at all than to do so and 
subsequently operate unsustainably (Ditcher and Harper, 2007; Gashayie and Singh, 2015). 
Thus, the failure of the DTMFIs to live long is a problem because it thwarts the financial 
inclusion agenda of increasing financial access to the poor and low-income households through 
deposit products and other micro-financial services. This means that financial sustainability in 
and of itself is not an end; rather it is a means to an end, which is the continual delivery of 
micro-financial services to the poor and the low-income households.  
Prior studies that have attempted to link deposits and financial sustainability found out 
that these variables can yield a positive, negative and neutral relationship (Bogan, 2012; 
Shaoyan and Duwal, 2012; Tehulu, 2013; Gashayie and Singh, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a; 
Mwizarubi, Singh, Mnzvava and Prusty, 2016; Bayai and Ikhide; 2018). However, all these 
studies did not go further to examine why DTMFIs may still fall short in attaining financial 
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sustainability despite having deposits as a readily available and cheap source of financing their 
operations. This is crucial in Low Income Sub-Saharan Africa where the DTMFIs are expected 
to be viable institutions that are indefinite tools for eradicating extreme poverty. Moreover, a 
study of this kind also entices the depository microfinance stakeholders to devise strategies or 
mechanisms of treating the problems inherent with the disappearance of financial unsustainable 
DTMFIs.  
The drive towards the attainment of financial sustainability which looks at the long-
term financial performance of the LISSA DTMFIs is not complete without examining the short-
term financial performance of these financial service providers. This brings to question, the 
liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs. Operating with adequate liquidity levels has also become a 
challenge for the LISSA DTMFIs. Riquet and Poursat (2013) provide an account of LISSA 
DTMFIs that discontinued operations due to failure to meet their liquidity demands in the form 
of withdrawals on deposits, the interest on deposits and lines of credit between the years 2001 
and 2011. In 2013, Boateng et al. (2016) recorded an account of 50 Ghanaian DTMFIs that 
folded and failed to honour their obligations to microdepositors. Thus, some LISSA DTMFIs 
have sunk into oblivion with depositors’ funds. The failure of DTMFIs to be liquid is a problem 
as it has dire consequences such as contagion risk due to the sudden and unexpected deposit 
runs; oblivion of depositors’ funds which further condemns the small savers into extreme 
poverty levels; and systemic risk as the whole financial sector is disturbed by the loss of 
depositors’ confidence. In the WAEMU and the CEMAC states, the DTMFIs were placed 
under Target Government Administration (TGA) which was a 6 to 12 months supervisory tool 
for managing and bailing out illiquid DTMFIs (Riquet and Poursat, 2013). However, the TGA 
was a short-term solution for managing DTMFIs with liquidity problems and the TGA did not 
provide for the repayment of depositors’ funds from the failed institutions nor guarantee the 
safety of the existing and future deposits. A long-term solution therefore is required as the 
safety of the depositors’ funds is crucial for the soundness and safety of the entire financial 
system. Previous empirical studies that have looked at the liquidity of DTMFIs in SSA did not 
consider deposit insurance as one of the plausible solutions (Mata, 2011; Kimathi, Mugo, Njeje 
and Otieno, 2015; Bichanga, 2016; Mamathi, Aguma and Mwirigi, 2017; Maxwell, Lakshmi, 
Singh, Boohene and Aboagye, 2018). Therefore, examining the relevance of deposit insurance 
schemes in the management of the liquidity of LISSA DTMFIs is of paramount importance as 
it helps to mitigate the risk of sudden and unexpected runs on deposits in the depository 
microfinance sector.  
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Focusing on the financial performance of the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector 
through examining their liquidity and financial positions is not complete without looking at 
their outreach because the DTMFIs are double bottom-line institutions that have to pursue both 
financial performance and social performance objectives concurrently. However, the 
attainment of the double bottom-line objectives of microfinance provision concurrently has 
sparked a debate amongst different microfinance stakeholders across the LISSA countries and 
across the world on which objective to prioritise; financial sustainability or outreach (Huq et 
al., 2017). Upholding financial sustainability over outreach enables the MFIs to exist 
continually since its profitable while pursuing outreach as the primary goal enables the MFIs 
to reach out to the poorest populations (outreach depth) with a wide array of financial services 
(outreach breadth). The problem is that deepening outreach is costly as most of the poorest 
populations reside in inconvenient or scattered rural locations, and broadening the spectrum of 
financial services does not always result in gains in economies of scale thereby choking 
financial sustainability (WDIs, 2017; Zacharias, 2008). This prompts the MFIs to prioritise 
financial sustainability but it has been argued that this leads to mission drift; the shift of focus 
from the pro-poor clientele who consume financial products of small average balances to the 
better-off poor clientele who prefer large average balances (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011).  
Researchers and other stakeholders in the field have tried to find the optimal point 
where both outreach and financial sustainability can be achieved concurrently without any 
counter harm. This has resulted in some stakeholders to argue that there exists a trade-off in 
the attainment of the double bottom line objectives (Hermes et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2016; Huq 
et al., 2017; Reichert, 2018) though some have argued that there is no trade-off (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Churchill and Marr (2017) noted that trade-offs 
exist but their severity depends on the location studied. Accordingly, Bayai and Ikhide (2016b, 
p. 285) reiterate that “the exact nature of trade-offs in microfinance differ across regions, but 
meaningful trade-offs need to be recognised and weighted everywhere”.  
In light of the aforementioned arguments, additional research is thus required as the 
outreach-financial sustainability schism is still on-going and inconclusive. The conclusions that 
have been reached so far on the nexus between outreach and financial sustainability were based 
on studies that focussed on the microcredit arm of microfinance provision. Scanty or no 
literature exists on the outreach-financial sustainability nexus on the deposit-taking arm of 
microfinance provision. Thus, it is not clear as yet on whether the pursuit of financial 
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sustainability by the MFIs that mobilise deposits has led them to drift from their original 
mandate of serving the poorest populations to serving the wealthier clientele or an outreach-
financial sustainability trade-off exists in increasing financial access through deposits. 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
 
This study aimed to analyse the performance of DTMFIs operating in the LISSA 
countries using three measures of performance; financial sustainability, liquidity and outreach. 
From this aim, three study objectives were derived, namely to: 
1.4.1 Understand why the depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries falls short in 
attaining financial sustainability? 
1.4.2 Assess the relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance in the depository 
microfinance sector of the LISSA countries. 
1.4.3 Examine whether there is any evidence of mission drift or a trade-off in the LISSA’s 
depository microfinance sector in the pursuit of outreach and financial sustainability goals. 
1.5 Research questions 
 
From the three study objectives outlined above, three research questions were asked in 
this study: 
1.5.1 Why does the depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries fall short in 
attaining financial sustainability? 
1.5.2 What is the relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance in the depository 
microfinance sector of the LISSA countries? 
1.5.3 Is there any evidence of an outreach-financial sustainability trade-off or mission drift in 
the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector? 
1.6 Scope and Significance of the Study 
This study analysed the performance of 64 LISSA DTMFIs based on an unbalanced 
panel dataset for the years 2006 to 2017 that was extracted from the MIX database. The 
sampled DTMFIs were drawn from the LICs of SSA based on the statistics from the World 
Bank which show that extreme poverty is on the rise in these countries. Therefore, 
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microfinance provision is much needed in the LISSA countries to fast track the lives of many 
people out of extreme poverty through financial access. However, this thrust is only possible 
if the providers of microfinance products and services live long by achieving and surpassing 
the financial sustainability threshold. As indicated earlier, DTMFIs in the LISSA countries fall 
short in attaining financial sustainability despite having large volumes of deposit finance. 
Therefore, venturing into this virgin research area will inform the LISSA depository 
microfinance managers on how to devise strategies or mechanisms of treating the problems 
that cripple their ability to attain financial sustainability.  
The liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs and the insurance of deposits they mobilise also 
have to be accounted for because some of these institutions have gone down the drain with 
depositors’ funds and this problem has not been investigated in empirical studies. Therefore, 
this study is hoped to provide light to the managers, regulators and supervisors of DTMFIs on 
the importance of having custom made deposit insurance packages that curb panic and 
unanticipated withdrawals on deposits. In turn, the liquidity levels of the DTMFIs would be 
preserved or improved to sufficient levels that will enable them to meet their demands for 
liquidity with ease. It is also anticipated that depositor confidence will be boosted and 
downstream effects will be felt in the entire financial system since there are financial linkages 
between the microfinance sector and the conventional banking sector. 
As noted in the background of this study, there is an on-going debate and inconclusive 
evidence on the relationship between outreach and financial sustainability. While the outreach-
financial sustainability relationship has always been told from a microlending perspective using 
lending outreach variables, this study takes a different dimension and examines the outreach-
financial sustainability relationship from a deposit-taking perspective using deposit outreach 
variables. This study is therefore hoped to provide an insight on the extent to which the 
depository microfinance sector in the LISSA region can work towards building sustainable and 
inclusive financial systems in the perpetual fight against poverty and financial exclusion using 
deposits. The results obtained are hoped to benefit the DTMFIs’ managers; national, regional 
and international policy makers on how to balance social performance goals and financial 
performance goals. 
The theoretical significance of the study lies in the strength of the adopted theories in 
explaining the interrelationships and determinants of the main variables of this study which are 
financial sustainability, liquidity and outreach. 
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1.7 Organisation of the Study 
 
This study is organised into six chapters. Chapter one is the introductory chapter which 
outlines the background information, the problem statement that motivated the research, the 
research objectives and questions, the scope and significance of the study, how the study is 
organised and lastly, the limitations of the study.  
Chapter two is an overview of the LISSA countries and the justification for the 
existence of the microfinance sector in these countries based on selected macroeconomic 
indicators. Chapter two also discusses the concepts of financial sustainability, liquidity and 
outreach. The chapter also provides a conceptual background of deposits held by DTMFIs and 
the concept of deposit insurance.  
Chapter three provides the literature review which is categorised into three sections in 
line with the three objectives of the study. In each section, there is a theoretical literature review 
followed by the empirical literature review. The chapter then highlights the conceptual 
framework for the study that is drawn from the critical synthesis of the literature reviewed.  
Chapter four focussed on the research methodology which is categorised into three 
sections in line with the objectives of the study. Each section has the following components; a 
description of the data used and the sources of data, the variables incorporated in the empirical 
models and the justifications of why they were used, the econometric model used and the 
specification of the empirical model adopted. Each objective is answered using its own 
econometric method. 
Chapter five is a presentation and analysis of the results of the three objectives or 
research questions of the study.  
Chapter six terminates the study by drawing and consolidating conclusions from the 
findings presented in Chapter five. This chapter also provides a highlight on the originality and 
contribution of the present study. The recommendations to different microfinance stakeholders 
as a way of addressing their requirements in the provision of microfinance products and 
services are also presented in this chapter. The limitations of this study and areas of further 
research are also highlighted in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
MICROFINANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW-INCOME SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The microfinance sector in the LISSA countries is made up of formal and informal 
institutional networks that facilitate mobilisation of deposits or savings, loan disbursements 
and other micro-financial services. Therefore, this chapter aims to provide historical 
background on the evolution and role of microfinance provision in the LISSA countries. The 
chapter also focuses on the economic performance or growth of the LISSA countries in light 
of microfinance provision; followed by discussions on deposits and the concepts of financial 
sustainability, liquidity, deposit insurance, outreach, mission drift and trade-off. 
2.2 Evolution and Role of Microfinance in Low-Income Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Microfinance provision can be traced back to the 1970s when there was rampant 
evolution of MFIs in Asia (Cull et al., 2009a). Professor Muhammed Yunus pioneered the first 
microfinance model in Bangladesh by disbursing a collateral free loan of $27 to a group of 42 
poor village women who used the credit line to finance their business projects. The loan 
repayment was successful, with a 100 % compliance and since then, microfinance provision in 
the form of village banks or the Grameen model spilled over to Latin America, SSA and other 
world’s regions. This led to the emergence of MFIs which were mainly credit focussed 
targeting women, the poorest and the rural populations through solidarity lending as they were 
deemed uncreditworthy in the conventional banking system (Helmore, Chidiac and Hendricks, 
2009). In Africa, the village banking model, a form of microfinance, was first replicated in 
Kenya through an institution called K-REP and the other pioneer MFIs were mainly the rural 
and postal savings such as the Tanzania Postal Bank and the Post Office Savings Bank in 
Zimbabwe (Basu, Blavy and Yulex, 2004). However, informal mechanisms for loans and 
savings also existed alongside such as the Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
which were also called “susu” in Ghana, “mukando” in Zimbabwe, “banquiers ambulants” in 
Benin and “tontines” in Cameroon. Some informal microfinance networks still exist today and 
are being integrated into the main financial sector such as the “stokvels” of South Africa. 
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In early 1970s, semi-formal microfinance providers such as the Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Organisations (SACCOs) also emerged from the credit systems cooperatives that 
were involved amongst coffee cash crop farmers in Kenya and Tanzania.  Between 1975 and 
1985-90, semi-formal microfinance providers existed in the form of savings and credit 
cooperatives (“coopératives d’épagne et de crédit”) in the both the rural and urban areas of 
some Eastern and Western African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo) and were 
generally referred to as “COOPECs” (Chao-Béroff et al., 2000).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the microfinance sector in the LISSA countries saw the 
proliferation of Non-Governmental Organisations such as PRIDE and 3AE in Guinea; PADME 
and PAPME in Benin, amongst others (MIX, 2006; International Trade Centre (ITC), 2011). 
However, these institutions were mainly donor or government funded and this form of 
financing has not been sustainable for the continued existence of the MFIs as it has been 
dwindling over the years. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
infiltrated the microfinance sector and some Non-Governmental Organisations were 
transformed into Non-Bank Financial Institutions in search of profitability. Another 
developmental feature in the evolution of the microfinance sector in LISSA in the 1990s was 
that there was a sub-regional concentration of MFIs; cooperatives in Western Africa, Non-
Bank Financial Institutions in Eastern Africa, Non-Governmental Organisations and banks in 
Southern Africa and Central Africa (MIX, 2006; Bertrand, 2011; United Nations, 2013). The 
development of microfinance in Eastern Africa can be classified as an outlier because of the 
telecommunications revolutions in Kenya that enabled the quick widespread of provision of 
microfinancial services through mobile phone platforms across the subregion (refer to section 
2.2.ii). At the dawn of the 2000s, there was a paradigm shift of focus from microcredit to 
deposit mobilisation which resulted in the number of depositors exceeding the number of active 
borrowers. This was a direct result of extensive licencing of COMFIs into DTMFIs especially 
in the WAEMU and CEMAC economic blocks.  
In 2005, 26 Greenfield MFIs8 penetrated the microfinance sector in Africa thereby 
changing the sector’s landscape in terms of financial performance, growth and outreach 
through retail banking services and extensive coverage (Cull, Harten, Nishida and Bull, 2014). 
According to Horizon Africa Capital (2017) as well as Chikalipah (2018), the microfinance 
 
8 Greenfield MFIs are “institutions that are created without any pre-existing organisation” (Cull et al., 2014, p. 2). 
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sector in the LISSA countries and the rest of Africa has been growing commendably since then 
at approximately 10 % per annum. The contributing factors for this growth include, inter alia; 
downscaling of commercial banks into microfinance provision (Lafourcade et al., 2005; Al-
Azzam, Mimouni and Ali, 2012; Bangoura, 2012), growth of mobile financial services (IMF, 
2016b), involvement of the national governments in the microfinance sector (CGAP, 2012) 
and economic growth (Borjesson and Hulten, 2016). However, Chikalipah (2017) observed 
that the growth and performance of MFIs in the LISSA countries is stifled by its weak 
institutional environments, so regulation became inevitable. National microfinance policies 
have been drafted and put in place across several LISSA countries (MIX and CGAP, 2008).   
The MFIs in the WAEMU economic cluster are mainly regulated by the PARMEC law 
which was issued in the 1990s whilst the microfinance sector in other LISSA countries is 
regulated through acts of parliament that govern the operations of banking institutions. In 2009, 
Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) entered LISSA providing funding to the 
microfinance sector following the souring of liquidity in both MFIs and the banking sector after 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 (refer to Figure 2.11). Between 2010 and 2019, 
advances in information and technology brought revolutionary changes in the LISSA 
countries’ microfinance sector through the adoption of financial technology (FinTech) in the 
delivery of micro-financial products and services.  FinTech is helping the MFIs to leverage on 
mobile money platforms and the internet to intensify cost efficient outreach efforts by offering 
a wide variety of financial services such as money transfers, micro-insurance, microleasing, 
diaspora remittances and foreign exchange transactions (besides deposits and loans) to urban, 
rural and marginalised populations. Having this background on the evolution of the 
microfinance sector in LISSA countries in mind, the following paragraphs discuss the roles of 
microfinance in LISSA which, inter alia, include: poverty reduction, financial inclusion and 
women empowerment. 
i. Poverty Reduction 
The percentages of people that survive on less than US$1.90 a day are very high amongst 
the LISSA countries as shown in Figure 2.1. Countries such as Burundi, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Madagascar and Malawi have percentages which are 70 % and above. The high 
poverty rates in the LISSA countries are attributed to a plethora of macroeconomic factors that, 
inter alia, include: low GDP, high unemployment, limited financial access, high levels of 
inflation, high levels of public debt and negative current account balances (Bayai, 2017). 
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Furthermore, Abdulai (2017) noted that high levels of poverty in African countries are due to 
unfavourable business environments which result in low economic activity and ultimately 
choking economic growth which is one of the positive drivers of poverty alleviation measures. 
Comoros and Zimbabwe have low percentages of people surviving below the international 
poverty line as a result of experiencing economic growth (Nguyen, Dridi, Unsal and Willians, 
2015). According to the World Bank (2017), the global rate of extreme poverty declined from 
34.8 % in 1990 to 10.7 % in 2013 but extreme poverty is still very high in SSA particularly in 
the LICs due to rapid population growth. In 1990, the extreme poverty rate stood at 54.8 % and 
in 2013 it stood at 41 %. This statistic reflects that the African continent lagged behind in 
attaining one of the Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) of the United Nations of halving 
the extreme poverty rate by the year 2015 (United Nations, 2015).  
Figure 2.1: Percentage population living below $1.90 a day in the LISSA countries 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the World Development Indicators9 
The World Bank is optimistic that the extreme poverty rates in the LISSA countries 
will continue in double-digit figures by the year 2030 indicating that robust measures have to 
be taken to eradicate extreme poverty in these countries. Therefore, microfinance provision 
was incorporated in the SDGs as the primary solution to eradicate extreme poverty in LICs. 
 
9 The LISSA countries and their abbreviations are as follows: Benin-BEN, Burkina Faso-BFA, Burundi-BDI, 
Central African Republic-CAF, Chad-TCD, Comoros-COM, Congo, Democratic Republic-ZAR, Eritrea-ERI, 
Ethiopia-ETH, Gambia, The-GAM, Guinea-GIN, Guinea-Bissau-GNB, Liberia-LBR, Madagascar-MOZ, Niger- 
NER, Rwanda-RWA, Senegal-SEN, Sierra-Leone-SLE, Somalia-SOM, Tanzania-TZA, Togo-TGO, Uganda-
UGA, Zimbabwe-ZWE. 
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The study of Van Rooyen, Steward and De Wet (2012) presented that over time, the impact of 
microfinance in SSA through the provision of microcredit and savings has produced positive 
impacts on the economic and social welfare of the urban and rural poor and low-income 
households thereby lessening the rate of poverty throughout the region. According to Hermes 
(2014), microfinance provision has also led to the reduction of income inequalities between the 
rich and the poor.  
Despite the significant role that microfinance provision has played in the fight against 
poverty, the United Nations (2013, p. 6) stated that:  
     “microfinance on its own is not a miracle solution to eradicate extreme poverty. …     
       microfinance can deliver positive effects only when it is combined holistically  
       and integrated effectively with other economic and social programmes to meet  
       the diverse needs of the poor and help them form poverty”.  
Several complementary policies and strategies therefore have also been adopted in the 
past decades to fight extreme poverty in the LISSA countries although the problem of extreme 
poverty persists. According to Handley, Higgins, Sharma, Bird and Cammack (2009), United 
Nations Report (2019) as well as the World Bank (2019a), the combined effect of different 
strategies and measures for alleviating poverty such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s, Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs), Development Aid and 
the MDGs; led to the reduction of extreme poverty levels from 1.9 billion people in 1990 to 
836 million people in 2015. This statistic shows that the fight against extreme poverty is a 
never-ending upward path as long as most of the residents in the LISSA countries still survive 
on less than US$1.90 a day. In considering the aforementioned poverty reduction tools, 
Musanganya, Nyinawumuntu and Nyirahogenima (2017, p. 81) argued that microfinance 
provision stands foremost as the “staple tool” for uprooting abject poverty in LISSA. 
Nonetheless, microfinance provision is not only a tool for poverty reduction but is also a tool 
for financial inclusion of the poor and low-income people which is discussed next.  
ii. Financial Inclusion 
The provision of microfinance has also played a pivotal role in promoting financial 
inclusion in the LISSA countries and other parts of the globe. According to Tita and Aziakpono 
(2017), financial inclusion ensures that financial institutions make financial products and 
services available and accessible to all people regardless of their level of income, gender and 
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location at an affordable cost. In assessing the levels of financial inclusion in the LISSA 
countries under study, financial inclusion was defined using the standard Global Findex 
Database measure, which is, the percentage of people who have access to financial services 
(savings or borrowings) from formal financial institutions (Demirgüç-Kunt, Leora, Dorothe, 
Saniya and Jake, 2018). Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the percentages of people who had 
financial access in the LISSA countries in 2014 and 2017. Figure 2.2 illustrates financial 
inclusion to be measured as the percentage of adults who saved in financial institutions. The 
statistics indicate that the percentage of adults who saved in financial institutions in the LISSA 
countries in 2014 and 2017 was extremely low, as more than 50 % of the LISSA population 
resides in the rural and marginalised areas which are beyond the reach of commercial banks.  
Figure 2.2: Percentage of adults (15+ years) who saved at a financial institution in 2014 
and 2017  
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Global Findex Database 
In 2014, the average percentage of people who saved at a financial institution across 
the LISSA countries as a whole was extremely low and averaged 6.6 %. In 2017, the average 
percentage for all the countries increased slightly to 8.8 %. Rwanda, Ethiopia and Uganda 
contributed more to the regional average as these countries recorded high percentages of people 
who saved in financial institutions in the year 2017. The slight increase in the percentage of 
savers between 2014 and 2017 is attributed to the development of banking or financial systems 
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across Africa (Bayai, 2017). Another contributing factor is the increase in financial literacy 
programs conducted mostly by MFIs to financially excluded populations which create 
awareness on the use of formal savings facilities for the poor and low-income households 
(Ndlovu, 2017). Access to formal savings facilities enables the poor and the low-income 
earners to smoothen their consumption patterns, be proactive in emergency situations, and to 
meet large expenditures such as paying dowry, wedding preparations and tertiary education. 
However, the 2017 regional average for the percentage of people who deposited their excess 
funds with financial institutions was pulled down by decreases recorded in Rwanda, Senegal, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Furthermore, Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique and 
South Sudan had the least percentages of people who saved in financial institutions.  
Figure 2.3 illustrates financial access in LISSA countries in terms of borrowing from a 
financial institution for two comparative years, 2014 and 2017.  
Figure 2.3: Percentage of adults (15+ years) who borrowed from a financial institution in 
2014 and 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Global Findex Database 
Figure 2.3 illustrates that there is a financial inclusion gap in the lines of credit that are 
advanced to the residents of the LISSA countries as the percentages of adults who borrowed 
from financial institutions in 2014 and 2017 were extremely low. On average, approximately 
4.2 % and 7.2 % of the population aged 15+ in the LISSA countries managed to borrow from 
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a financial institution in 2014 and 2017, respectively. These statistics though extremely low, 
indicate an upward trend in the uptake of credit facilities. On the country level, almost all the 
countries recorded increases in the percentage of people who borrowed from financial 
institutions between 2014 and 2017 except for Rwanda and Uganda. This means that there was 
an improvement in the number of people that were financed by financial institutions. The study 
by Van Rooyen et al. (2012) demonstrated how access to credit facilities from MFIs has 
benefited vulnerable populations across African countries over time (refer to Section 2.2.i.). 
The decline in the formal borrowing trends in 2017 for Rwanda and Uganda was due to the 
high rate of borrowing from family or friends which stood at 42.9 % and 46.5 %, respectively 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018).   
When the borrowing trends are compared with saving trends, the statistics show that 
the LISSA population saves more than it borrows, a phenomenon that Lafourcade et al. (2005) 
called the “African exception”. This phenomenon is driven by factors such as central bank 
regulations that require DTMFIs to hold a larger percentage of their deposits as fractional 
reserves instead of intermediating them and that African MFIs have traditionally focussed on 
deposit products and services to encourage savings (Lafourcade et al., 2005). This shows that 
a lot of work has to be done on the borrowing front to improve the current levels of financial 
access through loans. Microfinance regulators have, therefore, drafted national financial 
inclusion strategies that encourage the MFIs to play a significant role in increasing financial 
access in the LISSA countries as they are characterised by populations that are shunned by 
commercial banks due to their inaccessibility and lack of physical collateral security. Thus, 
inclusive MFIs are envisaged to uplift the economic lives of the poor and low-income 
households by enabling them to deposit their savings, access lines of credit, transfer funds and 
gain financial literacy (IMF, 2016b).  
Advances in information and communication technologies are the driving forces which 
push the LISSA MFIs to be key players in the financial inclusion agenda.  Innovations in the 
use of mobile phones for financial transactions has enabled the LISSA MFIs to reach out to 
their target clientele in urban, rural and marginalised areas particularly in Eastern Africa by 
replicating the Kenyan’ M-Pesa, M-Shwari and M-Kopa mobile phone platforms. As a result, 
data from the Global Findex database shows that there was an increase in the percentage of 
people that used mobile money accounts between 2014 and 2017 in the LISSA countries. In 
Tanzania, M-Pawa, which was established in 2014, led to the creation of approximately 5 
million accounts in 2016 and loans worth US$22 million were disbursed (GSMA, 2016). 
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According to the United Nations (2013), the mobile network operators are influencing the 
development of branchless banking in different parts of Africa. These include the notable M-
PESA an affiliate of Vodaphone in Kenya, Orange Money in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Mali, 
MTN Mobile in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin and Zain Zap in Burundi. Besides poverty 
reduction and financial inclusion, the provision of microfinance is also a means to empower 
women in LISSA.  
iii. Women Empowerment 
The fifth Sustainable Development Goal of the United Nations aims to achieve gender 
equality and to empower all women and girls. According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (2018), the opportunities for work for women are less than those for men 
throughout the world and low female labour force participation rates leave many women 
vulnerable to poverty. In the same vein, the Women Thrive Worldwide (2018) estimated that 
in countries such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the poverty rate for women ranges 
between 48 and 65 per-cent and therefore concluded that, “poverty is gendered” across the 
LISSA countries. Hence, MFIs in the LISSA countries are vehicles that empower women 
through financial access following the success of the pioneer microfinance programs such as 
the Grameen model which mainly focused on lending to women. According to Van Rooyen et 
al. (2012), disbursement of microcredit coupled with training in microenterprise skills and 
business counselling to a group of men and women has led to the empowerment of women to 
improve their livelihoods in rural Uganda. In 2018, the Zimbabwean government established 
the Zimbabwe Women Microfinance Bank as a means to empower poor women through 
microfinance provision. 
Microfinance provision is one of the key players in women empowerment due to several 
reasons. Firstly, women are more prone to suffering from life’s unwanted misfortunes than 
men, therefore financial access enables them to fast track their lives out of such undesirables 
(Marr and Awaworyi, 2012). Secondly, focus on women than men in the provision of 
microfinance is part of the growing movement of increasing women's emancipation and gender 
equity. In many traditional African societies, women are unemployed, always at home and do 
not own assets that are considered bankable. Assets that are considered bankable are not 
registered in the names of women but the names of their husbands in most cases, indicating 
that it is difficult for them to access loans. Thirdly, women are more likely to use the loans that 
have been disbursed to them productively than men. Men are more prone to drunkenness and 
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other forms of abusing loaned funds whereas women are more likely to use the loans obtained 
to cater for the essentials of their families. Fourthly, credit risk management in both the banking 
and microfinance sectors has shown that women are more trustworthy clients in repaying loans 
than men, and this results in risk reduction, spurring liquidity and financial sustainability (Janda 
and Zetek, 2014).  
Having outlined the role of microfinance provision in LISSA, a discussion on the 
macroeconomic fundamentals that have a bearing on the operations of the LISSA’s 
microfinance sector in attaining financial sustainability, operating with adequate levels of 
liquidity and expanding outreach to the poorest in their large numbers through an array of 
financial services is important.  
2.3 LISSA Economic Performance in Light of Microfinance  
 
The success of the LISSA DTMFIs in terms of financial sustainability, liquidity and 
outreach and ultimately, poverty alleviation, is not only hinged on their ability to control their 
internal environment but also on stable macroeconomic conditions (Xu et al., 2016; Caro, 
2017; Churchill, 2019; Inekwe, 2019). In this realm, this section discusses the macroeconomic 
performance of the LISSA countries in light of the role and growth of the microfinance sector 
based on four macroeconomic fundamentals; real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, 
inflation rate, domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of the GDP and the level of 
informality.  
2.3.1 Growth 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has been growing between 1990 and 2015, and growth 
has made the region to be integrated into the global economy and growth also catalyses poverty 
reduction schemes (Nguyen et al., 2015). However, at a country level, growth in the real GDP 
has not been uniform across the SSA countries (Ndoricimpa, 2017). The average real GDP 
growth rate in the LISSA countries has been sluggish and fluctuating between 2006 and 2018 
as indicated in Figure 2.4 thereby shrinking the progress towards poverty alleviation 
(Broadberry and Gardener, 2019), albeit rapid population growth (WDIs, 2017). 
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Figure 2.4: Average annual Real Gross Domestic Product percentage growth rate for the 
LISSA countries for the years 2006 to 2018 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the World Development Indicators 
In the fiscal year 2006-7, the real GDP growth rate increased from 4.4 % to 4.9 % but 
there was a significant drop in 2008 due to the economic shocks of the global financial crisis 
(Zyuulu, 2010). Thereafter, there was a sharp revamp of the real GDP growth rate to a record 
high of 6.3 % in 2010 as the effects of the global financial crisis were levelling off and the 
increase in the level of foreign direct investments which was channelled into productive sectors 
(Iossifov and Khamis, 2009; Kamara, 2014). Between 2011 and 2015, the fall in the real GDP 
growth rate in LISSA was due to downward movements in commodity prices most particularly 
oil prices and the prevalence of drought in some parts of the region for some years (Horizon 
Africa Capital, 2017).  
Improvements in commodity prices and increasing financial depth contributed to the 
upward movements of the real GDP growth rate in LISSA between 2016 and 2018 (IMF, 
2016b; Mahonye, Marko and Anim, 2016; AfDB, 2018). Despite being slow, growth in the 
LISSA countries has produced spillover effects into the microfinance sector hence putting a 
check on growing poverty levels (Ikhide, 2015). Some DTMFIs have up-scaled their operations 
and have become fully-fledged commercial banks, for instance, two banking institutions in 
Uganda have their roots in microfinance. As a result of growth, the uptake of microloans has 
increased as the MSMEs require financing for boosting their operations to meet the growing 
demand for their products and services. Growth in the volume of the loan portfolio results in 
increased interest income thereby boosting financing sustainability (Imai, Gaiha, Thapa, 
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Annim and Gupta, 2011). However, growing loan portfolios may lead to larger loan balances 
which have been criticised as the drivers of mission drift (Ahlin et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2016). 
However, where growth has been moderate or negative due to unstable macroeconomic 
conditions, it has been blamed for stifling microfinance operations by dwindling sources of 
finance which cripple liquidity and the continued existence of the sector in putting a check on 
poverty (Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). Also, growth decline causes repayment 
problems as the borrowers withhold payments trying to cope with the increased cost of living 
(Janda and Zetek, 2014).  
2.3.2 Inflation 
The rate of inflation is also another macroeconomic variable that has an impact on the 
stability of the economic environment, business operations and ultimately the poor and low-
income households in the LISSA countries. Figure 2.5 shows the average inflation rate 
(measured using the Consumer Price Index (CPI)) for the LISSA countries between 2006 and 
2018.  
Figure 2.5: Average Inflation Rate for the LISSA countries for the years 2006 to 2018 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the World Development Indicators 
As Figure 2.5 above shows, between 2006 and 2013, the average inflation rate10 for the 
LISSA countries was fluctuating as a single-digit figure and was extremely low in 2006, 2009, 
2010 and 2013, not exceeding 6 %, indicating that it was enhancing growth (Ndoricimpa, 
 
10 The average inflation rate excluded Zimbabwe during its hyperinflationary years, 2006 to 2009. 
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2017). One of the reasons for the single-digit average inflation figure is that some of the LISSA 
countries in Central Africa and Western Africa belong to the CFA Franc common monetary 
area11 (see Figure 2.6) where the Franc is pegged against the Euro through a fixed exchange 
rate regime so as to insulate it from inflationary pressures. The sharp increase in the average 
inflation rate between 2014 and 2016 in the LISSA countries was ignited by the rise in the 
prices of basic food commodities which were very high, volatile and persistent due to 
“incomplete pass-through from world food and fuel prices and exchange rates to domestic food 
prices” (Alper, Hobdari and Uppal, 2016, p. 2). Furthermore, the sustained rise in food prices 
was caused by the occurrence of drought in East Africa in 2015 and 2016 (African 
Development Bank (AfDB), 2018). Similarly, commodity price shocks in oil-exporting 
countries such as Chad and South Sudan, exchange rate depreciations and widening fiscal 
deficits contributed to the sharp rise in the inflation rate to a double-digit figure of 18.2 % in 
2016. 
In 2017, the average inflation rate dropped sharply to 10.6 % and there was a further 
sharp drop to a single-digit figure of 3 % in 2018 as there was a marked improvement in 
harvests and commodity prices coupled with narrowing fiscal deficits. Thus, inflation has been 
a setback on the economic growth of the LISSA countries over time, especially where it has 
been above the threshold levels such as in the year 2016 thereby exerting pressure on the 
monetary authorities to put a check on the general price level (Ndoricimpa, 2017). Furthermore, 
inflation is a drawback on reducing poverty through microfinance provision as it leads to a 
reduction in the volumes of deposits and gross loan portfolios implying that inflation stifles 
outreach of the LISSA DTMFIs (Donou-Adonsou and Sylvester, 2016; Yimga, 2016).   
During episodes of high inflation, deposits in the LISSA DTMFIs tend to be short-lived 
due to fear of loss in the purchasing power of money if they are withdrawn later thereby 
increasing the risk of early withdrawals which spiral deposit runs. Thus, inflation threatens the 
liquidity positions of the LISSA DTMFIs and also causes difficulties in loan collections as the 
borrowers deliberately delay in making payments. Intuitively, delayed payments also translate 
into high portfolio at risk ratios and high loan loss provisions meaning that profitability is 
eroded thereby reducing financial sustainability. Nevertheless, high inflation rates prompt the 
 
11 The CFA Franc zone includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
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providers of microfinance to charge high lending rates which increase interest income for 
boosting profitability (Janda and Zetek, 2014) but profitability is eroded by the rising 
operational costs in so doing choking financial sustainability.  
Figure 2.6: Median Inflation Rates in Africa and its Sub-regions between 2009 and 2019 
 
Source: Adapted from African Development Bank (2018, p. 15) 
2.3.3 Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
The private sector is important in driving economic activities that result in economic 
growth in the LISSA countries (AfDB, 2018). In this realm, private sector credit12 by domestic 
banking institutions is required to finance producers so as to enable them to even out the supply 
of goods and services which are needed for the well-being of economic agents. Figure 2.7 
below shows the level of domestic bank credit to the private sector as a proportion of the GDP 
between 2006 and 2017 for the LISSA countries. 
 
 
 
12 Private sector credit refers to financial resources or payable claims such as loans, non-equity securities 
purchases, trade-credits and other accounts receivables to the private sector (Mahonye et al., 2016).  
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Figure 2.7: Domestic Credit to the Private Sector by Banks as a percentage of the GDP 
for the LISSA countries for the years 2006 to 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the World Development Indicators 
The average percentage of domestic credit to the private sector increased steadily from 
8.3 % in 2006 to 14.4 % in 2017 indicating that financial development has been deepening in 
the LISSA countries but at a slower rate when compared to other world’s regions (Ikhide, 2015; 
IMF, 2016b, Nguena et al., 2016). The full potential of commercial banks to finance the private 
sector was pulled down by growing public debt holdings in banking institutions across all the 
African countries especially in Ghana, Niger, Tanzania and Zambia between 2014 and 2018. 
According to the European Investment Bank (2018), public debt holdings of African banking 
institutions stood at 8 % in 2008 and increased to 12 % in 2017. Furthermore, public debt 
constituted 19 % of the banks’ assets in 2017 as compared to 14 % in 2008 as shown in Figure 
2.8 below.  
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Figure 2.8: Public Debt Holdings of Banks in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Adapted from European Investment Bank (2018, p. 169) 
Public debt is on the rise due to the high interest revenue earned on the sovereign paper 
which is attractive to domestic banking institutions and the limited presence of liquid bond 
markets in Africa (Bayai, 2017; European Investment Bank, 2018). Also, the banking 
institutions themselves now prefer to lend to the public sector than the private sector due to 
lack of adequate credit risk management infrastructure such as Credit Reference Bureaus in 
most of the LISSA countries in order to help them in assessing the risk profiles of the private 
sector deficit units. This has caused information asymmetry problems making enforcement of 
credit contracts to the private sector very difficult (IMF, 2016b).  
Lending less to the private sector makes the LISSA banking institutions thwart the 
output from productive sectors such as the MSMEs thereby choking economic growth. In turn, 
the incomes of the poor and micro-entrepreneurs remain stagnant making it difficult for them 
to survive above the poverty datum line. Thus, low levels of domestic credit to the private 
sector in the LISSA countries have paved way for the MFIs to chip in and satisfy the unmet 
demand for loans for the poor households and the owners of MSMEs thereby leading to the 
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increase in the gross loan portfolio which earns interest income that boosts profitability and 
ultimately, financial sustainability (Janda and Zetek, 2014; Ikhide, 2015). The MSMEs benefit 
from the MFIs in the LISSA countries in the form of seed capital, working capital and order 
financing facilities. Thus, intervention of the MFIs in providing credit to the private sector has 
led to the integration of the microfinance sector into the financial system thereby increasing 
the depth of financial development in the LISSA countries (Sodikin and Donou-Adonsou, 
2010). However, increasing financial depth means that the MFIs are now in direct competition 
with the banking institutions which improves efficiency and financial sustainability but this 
“would lead to lending with fewer restrictions and for greater amounts which in turn would 
lead the customers to greater indebtedness and therefore an increase in the rate of default” 
(Sainz-Fernandez, Torre-Olmo and Lόpez-Gutiérrez, 2015, p. 1062).  
2.3.4 Informality 
The level of informality13 of businesses is extremely high in the LISSA countries. 
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2019), informality in the LISSA 
countries mainly consists of output informality and employment informality. Output 
informality accounts for about 40 % of the official GDP. In terms of employment informality, 
9 out of 10 workers are informally employed, of which 6 are self-employed hence the high 
means shown in Figure 2.9. 
Figure 2.9 below shows that there was a slight decrease in the average annual self-
employment rate from 84.5 % in 2006 to 82 % in 2019, indicating that employment informality 
is very high in the LISSA countries. According to the World Bank (2019a), the decrease in the 
mean regional self-employment rate is attributed to substantial efforts that have been made in 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania in reducing both informal output and employment. 
However, the slow progress in decreasing the average employment informality rate of the 
LISSA countries is blamed on the high level of the self-employment rate in Benin, Burundi, 
Madagascar and Uganda where it is approximately 85 %.  
 
 
13 Informality discussed in this section refers to the informality of businesses not the informality of the 
microfinance sector as discussed in section 2.2. 
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Figure 2.9: Mean Self Employment Rate as a percentage of Total Employment for the 
LISSA countries between 2006 and 2019 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the World Development Indicators 
The ILO reports that between 2010 and 2016, the level of employment informality was 
not the same across the sub-regions of SSA as it stood at 80 % in Western Africa, 68 % in 
Eastern Africa, 48 % in Central Africa and 43 % in Southern Africa. Drought episodes, 
redundancy during economic depressions, political upheavals, inheriting informal businesses, 
high dependence on agriculture, few opportunities in capital intensive businesses, social-
religious factors that stifle women emancipation, low wage employment due to less education, 
skills and training and restrictive procedures and costs of registering formal businesses are the 
main culprits that force the LISSA residents to earn a living in the informal sector. The high 
level of informality in the LISSA countries mean that extreme poverty persists because the 
informal sector business owners do not all contribute to pension and social protection schemes. 
This indicates that upon injury, illness, retirement and death, the informal sector participants 
find themselves without funds for these life’s claims. Also, the informal sector increases the 
levels of tax evasion meaning that the financial resources of the LISSA’s governments are not 
realised as they should be thereby constraining their ability to finance the informal sector itself 
and other poverty reduction schemes (GSMA, 2017).  
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According to Ibrahim and Alagidede (2018), the high level of informality is also the 
cause of low financial development in the LISSA countries as banking institutions have been 
reluctant to lend to the sector due to perceived high credit risk. Intuitively, this means that the 
informal sector entrepreneurs are bailed out by MFIs as these financial institutions are better 
knowledgeable in lending to customers whose business operations generate low-profit levels 
and cash flows (Janda and Zetek, 2014). The MFIs in the LISSA countries also tend to thrive 
in dealing with the informal sector borrowers due to their flexibility in renegotiating the terms 
of credit when the informal sector borrowers face cash flow problems. The LISSA’s 
microfinance sector also provides deposit facilities for the safe custody of the excess cash flows 
of the informal businesses and these businesses have contributed immensely to the phenomenal 
growth in deposits held by the LISSA DTMFIs as reported by the MIX. The complementary 
relationship between the informal sector and the microfinance sector has led some informal 
businesses to grow and upgrade to become formal businesses (Amsi, Ngare, Imo and Gachie, 
2017).  
The next section discusses the nature of deposits in the microfinance sector. 
2.4 Deposits 
2.4.1 Deposits in Microfinance  
Rutherford (1999) observed that poor and low-income households have the capacity to 
save. Furthermore, Robinson (2004) as well as Ledgerwood, Earne and Nelson (2013) recorded 
that the savings by the low-income households exist either as formal or informal savings. 
Informal savings take the form of cash kept at home, agricultural products and minerals. The 
formal savings which are kept by DTMFIs are referred to as deposits14 (CGAP/World Bank, 
2005; Ledgerwood et al., 2013). These formal or institutional savings in the form of deposits 
are preferable to informal or non-institutional savings because DTMFIs offer security, returns 
(interest income), varied forms of liquidating the savings, custom made deposit products and 
access to loans (Robinson, 2004; Helms, 2006). The deposits from the poor and low-income 
households are small in size when compared to commercial bank deposits, and exist either as 
compulsory savings or voluntary savings.  Brom (2009) wrote that both compulsory and 
voluntary deposits come in the form of individual or group savings, lock-in or open access 
 
14 Formal savings in commercial banks and other banking institutions are also called deposits. 
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deposits. Izaguirre (2016) observed that due to the current digitalisation of financial products 
and services across the world, some deposits held by DTMFIs now exist in the form of digitally 
stored value products due to the rise of FinTech.   
Compulsory or mandatory deposits are deposits that are mainly required by COMFIs 
from the poor and low-income households as cash collateral for microcredit. Thus, compulsory 
deposits are forced or tied to the loan agreements and hence they have been referred to as the 
“hidden collateral” of microcredit (Cozarenco, Hudon and Szafarz, 2016, p. 3). Compulsory 
savings are sometimes deposited with commercial banks by either the MFIs themselves or by 
the microcredit borrowers for safe custody (Karim et al., 2011). In terms of accounting 
treatment, de Sousa-Shields and King (2005) noted that MFIs recognise compulsory deposits 
as cash and cash equivalents in their annual financial statements. Glisovic, Mesfin and Moretto 
(2012) noted that MFIs also determine the size, timing and liquidity of the compulsory savings. 
According to Robinson (2004), compulsory deposits do not earn any interest; they are 
deterrents in obtaining loans and not liquid unless the depositors forgo their right to borrow. 
Robinson also noted that there is no wide range of deposit products associated with compulsory 
deposits.  
The empirical works of Christen, Lyman and Rosenberg (2003), de Sousa-Shields and 
King (2005) and Karim et al. (2011) noted that MFIs in different locations differ in the way 
they handle compulsory deposits. While some stakeholders contend that compulsory deposits 
cannot be intermediated (Simtowe, 2008), others argue that compulsory deposits can be 
intermediated (Robinson, 2004). de Sousa-Shields and King (2005) further reasoned that 
compulsory deposits can only be intermediated by supervised MFIs. Robinson (2004) wrote 
that the stakeholders who lobby for compulsory deposits in microfinance provision believe that 
the low-income households do not have financial discipline so they must be forced or taught 
how to save. Nonetheless, Karim et al. (2011) opined that COMFIs that require compulsory 
savings from their loan customers have two options; either discontinuing the practice or 
transforming into DTMFIs.  
In terms of voluntary deposits, as the name suggests, microfinance clients deposit their 
savings voluntarily or willingly. According to Robinson (2004), the microdepositors have a 
savings background which encourages them to save in formal institutions and they do not need 
to be taught or forced to save. DTMFIs intermediate voluntary deposits into loan portfolios 
(Brom, 2009). Voluntary deposits are packaged in different forms (demand deposits, 
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contractual savings, time deposits and equity deposits) with varying levels of liquidity, and 
these different deposits earn varying levels of interest (CGAP/World Bank 2005; Glisovic et 
al., 2012). 
According to Robinson (2004, p. 9), the MFIs that collect deposits must follow 10 
principles15 which set the foundation for the way they are regulated and guided in deposit 
mobilisation activities. Of these principles, principle number 10 states that “certain basic 
preconditions are needed for mobilising voluntary savings”. Under this principle, it is stated 
that wherever DTMFIs operate, there must be a reasonable policy and regulatory environment 
which is characterised by liberalisation of interest rates and appropriate regulations. Amongst 
the appropriate regulations are the liquidity ratios which guide how much of the deposits can 
be intermediated into loans. For instance, in Zimbabwe, the loans to deposits ratio and the 
prudential liquidity ratio are pegged at 70 % and 30 %, respectively (Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ), 2020b).   
Mobilisation of deposits in microfinance requires that the DTMFIs are regulated 
institutions implying that there are regulatory costs for complying with the rules and regulations 
set by the regulators (Cull et al., 2009b). Additionally, there are some prerequisites that must 
be met before the deposit-taking institutions are allowed to attract deposits so that the process 
is conducted in a professional manner that bolsters depositor confidence and does not pose 
systemic risk. The preconditions mainly comprise of capital and revenue expenditures that must 
be incurred prior to commencing operations which inter alia include: risk and liquidity 
management strategies, internal control systems, infrastructural development, appropriate 
corporate governance structures, training and development needs and the ability to develop 
appropriate deposit products and other financial services for the target market. There should 
also be consistent financial viability in operating in the credit market before transforming to a 
deposit-taking institution. Another important precondition for attracting deposits is that there 
should be a conducive economic and political environment that encourages economic agents 
to store their savings in formal financial institutions (Robinson, 2004; Ledgerwood and White, 
2006).  
 
15 A detailed description of the 10 basic principles for MFIs that collect savings from the public is found in 
Ledgerwood and White (2006) and Robinson (2004).  
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2.4.2 Deposit-taking Charter Types 
The charter types which are the legal forms of ownership of the DTMFIs in the LISSA 
countries are: banks (BANKs), Non-bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs), Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), Credit Unions and Co-operatives (CUCs) and Rural banks (RBs). The 
2014 Global Outreach and Financial Performance Benchmark Report published by the MIX 
provides definitions of these varied charter types. BANKs are licenced financial institutions 
which are regulated by a state supervisory agency providing a wide array of financial services 
such as deposit-taking, lending, payment services and money transfers. CUCs are not-for-profit 
making member-based institutions that provide financial services such as lines of credit and 
deposit-taking to their members. Normally, these institutions are regulated by a regional or 
national co-operative council and not the main regulator of financial institutions in the country. 
The NBFIs replicate the BANKs’ business models but are licensed and regulated separately 
from the BANKs. Compared to BANKs, the NBFIs have a restricted rage of financial services 
that they provide. The NGOs are registered as not-for-profit institutions under certain legal 
charters and are not regulated by the regulators of banking institutions. Usually, these 
institutions face stringent restrictions to engage in deposit-taking but they provide other 
financial services without the restraints. RBs focus on rural and peri-urban populations that are 
usually involved in agricultural activities. 
These various charter types exhibit variations in terms of their mission, policies, 
business models, institutional and clientele scale and profit status (NBFIs and BANKs being 
profit making entities and the NGOs, CUCs and RBs being non-profit entities). However, there 
is a growing transition from not-for-profit to profit status due to commercialisation of 
microfinance programs in search for continued existence in serving the target clientele (MIX 
& CGAP, 2011). As indicated earlier in section 2.2, the concentration of the charter types varies 
across sub-regions and countries due to the various legal requirements and historical factors 
that underlie the development of microfinance provision in each location (McGeehan et al., 
2007; MIX and CGAP, 2011). NGOs which are socially oriented institutions infiltrated all 
institutions all the subregions since the 1980s; Central, Eastern, Southern and Western. CUCs 
are more dominant in Central, Eastern and Western Africa due to the loi Parmec microfinance 
law that prevailed between 1993 and 2007 and the pioneer co-operative institutions from 
Canada and France. Concentration of NBFIs in East Africa was induced by the quest for 
profitability and their proliferation across all the sub-regions was partly spearheaded by the 
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fusion of global companies such as Opportunity International and Procredit (MIX, 2007). 
Eastern and Western Africa has Africa’s oldest and most regulated microfinance regulators 
(Lafourcade et al., 2005). In Southern Africa, DTMFIs mainly consist of two types; the 
downscaling of commercial banks into microfinance provision, and the upscaling of NBFIs 
from being non-profit to profit making concerns (Karim et al., 2011). The commercial banks 
that are involved in microfinance provision are those that have become aware that the economic 
agents that are at the bottom of the pyramid are bankable and profitable. The RBs or 
Community banks are mainly found in Ghana, Tanzania and Sierra Leone (United Nations, 
2013). 
The different DTMFI charter types across the sub-regions have different outreach 
patterns (Lafourcade et al., 2005). NGOs are pro-poor organizations and reach the poorest 
clientele in rural and marginalized areas with the smallest average loan balance per borrower. 
NGOs are less involved in deposit-taking as most governments forbid them to do so. 
Cooperatives particularly target the better-off poor who are salaried and reside in urban areas 
with high average loan balance per borrower and average deposit balance per depositor (MIX, 
2007). Cooperatives are hailed for their ability to tap more deposits (MIX, 2006). Similarly, 
DTMFIs with a bank charter type focus more on the urban populations providing financial 
products and services of larger average balances (MIX & CGAP, 2008). The RBs are also 
instrumental in their outreach mission as they service about 2.3 million clients (United Nations, 
2013). 
2.4.3 Deposits in Sub-Saharan Africa: Contextualised Stylised Facts 
The annual MIX financial and social performance reports show that deposit 
mobilisation is one of the prime activities in the microfinance sector of SSA. In the dawn of 
the 2000s, Lafourcade et al. (2005) noted that approximately 70 % of the MIX reporting MFIs 
from SSA were already actively involved in deposit-taking. As a result, it has been noted that 
exclusive to this region, the volumes of deposits16 exceed the volumes of the gross loan 
portfolio (MIX and CGAP, 2013). Figure 2.10 below shows the volume of voluntary deposits 
that was mobilised by DTMFIs from SSA between 2005 and 2009 and between 2014 and 
201717.  
 
16 Hereafter, the deposits refer to voluntary deposits, unless otherwise indicated. 
17 Deposits for the years 2010 to 2013 were not reported in the MIX and CGAP’s annual reports for SSA.  
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Figure 2.10: Volume of Voluntary Deposits in Sub-Saharan Africa for some years 
between 2005 and 2017 
      
Source: Compiled by the author using data from MIX and CGAP reports  
As Figure 2.10 above shows, the high volume of deposits mobilised by the DTMFIs in 
SSA demonstrates that the poor and the low-income households have the capacity to save 
(Rutherford, 1999). In the year 2005, the volume of deposits from SSA DTMFIs stood at 
US$0.707 billion and grew sharply annually until 2009 where it reached a maximum of US$5.2 
billion. Following this phenomenal growth in the volume of deposits in SSA between 2005 and 
2009, SSA became the second leading world’s region in terms of mobilising microfinance 
deposit volumes behind Latin America and the Caribbean. The MIX and the CGAP attribute 
this sharp growth of the deposit volumes in SSA to the influential role of co-operatives most 
particularly in West Africa and the proliferation of deposit focussed Greenfield MFIs in SSA 
(MIX, 2006; MIX and CGAP, 2012). In support of the annual growth rate in deposit volumes 
in SSA between 2005 and 2009, Basu et al. (2004) had earlier on attested that there was an 
increased appetite for deposits than microcredit in Africa. While the figures for deposits in 
Figure 2.10 for the years 2005 to 2009 are reported in US$ billions, the 2014, 2015, 2016 and 
2017 MIX Benchmarking reports posted SSA deposit volumes in US$ millions.  
The drop in the absolute deposit volumes between 2014 and 2017 compared to the years 
between 2005 and 2009 in SSA was also experienced in other world’s regions due to the 
reduced number of MFIs that reported their financial and social performance data to the MIX. 
In spite of this drop in absolute volumes of deposits, SSA remained the second largest world’s 
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region in mobilising microdeposits based on data obtained from the MIX until the year 2015. 
In 2016, East Asia and Pacific and South Asia overtook SSA. In 2017, only the deposit volumes 
from the Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia surpassed the deposit volumes of 
SSA. As deposits have been argued to be a means of attaining financial sustainability (Millson, 
2013; Kaloo, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a), financial sustainability is the next point of 
discussion. 
i. Scales of Deposits in the LISSA countries 
Figure 2.11 below shows the means of the scale of deposits spanning 2006 to 2017 for the 
sampled LISSA DTMFIs18.  
Figure 2.11: Mean Values of the Scales of Deposits for the sampled LISSA DTMFIs 
between the years 2006 and 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange  
On an annual basis, small scale deposits were extremely low in terms of volume and 
exhibited slight variations over time when compared to the medium-scale and large-scale 
deposits. The medium-scale deposits were almost thrice greater than the small-scale deposits 
in each comparative year. The medium-scale deposits nearly exhibited a level trend over the 
years as slight variations were observed from one year to the next. Between 2006 and 2009, 
the volume of the large-scale deposits followed an upward trajectory. In spite of the anomaly 
 
18 Details on the sampled LISSA DTMFIs are discussed in Chapter four and Appendix 4. 
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in 2013, the large-scale deposits exhibited a downward trend between 2010 and 2014. As per 
the MIX’s reports, this plunging of large-scale deposits volumes could be blamed on the 
decrease in the number of self-reporting financial service providers during this period (MIX, 
2014; 2015; 2016). After 2014, the large-scale deposits followed an upward path until 2017 
when they reached the highest average volume of US$62 677 544 ever since. On the contrary, 
the lowest volume of small-scale deposits of US$248 294 was recorded in that same year. 
Overall, it can be said that the large-scale deposits were dominant in the LISSA’s depository 
microfinance sector during the entire period under consideration. In each relative year, the 
large-scale deposits far exceeded the volumes of both small scale and medium scale deposits 
combined many times, thereby explaining why deposit financing is principal in SSA as a whole 
(Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a). 
ii.  Scales of Deposits and Charter Type in the LISSA countries 
Figure 2.12 below shows the average values of the LISSA DTMFIs’ deposit volumes 
disaggregated by charter type. Of all the charter types, the NBFI-DTMFIs lagged behind in 
deposit mobilisation between the years 2006 and 2012, an indicator that these institutions did 
not have enough capacity to intensify their deposit mobilisation strategies. A change in this 
trend was observed as from the year 2013 when this lagging charter type surpassed the NGOs 
in terms of the mobilised deposits volumes till the year 2017. Most empirical writers state that 
the NGOs are largely restrained from mobilising deposits in many jurisdictions (D’Espallier et 
al., 2017). However, throughout the entire period, the CUC-DTMFIs recorded steady growth 
in the volumes of deposits that they mobilised. As from the year 2015, the CUCs experienced 
a sharp increase of the deposit volumes as they reached their highest average of US$84 931 
089 in 2017 outwitting their counterparts. This may be attributed to the fact that the CUCs rely 
on deposits for both investment and financing purposes.  
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Figure 2.12: Mean Values of the Deposits by Charter Type for the sampled LISSA 
DTMFIs between the years 2006 and 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange  
The BANK-DTMFIs also experienced steady growth in the deposit volumes from 2006 
to 2011 as evidence that most commercial banks were downscaling to include microfinance 
products and services during this period. Thereafter, the growth rate in the volumes of deposits 
mobilised by the BANKs was negative especially in 2013. However, in 2017 the deposit 
volumes of the BANKs skyrocketed to make the BANKs the second-largest charter type in 
terms of deposit mobilisation.   
The next section discusses the concept of financial sustainability. 
2.5 Financial Sustainability 
2.5.1 Definition of Financial Sustainability 
According to Rai and Rai (2012), the financial sustainability of MFIs is defined in 
multiple ways. Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) stated that financial sustainability is the ability of 
the MFIs to generate sufficient profits that cover their operational costs, loan losses and 
financial costs. The operational costs include transactional, personnel and administrative 
expenses while the non-operational expenses specifically include loan loss impairments and 
the finance costs which represent the interest paid to providers of finance and the interest paid 
on deposits. Johnson (2015, p. 123) defined financial sustainability as the “ability of an MFI to 
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achieve unsubsidised full cost recovery”. Wafula et al. (2017) defined financial sustainability 
of MFIs in three stages; the survival stage where the MFIs struggle in meeting their costs; the 
sustainability stage where the use of wholesale funds and subsidies is envisaged to cover the 
costs; and the self-sufficiency stage where the financial revenue earned covers the costs. The 
self-sufficiency stage of the financial sustainability of MFIs focuses on the financial viability 
of the MFIs through computation and analysis of self-sufficiency levels as shown in Figure 
2.13 below; Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS).  
Figure 2.13: Self-Sufficiency Levels 
 
Source: Adapted from CGAP/World Bank (2009, p. 409) 
According to the CGAP/World Bank (2009), while both the operational self-sufficiency 
and financial self-sufficiency measures cover loan loss provisions, operating expenses and 
financing costs from operating income, financial self-sufficiency is different from the 
operational self-sufficiency as it makes adjustments for costs associated with subsidies, the 
general price level and the portfolio at risk. Furthermore, Bogan (2012) noted that operational 
self-sufficiency is when the self-sufficiency ratio is 100 % or more, but once the 110 % 
threshold is surpassed, it becomes financial self-sufficiency. However, regardless of how 
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financial sustainability is defined, microfinance stakeholders concur that financial 
sustainability of MFIs is fundamental for achieving their objectives and their success (Anyawu, 
2004; Gobezie, 2009; Huq et al., 2017). 
2.5.2 Financial Sustainability and its Importance 
The world witnessed a paradigm shift in microfinance provision since the 1980s as the 
grand theme became the ‘sustainability of the MFIs’ (Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Cull et al., 
2009a). As noted in the background of the present study (section 1.1), the focus on financial 
sustainability was prompted by the commercialisation drive as MFIs sought to operate 
financially viable institutions by shifting from subsidised financing to non-subsidised financing 
(Ledgerwood and White, 2006; Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). Khandker et al. (1995) 
cited in Rai and Rai (2012) wrote that sustainability in the microfinance sector is broken down 
into four themes; financial, economic, institutional and borrower. Of these four forms of 
sustainability, financial sustainability has been the major point of discussion in the field of 
microfinance (Woller, Dunford and Woodworth, 1999; Mersland and Strøm, 2010, Abdulai, 
2017), and Wafula, Mutua and Museiga (2017) noted that financial sustainability is positively 
associated with institutional sustainability.  
The level of success attributed to financial sustainability varies across the MFIs (Ahlin 
et al., 2011). Therefore, Kinde (2012) considered financial sustainability as an ingredient for 
the livelihood of MFIs while Gashayie and Singh (2015) regarded financial sustainability as an 
indispensable condition for institutional sustainability of MFIs. Working towards achieving 
financial sustainability has been identified by microfinance empirics as one of the ‘best 
practices’ adopted by MFIs across the world (Woller et al., 1999; Morduch, 2000; Tucker, 
2001, Bassem, 2009). This is anchored on the fact that attaining financial sustainability ensures 
that the poor and low-income households benefit from consuming microfinance services 
continually rather than for a snapshot as the MFIs live long (Meyer, 2002; Helms, 2006; Rai 
and Rai, 2012). In support of this fact, (Tucker, 2001, p. 107) reasoned that attaining financial 
sustainability is “a necessity for most if not all MFIs” while Bassem (2009) and Agarwal and 
Sinha (2010) argued that accomplishing financial sustainability should be part of the corporate 
governance goals and objectives of the MFIs. This entails that attaining financial sustainability 
has several benefits for MFIs.  
Sustainable MFIs are attractive to microfinance stakeholders, primarily the investors 
and donors (Shaoyan and Duwal, 2012). Financial sustainable MFIs have also been considered 
60 
 
as superior vehicles in the fight against poverty (Morduch, 2000). This is why Otero (1999) 
argued that, in and of itself, financial sustainability of MFIs is not an end, but a means to an 
end, that is, the long term efficient and profitable means of deepening and broadening outreach 
to the poor. Barbosha (2013, p. 24) argued that pursuing financial sustainability makes the 
MFIs to “perform goodly for their sustenance than reliance on external providers of finance”. 
Bayai (2017) opined that financial sustainable MFIs are readily integrated into the financial 
system thereby deepening financial development. Inspite of these merits of financial 
sustainability, Bayai and Ikhide (2016a) noticed that financial sustainability varies with 
locations due to several factors as noted by Gashayie and Singh (2015) in Table 2.1   
Table 2.1: Factors affecting Financial Sustainability in the Microfinance Sector 
 
Source: Adapted from Gashayie and Singh (2015, p. 227) 
According to Gashayie and Singh (2015), there are three categories of factors that affect 
the financial sustainability of MFIs. Some are MFI-related, others are clientele-related and 
some are macroeconomic related. Of these three different categories of factors that affect 
financial sustainability in the microfinance sector, Kinde (2012, p. 1) observed that some “have 
been found to be significant in one economy or applicable to a set of MFIs, some are not 
significant”. Despite the widely acclaimed drive towards achieving financial sustainability 
(Quayes, 2012), most MFIs struggle to attain this goal (Agarwal and Sinha, 2010; Kinde, 2012). 
In amplifying this point, Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) wrote that MFIs across the globe 
have achieved financial sustainability unevenly. This indicates that as the MFIs age, grow and 
differentiate their market segments, financial sustainability may be achieved or not depending 
on how the MFIs manage the internal and external factors. MFIs such as the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, amongst a few, have recorded success stories on 
financial sustainability and growth in the number of clientele served. Of the unsustainable 
MFIs, Kinde (2012) identified two sets; firstly, MFIs that operate at a loss with unsatisfactory 
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financial performance and secondly, MFIs that operate at a profit but part of their operations 
are subsidised. Ditcher and Harper (2007) estimated that out of the approximately 10 000 MFIs 
that were operational in the year 2007 across the world, only 3 to 5 % had attained full financial 
sustainability. Rosenberg et al. (2013) augmented this estimation and stated that MFIs with 
annual reported losses of 5 % are unsustainable. The microfinance sector in the LISSA 
countries also falls short in attaining financial sustainability despite having cheap deposit 
financing and that the drive towards achieving financial sustainability is mostly rampant in 
Africa and Asia than in any other part of the world (Ek, 2011).  
As mentioned in the background of the study in section 1.1, several DTMFIs in the 
eastern, central and western sub-regions of LISSA struggled to attain financial sustainability 
between the years 2001 and 2011; Benin, 2; Burkina Faso, 1; Mali, 3; Niger, 2 and Togo, 3; 
(Riquet and Poursat, 2013). Boateng et al., (2016) gave a record of 50 DTMFIs that collapsed 
in Ghana in 2013 due to lack of financial sustainability. Karim et al. (2011) also noted that both 
DTMFIs and COMFIs in Southern Africa struggled to achieve financial sustainability between 
the years 2000 and 2010 as their OSS ratio averaged 87.7 %. In Zimbabwe, failure to attain 
financial sustainability led to the massive deregistration of MFIs from 1600 in 2003 to 150 in 
2013 (Chikoko and Kwenda, 2013; Dube and Matanda, 2015). Thus, attaining financial 
sustainability is a major cause for concern across the universal microfinance sector, especially 
in the LISSA countries where the MFIs have to operate continuously so that extreme poverty 
is eradicated through access to financial services.  
It is also noted that the microfinance sector in the LISSA countries does not only strive 
to attain financial sustainability but also strives to operate with adequate levels of liquidity. 
Financial sustainability looks at the long-term financial performance of the microfinance sector 
in serving the poor but for the sector to perform in the long term, it must first perform goodly 
in the short term as measured by their ability to operate with optimal levels of liquidity. 
Therefore, the next section focuses on liquidity.  
2.6 Liquidity 
2.6.1 Definition of Liquidity 
Goodhart in Guathier (2011, p. 7) stated that “the word liquidity has so many facets that 
it is often counter-productive to use it without further and closer definition”. In light of this 
statement, various scholars concur that liquidity in the microfinance sector refers to the ability 
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of the MFIs to hold adequate levels of cash reserves in meeting their short term contractual and 
operational obligations (CGAP/World Bank, 2009; Tulchin, Sassman and Wolkomin, 2009; 
Parisetti and Kirimkan, 2015; Diar, 2017). As noted by Nanda (2016), short term refers to a 
period of one year or less. Maxwell et al. (2018) argued that liquidity is the prerequisite for 
DTMFIs to be able to cover the needs of their existing and potential clients; depositors’ 
withdrawals, interest on deposits and loan disbursements. Intuitively, this means that liquidity 
is also essential for meeting the short-term needs of the institutions themselves which are either 
operational or financial (CGAP, 2009; Mata, 2011). This is premised on the fact that the ability 
of MFIs to meet short term obligations is directly linked to their working capital policies 
(Nanda, 2016; Mucheru, Shukla and Kibachia, 2017). Besides meeting the short term financial 
and operational obligations, some researchers have added that liquidity in microfinance 
provision also embraces the marketability of the financial instruments traded by the MFIs in 
the financial markets (Ogol, 2011; Murage and Muriu, 2016). In a quest to boost their liquidity, 
MFIs have become active in the capital markets since the initial public offering (IPO) of Banco 
Compartamos of Mexico in 2007 which marked a paradigm shift in the financing structure of 
MFIs. However, this financing initiative was not so gladly welcomed by the advocates of the 
Welfarist theory (Cull et al., 2009a). 
2.6.2 Measurement of Liquidity  
Liquidity in the microfinance sector is measured in two ways (Gietzen, 2017). Firstly, 
static measures which are mainly financial ratios capture the liquidity state of MFIs at a 
particular point in time. Researchers in existing microfinance literature used different proxies 
for measuring liquidity in their studies; the savings liquidity ratio (Tulchin et al., 2009), the 
gross loans and advances to customer deposits (Bichanga, 2016), the non-earning liquid assets 
to gross loan portfolio (Tehulu, 2016), the current ratio and the quick ratio (CGAP, 2009; 
Nanda, 2016; Mamathi et al., 2017). The MIX uses the non-earning liquid assets to total assets 
(NELATA) ratio as the proxy for measuring liquidity. Based on these varied liquidity ratios, 
percentage benchmarks have been set by different microfinance regulators as a gauge for 
determining sufficient liquidity of MFIs. A study by Murage and Muriu (2016) which measured 
liquidity as cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets stated that the benchmark liquidity 
level for DTMFIs in Kenya is 20 %. At a technical training on risk management, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) (2011) also confirmed the 20 % benchmark liquidity rate for 
Vietnam MFIs.  
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According to the ADB (2011), the liquidity rate is computed as cash plus deposits plus 
securities divided by compulsory plus voluntary savings. Tucker (2001, p. 119) wrote that 
liquidity: 
       … “should not be above or below the benchmark performance band of 10 % to 25 %.    
       Too much liquidity means assets are not being loaned out, and too little poses the  
       institution in danger of failing to meet pending obligations”.  
With so many financial ratios for measuring liquidity in the microfinance sector, Bruett 
(2004, p. 4) argued that the main limitation of these static measures of liquidity is that “financial 
ratios capture a moment in time past rather than a movement of cash in the future”. Kar and 
Swain (2014) strengthened this point by arguing that ratios have distortions if they are not 
prepared using the widely accepted accounting standards. These shortcomings of static 
measures paved the way for the active measures of liquidity.  
Various researchers argue that active measures of liquidity require setting up of Asset 
and Liability Committees (ALCOs) that match the maturities of different assets and liabilities 
(Bruett, 2004; Ogol, 2011; Sam, 2015). Through matching, liquidity gaps are identified and 
covered systematically. Even so, there are contrasting views on asset and liability management 
in depository microfinance. On the one hand, some empirics argue that DTMFIs mismatch the 
maturities of their assets and liabilities by transforming short term liabilities (short-term 
deposits) into long term assets (long-term loans) thereby exposing themselves to liquidity risk 
(Bruett, 2004; Mata, 2011; Ogol, 2011; Mucheru et al., 2018). On the other hand, Gietzen 
(2017) argued that DTMFIs transform short-term deposits into short-term loans thereby 
eliminating liquidity risk. 
In making use of both static and active measures of liquidity, DTMFIs have to be 
cautious to establish and maintain optimal levels of liquidity. Optimal levels of liquidity are 
neither too high nor too low (ADB, 2011) but are adequate to keep the DTMFIs operational 
with little exposure to liquidity risk. Having too much liquidity may seem desirable while 
having too little liquidity is undesirable.  Murage and Muriu (2016) pointed out that with high 
liquidity levels, DTMFIs can offset their short-term obligations with ease, seize investment 
opportunities and diversify their loan portfolios. On the contrary, Tehulu (2016) argued that 
with high liquidity levels, the DTMFIs in diversifying their market segments catalyse credit 
risk through less stringent credit policies that may target defaulting clients. Conversely, low 
liquidity levels endanger the DTMFIs by incapacitating them in paying their outstanding 
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obligations (Nanda, 2016) thereby destroying their reputation (Anh and Tam, 2013; Sam, 2015; 
Klomp, 2018). Therefore, a trade-off exists in the measurement and management of liquidity 
in the microfinance sector. However, as explained in the discussion on the relationship between 
liquidity and deposit insurance throughout the study, the study adopted a liquidity management 
approach because deposit insurance protection is one of the measures of mitigating liquidity 
risk in the mainstream banking system for ailing deposit-taking institutions (Ngalawa, 2012). 
2.6.3 Sources of Liquidity  
Numerous avenues for liquidity in the microfinance sector are available. Deposits are 
viewed as the lifeline of the financial intermediaries that are involved in deposit-taking (Omino, 
2005; Ndambu, 2011; Millson, 2013; Mucheru et al., 2017). Besides deposit-taking, other 
sources of liquidity for DTMFIs, inter alia, include: capital market funding, grants, donations, 
borrowings from commercial banks, central bank borrowings, borrowings from development 
banks, facilities from institutions that provide wholesale funds, MIVs and diaspora remittances 
(Cull et al., 2009a; Mata, 2011; Glisovic et al., 2012; Parisetti and Kirimkan, 2015; Mucheru 
et al., 2017).  
2.6.4 Demand and Supply of Liquidity  
Table 2.2 below shows that depositors and the DTMFIs are both involved in the demand 
and supply liquidity chain in depository microfinance.  
Table 2.2: Demand and Supply of Liquidity in Depository Microfinance 
 Demand for Liquidity Supply of Liquidity 
Depositors 
Loans obtainable  
(cash inflow) 
Loans repayable with 
interest  
(cash outflow) 
DTMFIs 
Paying withdrawals on 
deposits with interest                       
(cash outflow) 
Deposit mobilisation              
(cash inflow) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on literature review 
In depository microfinance, loans obtainable are considered as the demand for liquidity 
by depositors (cash inflow to depositors) while loans repayable with interest are considered as 
the supply of liquidity (cash outflow from depositors and or borrowers). Likewise, paying 
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withdrawals on deposits with interest is regarded as the demand for liquidity from DTMFIs 
(cash outflow from DTMFIs) while mobilising deposits from the poor and low-income 
households is regarded as the supply of liquidity to DTMFIs (cash inflow to DTMFIs).  
Empirical literature points out several factors that influence the demand and supply of 
liquidity in operating DTMFIs. Mata (2011) noted that abrupt withdrawals and irregular loan 
disbursements impact the demand for liquidity negatively, while Ogol (2011) stated that the 
supply of liquidity is positively influenced by frequent, timeous and full loan repayments and 
effective deposit mobilisation. Furthermore, Ogol (2011) blamed the inability to source 
external funds especially during times of crisis as a strain to the liquidity of MFIs. Thus, the 
global financial crisis of 2008 not only had a negative impact on the global banking sector 
(Mucheru et al., 2017), but also constrained the liquidity of the global microfinance sector 
(Gauthier, 2011; Mata, 2011; Ogol, 2011; Kimathi et al., 2015).  
Figure 2.14 shows trends in the flow of funds to MFIs and the banking sector on a 
global scale between the years 2005 and 2009. 
Figure 2.14: Flow of Funds to the Global Microfinance Sector and the Banking Sector 
between the years 2005 and 2009 
 
 Source: Adapted from International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2013, p. 7) 
As Figure 2.14 above shows, between the years 2005 and 2006, both the MFIs and 
banks recorded positive growth in capital inflows. The steep increase in the flow of funds to 
MFIs in 2007 in their quest for financial sustainability can be partially attributed to their 
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engagement in the capital markets (Cull et al., 2009a). Another reason could be that following 
the receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize by Professor Muhummad Yunus and his Grameen Bank 
in 2006, it is reasonable to assume that investors poured in funds into the microfinance sector 
globally. Additionally, the MIX reports that during this period, Greenfield Institutions were 
spreading their wings globally thereby injecting funds into the microfinance sector worldwide 
(MIX and CGAP, 2012). Regrettably, both the MFIs and the traditional banks recorded 
negative growth in the flow of funds after 2007. The traditional banking sector experienced a 
descent in the flow of capital in 2008 and 2009 from a peak of more than 100 % in 2007, while 
the flow of funds to the microfinance sector diminished from a peak of approximately 55 % in 
2007 to below 0 % in 2008 and 2009. Therefore, the study of Ogol (2011) supported by the 
ADB (2011), Anh and Tam (2013) and Sam (2015) all contend that failure to balance the 
demand and supply of funds stifles liquidity of the microfinance industry. 
According to Nanda (2016, p. 38), “the highest concern of all microfinance institutions 
is that of liquidity because of the MFI operations’ growing size which makes liquidity a 
regional economic issue of importance”. In the same vein, Gietzen (2017, p. 121) added that 
“liquidity risk exposure ultimately remains an empirical question because deposit-taking MFIs 
have recently increased their share of funding from deposits”. It is in this regard that Abakaeva 
and Glisovic-Mezieres (2009), Brom (2012), Nandi (2016) and Maxwell et al. (2018) opined 
that it is therefore crucial for MFIs, both DTMFIs and COMFIs, to hedge against liquidity risk 
exposure. This is accomplished by devising and implementing appropriate liquidity risk 
management strategies and contingency plans as required by principle number 14 of the 2010 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Inspite of all these concerns, liquidity risk 
exposure of DTMFIs is prevalent amongst the LISSA countries as deposit insurance schemes 
for the protection of the voluntary deposits are non-existent in most parts (Mecagni et al., 
2015). Moreover, deposit protection through adherence to the Capital Adequacy Standards of 
the Basel Committee is also very minimal in the LISSA region (Mecagni et al., 2015; Gietzen, 
2017). Hence, the next section discusses liquidity in the context of deposit protection. 
2.6.5 Deposit Protection in Low Income Sub-Saharan Africa: A Contextualised View 
In line with the phenomenal growth in the volume of voluntary deposits and the number 
of voluntary depositors in SSA’s microfinance sector which was described as the ‘African 
exception’ in section 2.2.iii above, prudential regulation of DTMFIs (Christen et al., 2003; 
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Lafourcade et al., 2005; Bogan, 2012; Riquet and Poursat, 2013) and deposit insurance 
schemes are inevitable (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015; Izaguirre, 2016).   
i. Prudential Regulation 
According to Cull et al. (2009b) supported by Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2016), prudential 
regulation is at the helm of MFIs that mobilise deposits from the poor and low-income earners. 
Prudential regulation guards against widespread failure of the financial system due to 
insolvency of one or more of the DTMFIs thereby protecting depositors’ savings (Christen et 
al., 2003; CGAP, 2012). Low-income depositors cannot assess the financial soundness of the 
institutions that are the custodians of their hard-earned microsavings, hence a financial 
authority has to monitor these institutions on their behalf. Following the folding up of illiquid 
MFIs in the southern parts of SSA, Karim et al. (2011) stressed the importance of prudential 
regulation in protecting deposits held by the DTMFIs. Amongst the prudential regulation 
requirements for deposit protection are capital adequacy standards (IFC, 2013).  
Adherence to capital adequacy standards prescribed by the Basel Accords is one of the 
means of protecting deposits from the poor and low-income households. According to the Basel 
framework, DTMFIs are encouraged to compute and maintain a prudential capital adequacy 
ratio using either the Standardised or Simplified Approach to gauge how they can settle their 
obligations and deal with losses (BCBS, 2010; Berger, 2010). Concerning the capital adequacy 
ratio of DTMFIs, Brady (2017) wrote that the capital adequacy ratio compares tier 1 capital 
and restricted tier 2 core capital to the risk-weighted assets of the DTMFIs. Tier 1 capital 
consists of core equity capital while tier 2 capital consists of general reserves and subordinated 
term debt. The earlier work on capital adequacy by Staschen (2003) stated that by correlating 
different capital components with varied risk weights, the capital adequacy ratio becomes 
superior to the minimum capital requirement, another prudential requirement for deposit 
protection. Berger (2010) points out that the threshold capital adequacy ratios for commercial 
banks and DTMFIs are 8 % and 12 %, respectively. This means that the capital adequacy ratio 
for DTMFIs is 50 % greater than the capital adequacy ratio for commercial banks indicating 
that DTMFIs are required to maintain high ratios of equity relative to their risk-weighted assets 
(CGAP, 2012). Conversely, the BCBS (2010) states that in some jurisdictions where there are 
no specialised microfinance laws, the capital adequacy ratio for DTMFIs and commercial 
banks are the same. 
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Several reasons have been cited in the empirical literature on why the capital adequacy 
ratio for DTMFIs should be higher than for commercial banks. Firstly, since low-income 
depositors cannot monitor the DTMFIs on how they intermediate their voluntary savings hence 
a higher capital adequacy ratio is justifiable as a means to protect their microdeposits 
(Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2016). Secondly, microfinance stakeholders such as the owners or 
investors are very cautious and do not readily respond to calls for increasing the capital bases 
of DTMFIs. Thirdly, the loan portfolios of MFIs are subjected to high levels of loan 
delinquency than the loan books of commercial banks (BCBS, 2010).  
Figure 2.15 shows the state of affairs concerning the implementation of the capital 
adequacy standards in Sub-Saharan Africa based on the Basel framework. Additional details 
are shown in Appendix 2. Only a few countries in SSA have partly or fully implemented Basel 
II capital adequacy recommendations. When the SSA countries are categorised into LISSA and 
Non-LISSA19 countries, interesting inferences are drawn. Only 7 out of 27 LISSA countries 
are implementing or have implemented the Basel framework recommendations. These LISSA 
countries are Burundi, Comoros, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.  
In Non-LISSA countries, 8 out of 20 countries are implementing or have implemented 
the Basel framework capital adequacy recommendations. These Non-LISSA countries are 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe and South 
Africa. Thus, there are lesser LISSA countries than are Non-LISSA that are implementing or 
have implemented the Basel framework capital adequacy recommendations. This indicates that 
based on the capital adequacy standard, low-income depositors from the LISSA countries are 
more exposed to the risk of non-payment of their savings by DTMFIs than are low-income 
depositors from the Non-LISSA countries.  
 
 
 
19 Based on the 2017 World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the Non-LISSA countries are Seychelles 
in the high-income (US$12 475 or more) category; Angola, Botswana, Equitorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritious, 
Namibia, South Africa in the upper middle income (US$4 036 to US$12 475) category; Cape Verde, Cameroon; 
Congo, Republic; Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, 
Swaziland and Zambia in the lower middle income (US$1 026 to US$4 035) category.   
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Figure 2.15: Implementation of the Capital Adequacy Standard based on the Basel 
Framework in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Adapted from Mecagni et al. (2015, p. 29) 
ii. Deposit Insurance   
Depositors’ savings are exposed to non-payment by deposit-taking institutions during 
periods of diminishing cash resources. This exposure necessitated the establishment of the first 
deposit insurance scheme in the United States in the 1930s after the Great Depression of 1929. 
Since then, many countries have implemented deposit insurance schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al., 2005). According to the fathers of the modern-day deposit insurance theory (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983), deposit insurance schemes help to avert widespread panic withdrawal of 
deposits in the event of a bank failure. In so doing, this helps to maintain the stability of the 
banking system since the panic withdrawal of deposits is contagious. Ngalawa (2012) noted 
that deposit insurance is important as it bolsters confidence in the functioning of the banking 
sector.  
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Taking into account the above-mentioned benefits of deposit insurance, empirical 
literature on deposit insurance additionally shows that two forms of deposit insurance schemes 
exist, implicit and explicit deposit insurance (Christen et al., 2003; Ngalawa, 2012; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2015). Implicit deposit insurance assumes that in every jurisdiction, national 
governments act as a fallback for failing deposit-taking financial institutions. Explicit deposit 
insurance involves initiatives by central banks and the law in creating pools of deposit 
insurance funds that mitigate failure by deposit-taking financial institutions in repaying 
depositors’ funds (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2005; Izaguirre, 2016). Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015, 
p. 4) stated that “implicit coverage always exists, regardless of the level of explicit coverage” 
but it is not guaranteed that the national governments will act as a safety net for ailing deposit-
taking financial institutions. Therefore, this means that explicit deposit insurance is superior as 
it is a better safeguard. Figure 2.16 shows the state of affairs in terms of the implementation of 
explicit deposit insurance20 schemes in SSA.  
Figure 2.16: Number of Countries with or without Explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using information from Mecagni et al. (2015, p. 28) 
Figure 2.16 above shows that, of the 27 LISSA countries, only 5 (Central African, 
Republic; Chad, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe) have implemented explicit deposit 
 
20 The focus of this study is on explicit deposit insurance as implicit deposit insurance is a de facto scheme. 
Additional details of the list of LISSA and Non-LISSA countries on the adoption of explicit deposit insurance 
schemes is provided in Appendix 3. 
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insurance schemes while the remaining 22 have not. Of the 18 Non-LISSA’s countries, only 6 
(Cameroon; Congo, Republic; Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria) have implemented 
explicit deposit insurance schemes while the remaining 12 have not. Thus, only a few countries 
have explicit deposit insurance schemes in SSA indicating that depositors’ funds are highly at 
risk should the deposit-taking financial institutions fail to contain panic withdrawals on 
deposits (Mecagni et al., 2015). According to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) and Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2015), explicit deposit insurance schemes have to be designed and implemented 
successfully based on several important considerations. The considerations are: organisation 
and administration of the deposit insurance pool, specifications on how the deposit insurance 
pool is funded, the types of contributory institutions, the amount and extent of coverage, the 
types of deposits that are covered, the types of contribution premiums and the assessment base 
and the form of pay-outs to depositors. According to McCoy (2007), having clear designs of 
explicit deposit insurance schemes for each national jurisdiction guards against pressure from 
power-sharing political associations and imitating the regulatory structures of well-advanced 
nations, having clear coverage limits, market discipline and a strong financial institutions 
framework. Explicit deposit insurance schemes in the LISSA countries where they are in place, 
are administered publicly with participation from both domestic and foreign banks. Table 2.3 
below shows the design of explicit deposit insurance in the LISSA countries that have adopted 
the scheme. 
In terms of deposits coverage, Central African Republic, Chad and Uganda cover 
foreign currency deposits and such deposits are not covered in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
Nonetheless, the explicit deposit insurance schemes of Tanzania and Zimbabwe both cover 
interbank deposits while the rest of the LISSA countries with explicit deposit insurance plans 
do not cover interbank deposits. In terms of funding, the explicit insurance deposit schemes 
amongst the LISSA countries are ex-ante funds that are funded privately. This means that the 
contributory banks contribute to their respective explicit deposit insurance pools at periodic 
time intervals prior to the pools’ pay-outs. Only Zimbabwe has backstop arrangements if the 
funds from the deposit insurance pool are insufficient to cover any claims. In the contribution 
process, only the premiums that are paid by banks from Uganda are adjusted for risk. 
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Table 2.3: Design of Explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes in some LISSA Countries as of 
2013 
LISSA country and the date of 
enacting deposit insurance 
Central 
African 
Republic 
(2011) 
Chad 
(2011) 
Tanzania 
(1994) 
Uganda 
(1994) 
Zimbabwe 
(2003) 
Type of Deposit Insurance Scheme           
Explicit x x x x x 
legally separate x x x  x 
central bank, supervisor, or ministry    x   
administered publicly x x x  x 
administered privately       
administered jointly    x   
paybox only x x     
payboxplus, loss or risk minimiser   x x x 
multiple schemes           
Participation and Coverage           
compulsory for domestic banks x x x x x 
local subsidiaries of foreign banks x x x x x 
local branches of foreign banks x x     
foreign currency deposits x x  x   
interbank deposits   x  x 
Coinsurance           
Funding           
ex-ante fund       
ex-post fund       
funded by government       
funded privately x x x x x 
funded jointly       
Backstop         x 
Contribution and Assessment Base           
risk-adjusted premium    x   
assessment base       
covered deposits       
eligible deposits       
total deposits x x x x x 
total liabilities           
Pay-outs to Depositors       
per deposit account       
per depositor per institution x x x x x 
per depositor       
deposit losses imposed           
 
Source: Adapted from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015, p. 15-16) 
The assessment base in the explicit deposit insurance pools in the LISSA countries as 
shown in Table 2.3 consists only of total deposits. In making pay-outs to depositors in the event 
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of bank runs, all the LISSA countries’ explicit deposit insurance pools adopted the per 
depositor per institution pay-out method. According to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015), disbursing 
funds to insured depositors this way benefits them when they have multiple accounts across 
different depository institutions. Figure 2.17 gives additional details on the rate of adoption and 
implementation of explicit deposit insurance schemes in the LISSA countries over time.  
Figure 2.17: Rate of Adoption of Explicit Deposit Insurance amongst the LISSA countries 
between the years 1990 and 2013 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data on the deposit insurance databases by Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2005) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015)  
In the 1990s, only two LISSA countries enacted explicit deposit insurance schemes, 
Tanzania and Uganda in 1994. In the decade 2000 to 2009, only Zimbabwe adopted explicit 
deposit insurance in 2003 and between 2010 and 2013, Central African Republic and Chad 
followed suite. These statistics show that the adoption of explicit deposit insurance schemes 
amongst the LISSA countries has been very slow over the past 23 to 30 years. In light of the 
above discussion, it can be deduced that the LISSA DTMFIs cannot liquid and be effective 
poverty reduction tools if there are no insurance schemes to ensure the safety of deposits 
thereby stifling the outreach mission of keeping existing deposits and tapping new deposits for 
intermediation into loans and also providing other micro-financial services. Thus, there is a 
linkage between financial performance (liquidity in the short term and financial sustainability 
in the long term) and social performance (outreach). Next, outreach is discussed.  
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2.7 Outreach 
2.7.1 The Concept of Outreach 
Social performance in the microfinance sector is associated with the term ‘outreach’, a 
term which is also used in other fields such as religion and natural sciences (Rao and Fitamo, 
2014). Outreach enables MFIs to provide a wide array of financial services to their clientele of 
varying income or poverty status. This has been made possible by the ever-increasing 
advancements in information and communication technologies such as the use of mobile 
devices in doing financial transactions and the growing realisation by national governments of 
promoting financial access to those that are financially excluded (Ndlovu, 2017). Xu et al. 
(2016) noticed that the social mission of the MFIs that is achieved through outreach 
distinguishes them from the commercial banking institutions and that it also varies across the 
MFIs depending on whether they follow a financial systems approach or a poverty lending 
approach. Littlefield, Murdoch and Hashemi (2003) had earlier on ignited this argument by 
stating that the social mission of the MFIs makes them superior to other poverty alleviation 
developmental efforts. Rao and Fitamo (2014) argued that outreach is hybrid in nature, based 
on the six dimensions of outreach that were propounded by Woller and Schreiner (2004); 
worth, cost, depth, breadth, scope and length. Combining these six dimensions produces a 
composite and technical definition: “outreach is worth minus cost, weighted by depth, summed 
across breadth of users and scope of contracts, and discounted through time” (Karanja, 2014, 
p. 4). Despite having six dimensions of outreach, empirical writers have mainly focused on 
outreach depth and breadth (Johnson, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; Abdulai and Tewari, 
2017a). Depth of outreach relates to the qualitative aspects and breadth of outreach relates to 
the quantitative aspects. 
2.7.2 Depth of Outreach 
The depth of the outreach dimension is concerned about the demographic and economic 
status of the clientele served by the MFIs (Woller and Schreiner, 2004). On the demographic 
front, some population groups are considered. Firstly, reaching out more to women than men 
is a sign of deepening financial access because women are more vulnerable to poverty than 
men (Ann and Tam, 2013). Secondly, delivering financial services to the disadvantaged groups 
such as the disabled and the elderly deepens outreach. Thirdly, reaching out to those residing 
in rural areas, informal settlements or marginalised areas deepens outreach.  
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On the economic front, outreach is deepened when microfinance services and products 
are consumed by the unemployed mostly the youths or the economic active populations, those 
engaged in Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), those that earn very low levels 
of income and those that live under the poverty datum line or the income poverty threshold of 
US$1.90 per day. Thus, extending financial services to the above seemingly underprivileged 
groups justifies the fact that the depth of outreach is associated with very small average 
balances on loans on the microcredit side and very small average deposit balances on the 
deposit-taking side (Chikaza, 2015; Amin et al., 2017). However, some researchers in 
microfinance literature have criticised the depth of outreach facets. Small average balances 
have been criticised that they are not reflective of the poverty client spectrum but are said to be 
congruent with the term and type of the products offered and the delivery methodologies of 
their suppliers (Johnson, 2015; Churchill and Marr, 2017). As the clientele becomes repeat 
customers, the MFIs are prone to increase their average balances on loans. Also, deposits not 
withdrawn for prolonged periods accumulate and grow in size in pursuit of reinvestment gains. 
Residing in rural areas does not necessarily indicate that one is poor. Some wealthy individuals 
in low-income countries may prefer to reside in rural areas as a lifestyle habit. Increased women 
emancipation and equity in employment opportunities are indicators that women are becoming 
empowered and richer. In light of all these criticisms, outreach has been dubbed a vague 
concept in some empirical writings (Rao and Fitamo, 2014; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a). The 
next section discusses breadth of outreach. 
2.7.3 Breadth of Outreach  
The breadth of outreach is associated with the volumes of microfinance services and 
products and the numbers of the active poor and the low-income households that are clients at 
a particular point in time (Rosenberg, 2009). Providing a variety of financial services and 
products to as many clients as possible in the right mix and quantities enables this dimension 
of outreach to be achieved. Drawing from the empirical writings of Schreiner (2002), 
Rosenberg (2009) and the Microfinance Information Exchange, the breadth of outreach 
measures related to microcredit provision are the number of active borrowers, the volume of 
the gross loan portfolio and the number of loans outstanding. On the deposit-taking side, the 
breadth of outreach is measured using the number of voluntary depositors, the volume of 
deposits and the number of deposit accounts. Empirics and reports from the MIX link the 
volumes of products or the number of clients served to the scale of operations (Wijesiri, Yaron 
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and Meoli, 2015; Xu et al., 2016). For instance, small-scale MFIs serve less than 10 000 
borrowers, medium-scale MFIs serve 10 000 to 30 000 borrowers and large-scale MFIs serve 
borrowers greater than 10 000 (MIX and the CGAP, 2012).  
2.7.4 The Background on Outreach and Financial Sustainability 
The success story of the Grameen Bank21 of Bangladesh in the 1970s in the provision 
of microcredit to the poor who were deemed unbankable by commercial banks ignited the 
proliferation of MFIs across the four corners of the world (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013). 
As a result of this successful pioneering work and as alluded earlier on, the provision of 
microfinance is one of the main means of lessening the effects of poverty amongst the most 
vulnerable populations. In spite of the glory that has been ascribed to the role of microfinance 
provision in poverty alleviation, Huq et al. (2017) noted that the global microfinance sector 
faces turmoil in balancing the double bottom line objectives; outreach and financial 
sustainability. Since the origins of microfinance provision in the 1970s, MFIs primarily focused 
on outreach to the pro-poor and low-income households that are mostly in rural and 
marginalised areas. Additionally, the provision of microloans to women dominated the 
activities of these suppliers of microfinance, and as long as the means of operations was 
subsidised by donors and governments, the MFIs remained viable (Amin et al., 2017).  
In the 1990s, shrinkage in the supply of subsidy funding crept in and crippled the 
microfinance sector forcing the institutions to look into commercial funds; equity, debt, MIVs 
and voluntary deposits as the plausible solution (Barbosha, 2013). This prompted the rush for 
commercial sources of finance coupled with the pursuit of profitability which breeds financial 
sustainability (Quayes, 2012). As a result, there was a paradigm shift from the very costly 
outreach to the pro-poor in the rural and marginalised sections, to profitable outreach to the 
better-off poor in the urban and peri-urban areas, a phenomenon called ‘mission drift’ in 
microfinance literature (Zerai and Rani, 2011; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a). Therefore, the next 
section discusses the nexus between outreach and financial sustainability. 
2.7.5 Outreach versus Financial Sustainability  
Outreach and financial sustainability are the benchmarks for analysis of social and 
financial performance of MFIs and they are also the widely debated concepts in microfinance 
 
21 The Grameen Bank and its founder Professor Muhammad Yunus received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.   
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(Anyawu, 2004; Rao and Fitamo, 2014). Put together, empirics have traditionally called them 
the double bottom-line objectives of microfinance provision and the interconnectedness of 
these dual objectives distinguishes the microfinance sector from the commercial banking 
institutions (Briere and Szafarz, 2014; Yeshi, 2015; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a; Huq et al., 
2017; Khan, Shaorong and Ullah, 2017; Tadele, Roberts and Whiting, 2018). Additionally, 
Briere and Szafarz (2014) added that these dual objectives of MFIs distinguish them as hybrid 
financial institutions.  
In line with the ever-changing business environment, models and different stakeholder 
requirements, there is, however, a growing move towards the triple bottom-line objectives 
which incorporate the environmental impact and awareness objective on top of the double 
bottom-line objectives (Guntz, 2011). It is in this regard that Millson (2013) opined that the 
outreach-financial sustainability relationship is dependent on the different requirements of 
stakeholders. Since outreach and financial sustainability are two sides of the same coin, there 
is an inconclusive debate amongst microfinance researchers on whether these two objectives 
can be achieved at the same time. Morduch (2000) called this debate the ‘Microfinance Schism’ 
while Rhyne (1998) dubbed it ‘the Yin and Yang of Microfinance’. Thus, the top-level 
management in the microfinance sector has a huge task in this regard, as they have to balance 
both financial return and social return in their risk management framework (Parisetti and 
Kirimkan, 2015). Hence, there are three different views on the outreach-financial sustainability 
nexus.  
The first group of microfinance researchers argues that outreach and financial 
sustainability can be achieved simultaneously. In other words, outreach and financial 
sustainability are parallel themes indicating that both can be achieved at the same time without 
any counter harm (Ek, 2011). In the same vein, Guntz (2011) acknowledged the compatibility 
between outreach and financial sustainability by contending that these two objectives can go 
hand in hand. Martínez (2015) also picked the row and argued that MFIs do well by doing good 
when there is compatibility between outreach and financial sustainability. According to Huq et 
al. (2017), compatibility between outreach and financial sustainability is very important as it 
produces synergies. From these views, it can therefore be deduced that outreach and financial 
sustainability are complementary objectives (Abate et al., 2013; Yeshi, 2015). This is 
substantiated by empirical evidence on the success of bigger MFIs such as Bancosol in Bolivia 
which has reached out to vast masses of the poorest on a sustainable basis (Abdulai and Tewari, 
2017a). 
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The second group of microfinance researchers is of the view that outreach and financial 
sustainability are conflicting objectives. MFIs pursue one objective at the expense of the other 
(Huq et al., 2017). When financial sustainability is the primary goal, outreach is subordinate 
and vice versa. As argued by this group of researchers, MFIs shun the unemployed, the pro-
poor and the rural folk whom they deem are costly to serve and then concentrate on the salaried, 
the better-off poor and the urban dwellers (Chikaza, 2015; Bhuiyan et al., 2016). According to 
Cull and Morduch (2017), this increased focus by MFIs towards financial sustainability 
indicates that the MFIs have lost their moral compass. Thus, this group of researchers concurs 
that the financial sustainability drive has led MFIs to move away from their original mission 
of serving the huge masses of the unbanked populations, a marvel that is referred to as mission 
drift (Rouf, 2012; Millson, 2013; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a). Mission drift is evidenced by 
the disbursement of large average loan balances, mobilising large average deposit balances and 
charging commercial microcredit interest rates22 (Zerai and Rani, 2011). Accordingly, some 
researchers advocate that there exists a ‘trade-off’ between outreach and financial sustainability 
(Huq et al., 2017). At this point, financial sustainability should equal outreach (Guntz, 2011). 
Abera (2010) referred to this point as the optimality of outreach and financial sustainability. 
The concepts of mission drift and trade-off are discussed in detail in section 2.7.6.  
The third group of microfinance researchers is of the view that the outreach-financial 
sustainability relationship is neutral as these two objectives have no significant influence on 
each other (Huq et al., 2017). This means that there is no relationship between outreach and 
financial sustainability, hence no trade-off. Nonetheless, Chikaza (2015) opined that whatever 
the relationship between outreach and financial sustainability may be, both objectives are 
pivotal in the fight against poverty. This is what Johnson (2015, p. 123) described as 
“eradicating poverty through profits”. In this realm, Bassem (2009) likewise reasoned that 
financial sustainability ensures continual and not snapshot outreach. On the same strand, Helms 
(2006, p. 56) reiterated that: 
… “financial sustainability is necessary to reach significant numbers of poor people on 
a permanent basis. But building financially sustainable institutions is not an end in 
itself. Is it the only way to make an impact far beyond what donor agencies and most 
governments can fund?”  
 
22 It is argued that the poor can afford to repay microloans pegged at commercial rates which are influenced by 
the environment the MFIs thrive in (Rosenberg, Gonzalez and Narian, 2009). 
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The discourse on outreach and financial sustainability cannot be complete without 
noting that the financial mission has eclipsed the social mission given the notable 
commercialisation of MFIs. Commercialisation encourages the MFIs to be self-sufficient 
institutions through profit-orientation by seeking commercial sources of finance (equity and 
debt) and charging commercial interest rates on the lines of credit that they advance 
(Ledgerwood and White, 2006). Thus, commercialisation has pushed a number of social-
oriented MFIs which followed the pro-poor outreach mission through subsidised funding to 
redirect their focus towards the financial mission. It is in this regard that a number of NGOs 
have turned into either NBFIs or microfinance banks by seeking deposit-taking licences which 
they were largely restricted to get in various jurisdictions (D’Espallier et al., 2017).  
The next section further discusses the concepts of mission drift and trade-off in detail.  
2.7.6 Mission Drift and Trade-off 
Mission drift is the shift of focus by MFIs from serving the remote poor, women 
clientele and those that reside in rural or marginalised areas with financial services packaged 
in micro-amounts, to serving the wealthier clients who mainly reside in urban areas and demand 
financial services of larger amounts (Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Armendariz and Szafarz, 
2011; Churchill, 2019). Mission drift is mainly attributed to revolutionary changes or 
commercialisation of the microfinance sector in search of profitability (Kar, 2013; Rahman, 
Luo, Hafeez and Sun, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; Johnson, 2017). Hermes and Hudon 
(2018) associated mission drift with competition as the microfinance industry is evolving to 
include several financial service providers with profit motives. Hudon and Sandberg (2013) 
argued that commercialisation due to increased use of commercial funds leads to mission drift 
while commercialisation by MFIs as they try to cut on costs by applying market-based 
principles has fewer consequences for mission drift. Johnson (2017) argued that 
commercialisation mixed with market power results in mission drift but Ulla, Khawaja and 
Iqbal (2019) did not concur as they argued that there is no conclusive evidence that market 
conditions force MFIs to drift from their original mission. Xu et al. (2015) argued that the 
mission drift argument is stirred by both MFI characteristics and macroeconomic factors. 
Hartaska (2005), Bassem (2009) and Hartarska, Nadolnyak and Mersland (2014) and 
Rahman et al. (2015) contended that the mission drift debate is hinged on corporate governance 
issues; stakeholder representation and their support for independent boards with limited 
participation of employees, gender diversity and board size.  
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Mission drift has implications for different microfinance stakeholders such as the 
clientele, MFIs and policymakers. Different studies point out that mission drift results in a 
change in the composition of the clientele served or target market; from poorer to wealthier; 
rural to urban; informal to formal; less focus on women; groups to individuals (Hermes et al., 
2011; Churchill, 2019). However, Cuéllar-Fernández, Fuertes-Callén, Serrano-Cinca and 
Gutiérrez (2016) argued that mission drift does not necessarily occur on the target market but 
may be on the interest margins. They noted that MFIs with high margins disburse small loans 
to compensate for the inherent high operating costs, therefore this does not mean that they have 
drifted from their original mission. Lowering interest margins in deepening outreach can only 
be done so by lowering operating costs. The recent work of Cull and Morduch (2017) states 
that the implication of mission drift for MFIs is that they will be considered as institutions that 
have lost their moral campus. Also, the father of microfinance provision, Muhammed Yunus 
and the Welfarists, criticise mission drift as it leads MFIs in becoming usurious moneylenders 
thereby putting a dent on the microfinance industry (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2009; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2013; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b). This, in turn, slows down 
macroeconomic policies that focus on microfinance as the vehicle for the financial inclusion 
agenda and eradication of extreme poverty.  
Hermes and Hudon (2018, p. 6) defined the outreach-financial sustainability trade-off 
in microfinance as “the choice MFIs make regarding combinations of financial and social 
performance and the consequences this has for their operations”. Hermes and Lensink (2007) 
argued that the empirical evidence on the outreach-financial sustainability nexus suffers from 
being anecdotal or case study driven. On the same note, Wijesiri et al. (2015) realised that the 
relationship between outreach and financial sustainability is dependent on ownership 
modalities since owners have their desired outreach and financial sustainability mix. Reichert 
(2018) observed that attainment of the dual objectives is a highly debated topic in empirical 
literature and that there are three sets of studies: firstly, those that report the existence of trade-
offs; secondly, those that refute the existence of trade-offs, and thirdly, those that exhibit 
synergies.  
Hermes and Hudon (2018) observed that the outreach and financial sustainability trade-
off depends on the context-specific factors especially the country-specific context. On the same 
note, Lam, Zhang, Ang and Jacob (2019) argued that the existence of trade-offs shows that the 
MFIs are not consistent over time in the attainment of their dual objectives. According to Kar 
(2013), where trade-offs have been found, it is evidence that the MFIs are prone to mission 
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drift. In this realm, the third objective of this study was carried out as an attempt to check for 
the existence of trade-offs and/or mission drift in the depository microfinance sector of the 
LISSA countries in the pursuit of outreach and financial sustainability goals. 
2.8 Conclusion  
 
The primary goal of the 2016 to 2030 Sustainable Development Goals of the United 
Nations of eradicating extreme poverty through microfinance can only be achieved if 
microfinance provision in the LISSA countries is financially sustainable, liquid and reaches 
out to many of the poorest profitably under enabling macroeconomic conditions. The next 
chapter provides a theoretical and empirical review of the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature review in this chapter is categorised into three 
sections in line with the three objectives of the study that were outlined in Chapter one. The 
first literature review section is based on the first objective of the study which looks at deposits 
and financial sustainability. The second literature review focusses on liquidity and deposit 
insurance, the study’s second objective. The third section is a review of literature on outreach 
and financial sustainability which is the third objective of the study. The conceptual framework 
for the study based on literature review is also highlighted before the chapter summary which 
concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Deposits and Financial Sustainability 
3.2.1 Theoretical Framework for Deposits and Financial Sustainability 
In an attempt to understand why DTMFIs in the LISSA countries fall short in attaining 
financial sustainability, this section discusses two theories that focus on deposits and financial 
sustainability. The first theory, the financial intermediation theory relates to deposits, and the 
second theory which is the Institutionalists’ theory, relates to financial sustainability. 
i.  The Theory of Financial Intermediation of Deposits 
The theory of financial intermediation has been the predominant banking theory on 
deposits and loans since the 1960s up to the present day (Werner, 2014; 2016). The origins of 
this theory can be traced back to the work of von Mises (1912) and Keynes (1936). According 
to this theory, deposit-taking financial institutions such as banks and DTMFIs mobilise deposits 
from market segments that have surplus cash resources or savings to intermediate them as loans 
to borrowers who are cash deficient.  This theory also draws no lines of distinction between 
banks and non-banking financial institutions which mobilise deposits for intermediation. 
Deposits are a financing instrument for DTMFIs that are used to finance the loan book and the 
main operational activities. This results in financing costs being paid to the poor and low-
income depositors in the form of interest. However, the work of Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer 
(2012) states that the interest that is paid to the microfinance depositors is usually very low 
thereby making microfinance deposits a relatively cheaper source of financing operations and 
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the loan portfolio. With very low financing costs, profitability is increased thereby boosting 
financial sustainability.  
In the 1970s, Sealey and Lindley (1977) likened financial intermediation to a 
production process, whereby deposits are inputs which are intermediated or converted into 
output in the form of loans (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Based on this view of the theory of 
financial intermediation, it means that as the DTMFIs increase their scale of operations through 
mobilising huge deposit volumes, they are in a way, adding more inputs into the production or 
financial intermediation process. Therefore, economies of scale come into play as noted by 
Ngo et al. (2014) who stated that optimal scales of operation in microfinance are established 
by understanding the relationships between inputs and outputs of financial institutions. In other 
words, as the volume of the deposits (inputs) increases, there are decrements in the costs of 
mobilising such deposits due to economies of scale implying that the depository microfinance 
sector in the LISSA region should be operating at a low cost as they have enormous deposit 
volumes. This breeds high operating profits which spearhead the attainment of financial 
sustainability.  
The modern-day view of the theory of financial intermediation is still similar to the 
view of its earlier proponents (Werner, 2014; 2016). The limitation of this theory is that its 
advocates do not draw a line between banks and non-banking institutions when yet, all 
regulators of banking institutions and non-banking financial institutions across the world 
separate the two based on the nature of their operations, mission and target clientele. In 
addition, many financial services are solely provided by banking institutions which cannot be 
provided by the non-mainstream banking institutions including the DTMFIs. Jameaba (2018) 
further strengthened this point by arguing that banks are at the core of the financial 
intermediation process than the non-mainstream banking institutions because of their huge 
asset sizes.  
ii.  The Institutionalists’ Theory of Financial Sustainability 
According to the Institutionalists’ theory which was propounded by Rhyne (1998) and 
Woller et al. (1999), both COMFIs and DTMFIs are profit-oriented institutions that primarily 
seek to attain financial sustainability through earning interest income or through cost recovery 
rather than reliance on donor funding. Financial sustainability is achieved through charging 
commercial microcredit interest rates or implementing cost-cutting measures both of which 
result in high operating profits (Rosenberg et al., 2013). The Institutionalists believe that 
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delivery of microfinance without adopting a commercialised business model will lead to failure 
of MFIs going forward. Donors are not capable of bankrolling the operations of MFIs 
consistently into the future. It is only through the adoption of commercial capital and 
commercial lending rates that MFIs can attain financial sustainability (Ledgerwood and White, 
2006).  
This study, therefore, posits that the LISSA DTMFIs can attain financial sustainability 
through leveraging on the huge voluntary deposit volumes that they mobilise (commercial 
capital) to finance their operations because deposits as a financing option, are repayable at low 
interest rates (Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). This is in line with the cost recovery 
approach of the Institutionalists’ theory. Once financial sustainability has been achieved, the 
DTMFIs can then seek to achieve the subordinate objective; outreach. The main drawback of 
this theory is that it encourages MFIs to prioritise financial sustainability at the expense of 
reaching out to the poor and low-income households; the original mandate of microfinance 
provision.  
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence  
 
Empirical literature presents various results from several studies that looked at the 
financial sustainability of MFIs. The studies reviewed below were based on different samples; 
global, continental, regional, national and case studies.  
Ayayi and Sene (2010) studied 217 MFIs across 101 countries for the years 1998 to 
2006 using data obtained from the MIX in order to understand the drivers of the financial 
sustainability of MFIs. That study used the multiple linear regression technique and adopted 
the financial self-sufficiency ratio as the dependent variable. The estimated results showed that 
portfolio at risk and personnel costs are negative drivers of financial sustainability while 
financial revenue, age and the average loan balance are positive drivers of financial 
sustainability. The proportion of women clientele served was not found to be a significant 
driver of financial sustainability. Thus, the study of Ayayi and Sene (2010) indicated that the 
financial sustainability of MFIs is driven by their ability to contain internal factors. However, 
this study did not consider the external drivers of financial sustainability which were 
highlighted in other studies such as Gashayie and Singh (2015).  
Nyamsogoro (2010) looked at the financial sustainability of 98 Tanzanian rural MFIs 
using primary and secondary data for the years 2004 to 2007 which were analysed using 
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different panel econometric methods; random effects, fixed effects, pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), the instrumental variables technique and the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM). Operational self-sufficiency was the measure for financial sustainability. That study 
revealed that financial sustainability in the rural areas of Tanzania is influenced by several 
factors; “capital structure, interest rates charged, differences in lending types, cost per 
borrower, yield on gross loan portfolio, level of portfolio at risk, liquidity level, staff 
productivity and the operating efficiency” (Nyamsogoro, 2010, p. iv). The findings of 
Nyamsogoro (2010) were consistent with the findings of Ayayi and Sene (2010) as that study 
also did not consider the impact of the external environment in influencing the attainment of 
financial sustainability in the Tanzanian microfinance sector.  
Bogan (2012) examined the capital structure of a global sample of MIX reporting MFIs 
that had US$1.3 million in total assets for the years 2003 to 2006. The MFIs sampled in this 
study were drawn from Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and 
South Asia. That study investigated how changes in capital relate to efficiency and financial 
sustainability of MFIs. Using the OLS method, the deposits to assets ratio which is a proxy for 
deposit mobilisation, was found to be negatively related to operational self-sufficiency. That 
study yielded similar results when probit regression was utilised, but using the financial self-
sufficiency ratio as the measure of financial sustainability. The results of the two stage 
instrumental variables approach found no significant relations between the deposits to assets 
ratio and financial sustainability. Bogan (2012) also concluded that financing operations 
through grants relates negatively with financial sustainability but is positive with the cost per 
borrower. This finding was later on also confirmed in the study of Bayai and Ikhide (2018).  
Kinde (2012) investigated the financial sustainability of 14 Ethiopian MFIs using data 
for the years 2002 to 2010 obtained from the National Bank of Ethiopia and the MIX. The 
random effects model was adopted and financial self-sufficiency was the indicator for financial 
sustainability, the dependent variable. In line with Bogan (2012), the results of Kinde’s study 
showed that dependence on donations for equity capital and the costs incurred in administering 
loans to borrowers pull down attainment of financial sustainability. Outreach depth (average 
loan balance per borrower) and breadth (logarithm of the number of active borrowers) were 
found to be factors that positively influence financial sustainability. Ayayi and Sene (2010) 
also found a positive association between outreach depth and financial sustainability. The 
coefficient of productivity as measured by the borrowers per staff member was not a 
statistically significant factor for attaining financial sustainability. On the contrary, 
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Nyamsogoro (2010) concluded that productivity of the staff members is significant in 
explaining financial sustainability.  
Rai and Rai (2012) undertook a study to determine the factors that affect the financial 
sustainability of MFIs from India and Bangladesh utilising data from the MIX for the periods 
2005-6 and 2009-10 of 26 MFIs which were drawn from each of these countries. Financial 
sustainability was proxied using operational self-sufficiency. Based on the multiple linear 
regression technique, Rai and Rai (2012) found out that financial sustainability is positively 
associated with high capital adequacy and financial revenue earned from the loans advanced. 
Operating expenses were found to impede attaining of financial sustainability. Factors such as 
financial leverage, inception and the percentage of women clientele were not statistically 
significant thereby corroborating the findings of Ayayi and Sene (2010). 
Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) conducted a comparative analytic study of the financial 
sustainability of 12 Nepalese MIX reporting MFIs using data for the years 2006 to 2010. Using 
ratio analysis, their study found that the deposits to assets and deposits to loans ratios are highly 
significant in explaining financial performance. This finding is in marked contrast to the 
findings of Bogan (2012) who reported a negative relationship between the deposits to assets 
ratio and financial sustainability. Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) also concluded that the financial 
performance of MFIs in Nepal is dependent on the charter type. Financial performance in terms 
of the return on assets, return on equity and operational self-sufficiency surpassed the global 
benchmarks for all the charter types except for the government-owned MFIs. The co-operatives 
were found to perform well on the deposit-taking front as they are highly dependent on deposits 
for their operational existence and investment purposes.  
Tehulu (2013) conducted a study on the determinants of financial sustainability in East 
Africa. That study utilised an unbalanced panel dataset for the years between 2004 and 2009 
for 23 MIX reporting MFIs. The baseline results were obtained through the probit model and 
financial self-sufficiency was the dependent variable. Loan intensity as captured by the gross 
loan portfolio to total assets and size as measured by the logarithm of the total assets were 
found to be positive determinants of financial sustainability. The operating expenses ratio and 
loan portfolio quality (portfolio at risk) were found to be negative determinants of financial 
sustainability. Nonetheless, the results showed that deposits, as measured by the deposits to 
total assets, were not one of the key determinants of financial sustainability. This finding was 
not consistent with studies such as Bogan (2012) as well as Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) who 
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respectively found a negative and positive influence of deposits to assets on financial 
sustainability. Outreach breadth as represented by the logarithm of the number of active 
borrowers was positive but not statistically significant. In marked contrast, Kinde (2012) found 
a positive and significant relationship between the number of active borrowers and financial 
sustainability. As a robustness check, the ordered probit model was adopted, and corroborating 
results were found, except for financial leverage which was not significant.  
Bhanot and Bapat (2014) attempted to derive a sustainability index of MFIs using the 
technique of order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) based on the factors that 
they considered as determinants of financial sustainability in India. They considered data of 81 
MIX reporting MFIs for the year 2010 and adopted three dependent variables; average loan 
balance, logarithm of the number of borrowers and operational self-sufficiency. That study 
reported that size, as measured by the logarithm of the gross loan portfolio, the productivity of 
the loan officers, profitability when represented using the return on assets, are positive 
contributory variables for attaining financial sustainability. Financing the operations through 
leverage was found to contribute negatively to financial sustainability contrasting the findings 
of Rai and Rai (2012) who found financial leverage to be insignificant in influencing financial 
sustainability. In line with the conclusion of Tehulu (2013), financing the operations through 
deposits and ageing were also not found to be contributory factors towards achieving financial 
sustainability. 
Long and Marwa (2015) carried out a study to find the determinants of the financial 
sustainability of 25 MFIs in Ghana utilising data from the MIX for the period between 2006 
and 2011. They adopted the random effects econometric framework and measured financial 
sustainability using financial self-sufficiency. The operating expenses ratio was found to be 
negative with financial sustainability corroborating the results of Rai and Rai (2012). Similar 
to the results of Ayayi and Sene (2010), financial revenue was positively related to financial 
sustainability. Staff productivity was reported as a negative determinant of financial 
sustainability. This finding is consistent with Ayayi and Sene (2010) but contradicts the 
findings of Kinde (2012). The estimated results also showed that factors such as administration 
expenses, outreach depth and breadth, financial leverage, size and loan portfolio quality were 
insignificant determinants of financial sustainability. However, the result on financial leverage 
was not consistent with the findings of Bhanot and Bapat (2014) but was in line with Rai and 
Rai (2012). The insignificance of the portfolio at risk as a financial sustainability determinant 
confirmed the results of Rai and Rai (2012) but was contrary to the findings of Ayayi and Sene 
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(2010) as well as Bhanot and Bapat (2014) who reported that portfolio at risk is negative 
financial sustainability.   
After conducting a comprehensive literature review of different studies that were 
conducted across different parts of the world, Gashayie and Singh (2015) concluded that the 
factors that affect the financial sustainability of MFIs are in three categories; borrower related 
factors, macroeconomic factors and MFI-related factors. The borrower related factors include 
cost per borrower, number of active borrowers, women borrowers and group lending. The 
macroeconomic factors that influence financial sustainability were identified as per capita 
income, interest rate, competition, degree of economic freedom. Of the MFI-related factors, 
the following were identified; outreach breadth and depth, staff productivity, size, loan 
intensity, age, capital structure variables, yield on the gross loan portfolio, operating expenses 
ratio, management efficiency and deposit mobilisation. 
Bayai and Ikhide (2016a) also conducted a literature review study in an attempt to 
derive a conceptual view on financing and financial sustainability of MFIs. The financing 
options considered included subsidies, debt, deposits and equity and all these were found to 
vary across regions. Subsidised funding was identified as a financing option that has become 
less popular in the capital structure of MFIs due to its dwindling nature, dependency syndrome 
and inefficiency and the paradigm shift towards the commercial sources of finance. Smart 
subsidies, that is, subsidies that are within limits and designed carefully were therefore 
considered as the ones that improve financial sustainability. Debt financing was found to 
contribute to the attainment of financial sustainability through addressing the agency problem 
but it was cautioned that it has to be kept at very low levels so as to avoid the risk of running 
into insolvency and mission drift. Nonetheless, other studies reported different results on the 
use of financial leverage in augmenting financial sustainability (Rai and Rai, 2012; Tehulu, 
2013; Bhanot and Bapat, 2014). Deposit financing was found to significantly influence 
financial sustainability but it is embedded with compliance costs that erode operating revenues. 
This finding was consistent with Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) but contradictory to Tehulu 
(2012). Equity financing was also found to spur the attainment of financial sustainability. 
Mwizarubi et al. (2016) examined the financing paradigms of Tanzanian MFIs using 
time series quarterly data for the years 1997 to 2014 of the National Microfinance Bank. Using 
the OLS method, three models were estimated using three different dependent variables for 
measuring financial sustainability; return on assets, operational self-sufficiency and financial 
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self-sufficiency. The study concluded that the deposits to assets ratio is positively correlated 
with financial sustainability measures; the operational self-sufficiency ratio, the financial self-
sufficiency ratio and the return on assets. This conclusion is corroborated by Shaoyan (2012) 
as well as Bayai and Ikhide (2016a). Equity capital was also found to significantly contribute 
to operational self-sufficiency in line with the findings of Bayai and Ikhide (2016a). However, 
equity financing was not statistically significant with financial self-sufficiency and the return 
on assets. Financial leverage was not found to influence financial sustainability in all the 
estimated models. Subsidy funding was not considered unlike other studies such as Bogan 
(2012), Tehulu (2013) and Bayai and Ikhide (2016a).  
Bayai and Ikhide (2018) used an unbalanced panel dataset of 60 selected MIX reporting 
MFIs from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) for the years 2006 to 2012. 
Their estimated probit regression output did not show any significance of deposits in explaining 
the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability. This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Tehulu (2013) and is in contrast to the findings of Bogan (2012).  Donations were found to 
reduce the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability in concurrence with Bogan (2012). 
Equity financing and the real yield on the gross loan portfolio were found to increase the 
likelihood of attaining financial sustainability. This finding is similar to the finding of 
Mwizarubi et al. (2016). Financial leverage, new and mature MFIs, cost per borrower and 
portfolio at risk were factors that were found to reduce the likelihood of attaining financial 
sustainability.  
Wambua (2018) examined the effect of capital structure variables on financial 
sustainability using ten-year data for the years 2006 to 2015 of DTMFIs in Kenya. However, 
Wambui (2018) did not consider deposits as a capital structure variable unlike the other studies 
such as Bogan (2012) as well as Bayai and Ikhide (2016a; 2018) that also looked at the capital 
structure of MFIs. Nonetheless, the results of her study through multiple regression analysis 
pointed out that the use of leverage (debt) and ploughed back profits (equity) significantly 
influence financial sustainability positively. Equity in the form of common stock was found to 
be negatively related to financial sustainability contradicting the findings of Mwizarubi et al. 
(2016) and Bayai and Ikhide (2018) who found a positive relationship between equity financing 
and the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability.  
A closer look into the aforementioned previous research works reveals that financial 
sustainability of MFIs is affected by a myriad of factors. Moreover, the present study notes that 
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there are differences in the determinants of financial sustainability of COMFIs and those of 
DTMFIs as the latter financial institutions have a different working environment cost-wise23 
compared to the former financial institutions. Deposits, as one of these factors, were linked to 
financial sustainability using the deposits to assets ratio and mixed results were reported. The 
relationship between deposits to assets and financial sustainability was found to be positive, 
negative and insignificant with financial sustainability in different locations using different 
methodologies and samples. The variability of these findings in empirical literature confirms 
the observation made by Bayai and Ikhide (2016a) that the association between deposits and 
financial sustainability of MFIs varies from one region to another. Nonetheless, none of the 
above-cited prior research works have attempted to explain why the LISSA’s depository 
microfinance sector despite its huge deposit volumes, has recorded failures of DTMFIs in 
achieving financial sustainability. Accordingly, this study intends to fill this research gap. 
Unlike the previous studies, this study uses scales of operations of deposit volumes in 
attempting to explain why the depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries is found 
wanting in attaining financial sustainability.  
The next section is a literature review on liquidity and deposit insurance, the second 
objective of the study. 
3.3 Liquidity and Deposit Insurance 
 
3.3.1 Theories on Liquidity and Deposit Insurance 
This section discusses three theories. Firstly, there is a discussion of the theory of 
financial intermediation with a special focus on its provision of the liquidity arm. The second 
theory relates to deposit insurance. The third theory under discussion is the liquidity preference 
theory.  
i.  The Provision of Liquidity Function of the Theory of Financial Intermediation 
This section builds on what was discussed in Section 3.2.1 on the theory of financial 
intermediation by focussing on one of its arms, the provision of liquidity. The provision of 
liquidity arm of the theory of financial intermediation is one of the main functions of financial 
 
23 Regulatory costs are heavy on the DTMFIs given the higher capital requirements, licensing and other legal 
costs; and deposits have to accumulate to a certain level before they can edify financial sustainability (Robinson, 
2004; Ledgerwood and White, 2006; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a). 
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intermediaries; banking and non-banking institutions (Andries and Cuza, 2009). According to 
Diamond and Dybvirg (1983), financial intermediaries exist to provide liquidity to depositors 
whenever they require their funds in the form of withdrawals. Deposits are a liability to a 
financial intermediary that must be repaid when the need arises. McCoy (2007) stated that 
financial institutions also provide liquidity to borrowers in the form of loans, one of the 
financial institutions’ assets. Thus, financial intermediaries meet their short-term financial 
obligations through a system of asset and liability management. In cases of panic withdrawals, 
financial intermediaries are most likely to be illiquid due to the runs on deposits. As a counter, 
financial intermediaries like commercial banks subscribe to deposit protection schemes which 
help to safeguard depositors’ funds thereby guaranteeing the supply of withdrawals on deposits.  
The provision of liquidity arm of the theory of financial intermediation has been applied 
by microfinance researchers in different studies (Ogol, 2013; Odunga et al., 2013; Sam, 2015). 
Supported by Tehulu (2016), these microfinance writers argue that DTMFIs and COMFIs 
should be able to provide liquidity to their clientele by meeting their withdrawals on deposits 
and loan requests. 
ii.  Deposit Insurance Theory  
The origins of the deposit insurance theory are attributed to the reputable work of 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). According to this theory, deposit-taking financial institutions 
seek insurance cover against panic and unexpected runs on deposits to preserve the liquidity of 
these institutions (Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). In addition, deposit insurance cover helps to 
curb contagion risk in the financial system when one deposit-taking financial institution fails 
(Riquet and Poursat, 2013) and also helps to attract new deposits since the potential and 
existing depositors would trust that their funds are safe (Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). This 
way, deposit insurance provides or preserves liquidity in deposit-taking financial institutions. 
In spite of these benefits, it has been argued that deposit insurance schemes may alter the 
behaviour of the deposit-taking institutions thereby igniting the moral hazard problem 
(Ngalawa, 2012).  
Moral hazard in deposit-taking is the danger that deposit-taking financial institutions 
may take an excessive risk using depositors’ funds as they have the assurance that any losses 
incurred will be borne by the deposit insurance pool (McCoy, 2007). According to Ngalawa 
(2012), excessive risk-taking behaviour by banking institutions occurs on the liability side of 
the banks’ balance sheets. On the assets side, the moral hazard problem emanates from the 
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depositors themselves. Hughes and Mester (2013) wrote that excessive risk-taking by deposit-
taking financial institutions takes place when there are arbitrage opportunities in the pricing of 
deposit insurance. However, this excessive risk-taking ultimately exposes the deposit-taking 
financial institutions to liquidity risk (Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016). The moral hazard 
problem, however, was not incorporated in the pioneering work on the theory of deposit-
insurance by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Later writers on the theory of deposit insurance 
schemes added that the absence or presence of these schemes tends to influence the behaviour 
of depositors differently (McCoy, 2007; Carroll and Takayama, 2010).  
In the absence of deposit insurance cover, depositors discipline deposit-taking financial 
institutions from excessive risk-taking as they know that they do not have the fallback. In this 
regard, the depositors punish deposit-taking financial institutions either by withdrawing their 
funds which depletes liquidity or by demanding high returns on their deposits. Where deposit 
insurance cover is present, depositors can hardly punish the banks as they trust that their 
deposits are protected. This way, Calomiris and Jaremski (2016, p.1) wrote that “deposit 
insurance reduces liquidity risk by removing the incentives of depositors to withdraw from 
banks when concerned about insolvency risk”.  
iii.  The Liquidity Preference Theory 
The liquidity preference theory was founded by John Maynard Keynes in 1936. 
According to the liquidity preference theory, liquidity refers to the money held in the form of 
cash and when people prefer to have money in the form of cash; their preference is called 
liquidity preference. This liquidity preference is due to transactional, precautionary and 
speculative motives. The liquidity preference theory assumes that the transactional and 
precautionary motives are highly income elastic while the speculative motive is interest rate 
elastic. Another assumption is that the money supply as determined by the monetary authorities 
is fixed and perfectly inelastic. The monetary authorities influence the interest rates and when 
they cannot, the economy would be in a liquidity trap. The interest rate is determined by factors 
that affect the liquidity preference of the economic agents or it can be said that the rate of 
interest is the payment for partying with liquidity. Thus, the interest rate is the point where 
money demand is equal to the money supply. The limitations of the liquidity preference theory 
are that it does not take into account that the interest rate can be determined by non-monetary 
factors also. The liquidity preference theory ignores the fact that for investments to take place 
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there should be savings. Some microfinance scholars applied the liquidity preference theory in 
their studies; Kimathi et al. (2015) and Murage and Muiru (2016).  
3.3.2 Empirical Evidence on Liquidity and Deposit Insurance 
Liquidity in the microfinance sector is influenced by several factors. Of these factors, 
the first category relates to the behaviour of the depositors in lodging and withdrawing their 
deposits; the second category relates to MFI-specifics and the third category relates to 
macroeconomic factors.  
The studies of Mata (2011) and Maxwell et al. (2018) looked at the behaviour of 
depositors in influencing liquidity in the microfinance sector. 
Mata (2011) considered 7828 deposit contracts for the years 2002 to 2008 drawn from 
12 village banks in the Malian Rural Microfinance Network, PASECA-Kayes. Deposits were 
divided into two classes; migrants’ deposits which are the deposits or remittances of those that 
are in the diaspora into DTMFIs of the home country, and the locals’ deposits in the DTMFIs 
of the home country. The distribution of withdrawals was calculated through a bootstrapping 
technique. That study concluded that migrants’ deposits expose DTMFIs to liquidity risk as the 
migrants were found to withdraw their time deposits before maturity. Furthermore, it was 
concluded that the level of deposits at risk is higher for migrants than for locals. Under such 
circumstances, Milosevic and Kalos (2016) stated that such deposits are unstable, and lead the 
deposit-taking financial institutions to prolonged episodes of liquidity problems which expose 
them to the risk of insolvency.  
Maxwell et al. (2018) carried out a study to examine liquidity risk faced by Ghanaian 
MFIs and how it can be managed after consolidating in-depth interviews’ responses from 84 
respondents drawn from 6 MFIs across the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The MFIs surveyed 
had been operational for at least 10 years. Maxwell et al. (2018) discovered that large 
withdrawals by depositors during the last quarter of each year cause acute shortages of liquid 
resources in the first quarter of each next subsequent year. In addition, the study unveiled that 
Ghanaian MFIs also do not assess their liquidity positions periodically. Thus, these discoveries 
indicate that liquidity risk is very high in the microfinance sector of Ghana. 
Another set of researchers discovered that the liquidity in microfinance businesses is 
influenced by institution-specific variables.  
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Kipesha (2012) studied the efficiency of 35 MIX reporting MFIs sampled across 5 
countries in East Africa using data for the period between 2009 and 2011. Using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, the study revealed that reliance on donations, grants 
and subsidies creates liquidity problems for MFIs which cripple their operations. This shows 
that reliance on external sources of finance exposes MFIs to liquidity risk as external funds 
may not be readily available when desperately needed or when they dry up. However, in terms 
of efficiency, the East African MFIs were found to have high efficiency scores particularly 
those with a banking licence and those that operate as non-banking financial institutions.  
Kimathi et al. (2015) surveyed 96 employees selected across 6 MFIs in Kenya on the 
factors affecting the liquidity risk management practices of MFIs. Through multiple linear 
regression, the study found that the institution’s internal controls, institution policies, board 
management oversight and institution’s risk monitoring systems affect the liquidity risk 
management practices of MFIs. This study showed that top-level managers of financial 
institutions have a greater task of formulating and implementing effective liquidity strategies 
and policy frameworks. 
Wambui and Wanjiru (2016) carried out a study to examine the effect of credit risk on 
the liquidity of 5 DTMFIs in Kenya using data for the years 2010 to 2013. Liquidity was 
measured using cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets and the explanatory variables 
included credit risk as measured by the risk coverage ratio, financial leverage, gross loan 
portfolio to total assets, operating expenses ratio and portfolio at risk. Using multiple linear 
regression, the estimated results indicated that managing credit risk is positively related to 
liquidity together with the gross loan portfolio to total assets, efficient management of the level 
of operating expenses and financial leverage. However, portfolio at risk was found to be 
negative with liquidity.  
Laureti and Szafarz (2016) investigated the liquidity premium of 28 banking 
institutions and 5 MFIs in Bangladesh using data for the year 2012. The OLS method was used 
in the econometric estimation process and liquidity premium was used as the dependent 
variable. Of the explanatory variables, the MFI and public ownership dummies were negative 
and significantly related to the liquidity premium variable. Religious orientation which was 
also a categorical covariate showed that Islamic institutions were significant contributors 
towards liquidity premium while the log of total assets was insignificant. The study also 
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concluded that liquidity premium is lower in MFIs than in banks due to time inconsistences of 
the poor clientele served by the MFIs. 
Mamathi et al. (2017) who also surveyed the 12 Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in the 
Nairobi county in Kenya proxied liquidity using the working capital ratio. After applying 
multiple linear regression, the study unearthed that liquidity stress testing measured using a 5-
point Likert scale positively affects the liquidity of MFBs. However, profitability, as measured 
by the return on assets and return on equity ratios and the loans to deposits ratios, was found 
to have negative effects on the liquidity of MFIs.  
Some strands of empirical work show that liquidity in the microfinance sector is subject 
to a plethora of macroeconomic factors.  
Chikoko and Kwenda (2013) looked at the challenges that crippled the microfinance 
sector of Zimbabwe during the hyperinflationary period of the years 1999 to 2008. They 
surveyed 100 MFIs selected across three major cities in Zimbabwe; Harare, Bulawayo and 
Gweru. They discovered that hyperinflation did not only stifle economic activity but also 
choked liquidity in the microfinance sector through the setting of withdrawal limits by the 
Zimbabwean central bank. The negative repercussions of withdrawal limits on the 
microfinance businesses were that disbursements were slowed down due to limited cash 
available and collection problems were common. Hyperinflation also lead to the erosion of 
capital of the MFIs and the institutions also faced high operating costs which further dwindled 
their liquid resources. 
A Kenyan study by Bichanga (2016) investigated the effect of macroeconomic 
variables on the corporate liquidity of 12 Microfinance Banks (MFBs) between 2011 and 2015. 
Liquidity was proxied using gross loans and advances to customer deposits. Using regression 
inferential statistics, the study revealed that inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), economic activity proxied using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), exchange rates and 
interest rates, positively influence the liquidity of MFIs. 
After considering the above empirical studies, the current study noted that none of them 
considered how deposit protection in the form of deposit insurance is a determinant of liquidity 
in depository microfinance in the context of Low-Income Sub-Saharan Africa. This study, 
therefore, intends to fill this literature gap because over time, several DTMFIs in the LISSA 
countries have been defaulting in repaying depositors’ funds as deposit insurance schemes are 
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not in place in most of the countries where the DTMFIs are operational (Riquet and Poursat, 
2013; Boateng et al., 2016). Thus, there is scanty literature on deposit insurance in the 
microfinance sector but there a few empirical studies on deposit insurance in the conventional 
banking stream.   
Ngalawa (2012) examined banking instability and deposit insurance of 118 countries 
using deposit insurance data that spanned the period, 1980 to 2004. Banking instability (bank 
runs and insolvency) was the dependent variable which was captured as a dummy variable 
hence a logit model was adopted. The estimated marginal effects indicated that deposit 
insurance was an insignificant coefficient in explaining banking instability indicating that the 
trade-off between costs and benefits of adopting deposit insurance is neutral. Based on this 
finding, that study concluded that deposit insurance effects on banking stability must be 
country-specific. Furthermore, that study did not find strong evidence that the banking sector 
in low-income countries is more prone to banking instability than the banking system in high-
income countries. Low levels of real GDP per capita were found to increase the probability of 
banking instability while the inflation rate was found to have no significant impact on banking 
instability.  
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2013) looked at how deposit insurance affects bank 
risk and stability following the recent global financial crisis using data from the Bankscope 
database for the years 2004 to 2009 of 4109 banks sampled across 96 countries. Bank risk was 
captured using two measures; the log value of the bank’s z score and bank stock return 
volatility. Bank stability or systemic risk was proxied using the marginal expected shortfall 
measure. Deposit insurance was incorporated in the OLS regressions in two ways; firstly, as a 
dummy variable indicating whether a country had adopted explicit deposit insurance or not and 
whether the insurance cover was effective the last time a bank failed; secondly, a full coverage 
dummy that indicated whether a country offered full cover or not. The bank control variables 
included log of total assets, leverage, deposits to total assets, loan loss provisions and the return 
on assets and macroeconomic controls were GDP growth, log of population, trade over GDP, 
stock market capitalisation over GDP, supervisory quality and private credit over GDP. The 
findings of that study were that in the pre-crisis era, adoption of deposit insurance schemes led 
to increased bank risk and systemic risk thereby catalysing the moral hazard problem but during 
the crisis, bank risk was lower while systemic risk was higher indicating the stabilisation effect 
of deposit insurance. After consolidating the pre-crisis sample and the during-crisis sample, 
Anginer et al. (2013) discovered that the results of the net effect of deposit insurance was 
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negative as the destabilising effect during the normal period outweighed the stabilising effect 
during the financial crisis but this can be reduced by effective and enabling bank supervision.  
Calomiris and Jaremski (2016) examined the effect of deposit insurance on risk-taking, 
bank behaviour and market discipline in the early 20th century banks in the United States. Their 
study utilised annual bank data from All Bank Statistics for the period between 1900 and 1920 
and biennial bank data for the same period from Comptroller of the Currency and country-level 
data from the Census data. The conclusions of Calomiris and Jaremski (2016) were that 
implementation of deposit insurance schemes led to the reduction of market discipline as the 
depositors became reluctant to monitor banks thereby increasing the risk of insolvency of the 
insured banks. Also, the findings of that study indicated that the insured banks rushed for 
deposits in direct competition with the uninsured banks using the insurance cover as their 
competitive edge.  
Jameaba (2018) considered the impact of the establishment of the Indonesia Deposit 
Insurance Corporation on financial intermediation of Indonesian banking institutions. Data 
spanning the period 2000 to 2016 from the Bank of Indonesia and Financial Services 
Supervisory Agencies was utilised. The study employed technical analysis, trend analysis and 
multiple regression analysis to examine deposit insurance and financial intermediation which 
was measured using bank credit. Jameaba found that the introduction of the deposit insurance 
scheme ignited the moral hazard problem and also prompted the banking institutions and the 
depositors to be risk averse as they shifted from term and demand deposits to savings deposits 
and increased holding of risk-free treasury instruments. Thus, enactment of the deposit 
insurance scheme made savers in Indonesia to worry about the expected returns on the funds 
deposited and not necessarily the safety of their deposits. 
The next section reviews literature on the third objective of the study that looks at the 
relationship between outreach and financial sustainability. 
3.4 Outreach and Financial Sustainability  
 
3.4.1 Theoretical Background on Outreach and Financial Sustainability 
MFIs prioritise either outreach or financial sustainability based on two contrasting theories, the 
Welfarists’ Theory and the Institutionalists’ Theory. A couple of empirical studies provide 
evidence of the application of these two theories. On the one hand, some findings support 
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Welfarism and on the other hand, some findings support Institutionalism (Woller et al., 1999; 
Morduch, 2000; Zerai and Rani, 2011; Bangoura, 2012; Shaoyan and Duwal, 2012; Rao and 
Fitamo, 2014; Johnson, 2015; Xu et al., 2016; Rajer and Bhatt, 2016; Yeshi, 2015; Chikaza, 
2015; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017b; Amin et al., 2017; Khan et al., 2017).  
i. The Welfarists’ Theory 
The Welfarists’ theory was put forward by Christen (1997), Rodney (1997), Hatch and 
Frederisck (1998), Morduch (1999; 2000) and Woller et al. (1999). Welfarists or the ‘poverty 
camp’ (Rhyne, 1998) argue that MFIs exist to provide financial services to the core poor at 
affordable prices meaning that microcredit interest rates must be very low. The emphasis of 
Welfarism is that outreach to the pro-poor is superior to pursuing financial sustainability and 
thus uplifting the depth of outreach banner. Welfarists assume that MFIs are socially-oriented 
institutions and are not-for-profit making concerns. MFI operations, therefore, should be donor 
subsidised therefore there is no need to charge high interest rates on microcredit. The 
limitations of this theory are connected to some of its assumptions. The theory disregards the 
fact that the supply of grants and donations may not be even, for instance, donor funding to 
MFIs dwindled during the past decade’s Global Financial Crisis (Amin et al., 2017). Another 
limitation is that in practice, MFIs usually charge commercial interest rates on microcredit and 
some empirical findings show that the MFIs still get clients beyond their capacities as the 
clients can afford paying commercial interest rates (Rosenberg et al., 2013). 
ii. The Institutionalists Theory of Financial Sustainability 
The discussion of the Institutionalists’ theory of financial sustainability or the 
‘sustainability camp’ (Rhyne, 1998) in this section is an extension of its discussion under 
section 3.2.1(ii) which mainly focussed on how the theory explains the financial sustainability 
of MFIs. In the current section, the discussion of the Institutionalists’ theory relates to how this 
theory explains outreach and how it may or may not lead to mission drift. Though it is argued 
that the financial mission of the MFIs has eclipsed the social mission given the un-assailable 
and widespread commercialisation of MFIs (Ledgerwood and White, 2006; Lützenkirchen and 
Weistroffer, 2012), there is complementarity between the Welfarists and the Institutionalists. 
On the one hand, following the Institutionalists approach can lead to mission drift because 
profit-orientation encourages the MFIs to levy high administration costs on small average 
balances of financial products and services (Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a).  On the other hand, the 
Institutionalists argue that there is the possibility of satisfying the social mission through 
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attaining financial sustainability which enables the MFIs to exist continually in serving their 
target market. Thus, financial sustainability is not an end itself rather, financial sustainability 
is a means to an end which is outreach to the poor (Otero, 1999). In other words, the 
‘sustainability camp’ complements the ‘poverty camp’, therefore, pursuing financial 
sustainability does not necessarily lead to mission drift. 
3.4.2 Empirical Evidence 
An empirical review of literature shows evidence of a mixture of results on the 
outreach-financial sustainability relationship. Some strands of empirical evidence support the 
Welfarists suggesting that outreach is of prime consideration instead of financial sustainability 
in running a microfinance business. Some findings support the Institutionalists’ view 
suggesting that financial sustainability is achieved at the expense of outreach. In some cases, 
the empirical findings are neutral, supporting neither of the two views indicating that outreach 
and financial sustainability can be both achieved at the same time. 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) studied 114 MIX reporting MFIs drawn across 62 
countries to examine whether the regulated microfinance institutions achieve better outreach 
and financial sustainability. The Generalised Least Squares method was used. Financial 
sustainability was measured using operational self-sufficiency while the logarithm of the 
number of active borrowers was used as the proxy for outreach. Regulation was captured as a 
binary variable indicating whether an MFI is regulated or not. Amongst the control variables 
were MFI specifics (capital, loans to assets, age, size, deposits to total assets, charter type, 
competition) and macroeconomic variables (official supervisory power, informality, economic 
freedom, inflation, GDP per capita, log of GDP, deposit insurance, government intervention 
index, legal origin). That study found that imposing regulations on MFIs do not directly 
influence the way they balance their outreach and financial sustainability goals. The use of debt 
in the financing structure and operating in an inflationary environment was found to lead to 
increased financial sustainability. This finding is not consistent with the study of Bhanot and 
Bapat (2014) who reported that the use of debt in the capital structure impedes the attainment 
of financial sustainability. The NGO charter type, per capita income, economic freedom and 
having property rights variables were not significant in explaining financial sustainability. 
Mersland and Strøm (2010) carried out a study using a combination of panel 
econometric methods to investigate the existence of mission drift in microfinance provision, 
utilising data for the period 1998 to 2008 of 379 rated MFIs selected across 74 countries. Their 
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findings did not show the existence of mission drift and they suggested that MFIs can deepen 
their outreach (reduce the average loan size) as long as this is followed by cost-cutting measures 
so that profitability is not eroded. Furthermore, their results were robust to other mission drift 
measures; the proportion of women clientele served by the MFIs and lending methodology 
(group to individual) and target market (rural to urban). 
Hermes, Lensink and Meesters (2011) used the stochastic frontier analysis on data from 
the MIX that stretched from 1997 to 2007 comprising 435 MFIs. Their results showed that 
deepening outreach by focusing on the remote poor with very small average loan balances and 
targeting women clientele is costly to MFIs resulting in reduced efficiency. Thus, they 
concluded that there is a trade-off between outreach depth and efficiency. This result also 
suggested signs of mission drift as the MFIs change the composition of their clientele in search 
of efficiency. Ageing of the MFIs was found to result in reduced inefficiency but group-based 
lending was found to favour efficient operations due to the influence of group cohesion in the 
repayment of loans. 
Zerai and Rani (2011) investigated 85 Indian MIX reporting MFIs using data for the 
year 2009 through correlation analysis. The data were analysed using correlation analysis. That 
study found a strong positive association between financial sustainability and the breadth of 
outreach as measured by the number of borrowers in support of the Institutionalists’ approach. 
Zerai and Rani (2011) additionally found no evidence of a trade-off between financial 
sustainability and the breadth of outreach when measured using the average loan size and the 
proportion of women in the loan book indicating that there is no evidence of mission drift. The 
findings of Zerai and Rani (2011) of a neutral trade-off were later supported by Martínez (2015) 
whose study utilised data of 415 MIX reporting MFIs for the period 2003 to 2012. That study 
employed the instrumental variables technique and found no evidence of a trade-off between 
doing well (achieving financial sustainability) and doing good (increasing outreach depth). 
Depth of outreach was measured using the percentage of women borrowers and financial 
performance was proxied using operational self-sufficiency. Financial sustainability was 
favoured by a high average loan balance, productive staff members, real yield on the gross loan 
portfolio and price differential.  
Bassem (2012) used data for the years 2008 to 2011 of a sample of 73 MIX reporting 
MFIs drawn from 10 countries across the MENA region. The GLS technique was adopted in 
the estimation process. Financial performance as measured by the return on assets, return on 
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equity and operational self-sufficiency had a neutral relationship with outreach as measured by 
the percentage of female borrowers denoting that there is no trade-off between financial 
performance and outreach. Increasing the size of operations was found to be negative with the 
percentage of female borrowers thereby indicating mission drift. Nonetheless, the NGO 
modality and the group lending methodology were positive with the percentage of female 
borrowers suggesting that there is no diversion of focus from the original mission of the MFIs. 
Using the social range index as the outreach measure resulted in negative operational self-
sufficiency, insignificant return on assets and a positive return on equity. The results on the 
group lending methodology corroborated those found in the percentage of female borrowers’ 
models but the results were otherwise for the size coefficient.  
Kipesha and Zhang (2013) studied 47 MIX reporting MFIs from 5 countries across 
Eastern Africa between 2008 and 2011 to test whether trade-offs exist between financial and 
social performance measures. The study used a combination of fixed effects and random effects 
models. The Welfarists’ models adopted the average loan balance divided by the GNI per 
capita, percentage of female borrowers and logarithm of the number of active borrowers as the 
dependant variables. The Institutionalists’ models adopted operational self-sufficiency and the 
return on assets as dependent variables. The control explanatory variables included the cost per 
borrower, debt to equity, operating expenses, yield on the gross loan portfolio, loan loss rate 
and the number of products and services. They concluded that the trade-offs between outreach 
and financial performance measures (operational self-sufficiency and return on assets) depend 
on the variables used, model specification and the approach followed; Welfarism or 
Institutionalism. Other conclusions from that study were that high operating costs characterise 
the outreach programs of East African MFIs as the cost per borrower and the operating 
expenses ratio were positive in the Welfarists’ models. Financial leverage was found to favour 
outreach depth and breadth.  
Wijesiri et al. (2015) conducted a study on how age and size impact the outreach-
financial sustainability relationship using a two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis 
bootstrapped metafrontier approach for 420 MIX reporting MFIs using data for the year 2013. 
The inputs of the model were operating expenses and the number of personnel while the outputs 
were the gross loan portfolio, financial revenue, inverse of the average loan balance and the 
number of active borrowers. The environmental variables included MFI age and size. Their 
findings revealed that aging MFIs achieve financial sustainability better than the younger ones 
but they fall short in pursuing the outreach objective. In terms of size, older microfinance 
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providers were found to outperform the younger ones in achieving outreach and financial 
sustainability goals. Thus, the findings of Wijesiri et al. (2015) were consistent with those of 
Marr and Awaworoyi (2012) who discovered that low levels of outreach are recorded by 
mature and regulated MFIs.  
Bayai and Ikhide (2016b) sampled 60 MIX reporting MFIs from the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) and used an unbalanced panel dataset for the period 2006 
to 2012 in an attempt to link the depth and breadth of outreach to financing structure variables. 
The univariate multiple linear regression in the panel framework was used as the estimation 
technique. Their study unearthed that shunning donations to rely on financial leverage in an 
attempt to attain financial sustainability limits the ability of the MFIs to deepen and broaden 
outreach. The average loan size measured the depth of outreach while the number of active 
borrowers measured the breadth of outreach. That study also reported that new MFIs perform 
goodly on the depth of outreach dimension in line with the findings of Wijesiri et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, the study favoured that MFIs should engage in deposit mobilisation if they are to 
deepen and broaden their outreach activities.  
El-Maksoud (2016) evaluated the performance of MFIs in the MENA region through 
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) from a balanced panel dataset of 124 MIX 
reporting MFIs for the period 2004 to 2011. That study found no evidence of mission drift as 
the depth of outreach measures (average loan size and the proportion of female borrowers) and 
the breadth of outreach measure (number of active borrowers) were insignificant with 
profitability as measured by operational self-sufficiency. These findings are supported in the 
prior work of Zerai and Rani (2011) and Martínez (2015). This conclusion gives the impression 
that both outreach and financial sustainability can be pursued at the same time. That study also 
found that the external environment significantly influences the performance of MFIs.  
Xu et al. (2016) used a combination of fixed effects and random effects models to 
examine a global sample of 218 MIX reporting MFIs from 76 countries for the years 2001 to 
2011. The average loan balance per borrower divided by the GNI per capita was the dependent 
variable and the main explanatory variable was financial performance proxied using 
operational self-sufficiency. The MFI specific controls included age and scale while the 
country-specific controls included domestic credit to the private sector, foreign direct 
investment, inflation, availability and quality of credit information and the percentage of the 
rural population.   Evidence of mission drift was found as the average loan balance per borrower 
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divided by the GNI per capita was positive and significant with operational self-sufficiency. 
No significant relationship was found between the depth of outreach and the percentage of 
people living in the rural areas. Further evidence of mission drift was found between the 
average loan balance per borrower divided by the GNI per capita with domestic credit to the 
private sector and the shares in the GDP of net foreign direct investment. Following these 
findings, Xu et al. (2016) concluded that the depth of outreach is influenced by both MFI and 
country specific variables. 
Earlier evidence on the effect of country specific macro-economic controls on the depth 
of outreach was reported by Ahlin et al. (2011) who studied 329 MIX reporting MFIs from 70 
countries across the seven world’s sub-regions for the years 1996 to 2006 using a pooled linear 
regression model. Their findings were that performance of MFIs (financial sustainability, 
default rates and growth in loan size) is improved by economic growth. They also found a 
positive and significant association between foreign direct investment and the depth of outreach 
as proxied by the average loan size; and a negative and significant relationship between the 
depth of outreach with the manufacturing share in GDP and the labour force participation rate. 
Weak evidence was found between private sector credit and financial sustainability but private 
sector credit led to a reduction in operating costs, default rates and interest rates. Remittances 
favoured financial sustainability and improved default rates.  
Abdulai and Tewari (2017a) carried out a study on the determinants of outreach in SSA 
using an unbalanced panel dataset from the MIX on 71 MFIs selected from 10 countries across 
SSA for the years 2003 to 2013. The random effects model was used in the estimation process. 
Outreach depth was measured using average loan size and the percentage of female borrowers 
while outreach breadth was measured using the number of active borrowers. Operational self-
sufficiency was insignificant with all the three measures of outreach indicating that financial 
sustainability does not drive the outreach programs of the SSA MFIs. A positive and significant 
portfolio at risk coefficient was reported with outreach depth (average loan size) indicating that 
increased focus on the pro-poor leads to deterioration of loan portfolio quality but broadening 
outreach improves it. The productivity of the loan personal reduced as outreach was deepened 
but increased with outreach breadth. Operating expenses and profitability measured using the 
return on assets were also found to be negative with the average loan size but positive with the 
percentage of female borrowers.  
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A dynamic panel data study for the years 2005 to 2014 was conducted by Amin et al. 
(2017) upon sampling 405 Latin American MIX reporting MFIs across 21 countries using the 
GMM estimator. Their objective was to examine the impact of outreach on profitability. 
Profitability was measured using the return on assets while outreach depth was measured using 
the average loan balance and outreach breadth was measured using the number of active 
borrowers. The MFI-specific controls included the regulation dummy, charter type, offices’ 
coverage, financing structure, age, number of diamonds and size. The macroeconomic controls 
included the real GDP and the number of MFIs per country. Their findings were that the breadth 
of outreach is negatively related to profitability thereby contradicting the Institutionalists’ 
view. That study also concluded that there is a compatible relationship between profitability 
and the depth of outreach thereby contradicting the Welfarists’ view. This indicates that an 
increase in the average loan size leads to an increase in profitability suggesting that mission 
drift has occurred. Profitability was also increased by the number of MFIs and capital 
adequacy. All the charter type variables were not significant in explaining profitability but size, 
number of diamonds, real GDP and regulation status reduced profitability.  
Reichert (2018) conducted a meta-analysis study of 61 studies in an attempt to examine 
the nature of trade-offs in microfinance. The study noticed that attainment of the dual mission 
of MFIs is a highly debated topic in empirical literature and it affects three forms of outreach; 
cost, depth and breadth. Furthermore, the analysis noticed that are three sets of studies: those 
that exhibit the existence of trade-offs, those that refute the existence of trade-offs and those 
that exhibit synergies between outreach and financial performance. Overall, Reichert (2018) 
found that trade-offs are catalysed by outreach depth proxied by the average loan size, outreach 
cost proxied by the yield on the loan portfolio and efficiency as measured by cost per borrower, 
operating expenses and total expenses. On the contrary, risk, as measured by portfolio at risk 
results in fewer trade-offs while focusing on women clientele and profitability as measured by 
the return on assets and return on equity, do not exhibit trade-offs. Also, study artefacts such 
as using an economic frontier methodology and publications in development journals were 
found to have a positive bearing on the prevalence of trade-offs. 
Lam, Zhang, Ang and Jacob (2019) applied the seemingly unrelated regressions to 
investigate whether there is a reciprocal relationship between financial performance and social 
performance. They used data of 852 MIX reporting MFIs sampled across 96 countries for the 
years 2005 to 2012. Financial performance was measured using the return on assets while social 
performance was measured using the average loan size. That study did not find a reciprocal 
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relationship between the two measures of performance for their full sample. However, when 
they disaggregated the sample by profit status, they found contradicting results. They found 
that financial performance contributes positively to social performance in profit-oriented MFIs 
than in non-profit-oriented MFIs. Additionally, they found that social performance contributes 
positively to financial performance in non-profit-oriented MFIs than in profit-oriented MFIs. 
Based on these findings, Lam et al. (2019) concluded that profit-oriented MFIs are different 
from the non-profit-oriented MFIs in pursuing the double bottom-line objectives. Also, both 
types of MFIs have to learn from each other over time on how they can improve their pursuit 
of the dual mission. 
A closer look into all these previous studies discussed above amongst others, reveals 
that the outreach-financial sustainability relationship varies across locations and depends on 
the variables used to measure outreach, model specification and the goals to be achieved. It is 
for this reason that Bayai and Ikhide (2016b, p. 285) argued that “the exact nature of trade-offs 
in microfinance differ across regions, but meaningful trade-offs need to be recognised and 
weighted everywhere”. This study therefore intends to fill the literature gap by focusing on the 
outreach-financial sustainability relationship based on deposit-taking measures on outreach 
depth and breadth. This is done to examine whether there is any evidence of mission drift or a 
trade-off in the depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries. The deposit-taking 
perspective on the outreach-financial sustainability debate has not yet been investigated. 
Therefore, this study adopts the average deposit balance/GNI per capita as the proxy for the 
depth of outreach following the Welfarists’ view while the logarithm of the number of 
voluntary depositors is adopted as the proxy for the breadth of outreach following the 
Institutionalists’ view. This way, this study distinguishes itself from the previous studies that 
have looked at the outreach-financial sustainability relationship that measured the depth and 
breadth of outreach from a microcredit perspective. As revealed in the empirical microcredit 
perspective studies discussed above, the depth of outreach was mainly measured using the 
average loan size while the breadth of outreach was measured using the number of active 
borrowers.  
Another novel feature of the present study is that it exclusively focussed on the 
outreach-financial sustainability nexus of DTMFIs as compared to previous studies whose 
samples were a mixture of both DTMFIs and COMFIs. Using this approach, the previous 
studies measured outreach based on lending variables. The approach followed in the empirical 
studies gives the impression that the determinants of financial sustainability of both the 
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DTMFIs and the COMFIs are the same and that microfinance outreach is only credit-focused. 
As noted in section 3.2.2 above, DTMFIs and COMFIs don’t operate with the same constraints 
given the extra supervisory costs that are linked to deposit attraction (Robinson, 2004; 
Ledgerwood and White, 2006). 
The next section outlines the conceptual framework for the study. 
3.5 Conceptual Framework 
 
Figure 3.1 is an illustration of the conceptual framework for this study.  
Figure 3.1: The conceptual framework for the study 
 
Source: Author’s diagram based on literature review 
A critical review of the literature discussed above shows that there are interrelated links 
between financial sustainability, liquidity and outreach as a result of the deposit-taking process 
by the DTMFIs. These interrelationships are shown in the conceptual framework illustrated 
above by use of arrows. The boxes represent the main pillars of this research study which are 
financial sustainability, liquidity and outreach. Deposit insurance is also represented using a 
box. Deposit-taking is at the heart of achieving the financial and social performance objectives 
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of DTMFIs and therefore, the circle that represents the deposit-taking process is placed at the 
centre of the conceptual framework of this study. As discussed earlier, several empirical writers 
have argued that deposits are a means of achieving financial sustainability (Brom, 2009; 
Dokulilova et al., 2009; Ek, 2011; Hulme and Aran, 2011; Millson, 2013; Kaloo, 2015; Bayai 
and Ikhide, 2016a), hence the arrow that points to the financial sustainability box from the 
deposit-taking circle. Once financial sustainability has been achieved, DTMFIs are envisaged 
to live long in ensuring the continual delivery of micro-financial products and services through 
their outreach programs and this is captured by the arrow that starts from the financial 
sustainability box ending at the outreach box.  
Through deposit-taking, DTMFIs also provide liquidity to their customers by 
intermediating the mobilised deposits into loans as shown by the arrow that points to the 
liquidity box from the deposit-taking circle (Brom, 2012). Moreover, as the DTMFIs satisfy 
the liquidity needs of their clientele, they are in a way, fulfilling their social mission of outreach 
(de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz, 2004; Simtowe, 2008). The arrow that moves from the 
liquidity box to the outreach box sheds light on the relationship between liquidity and 
ountreach. However, for the DTMFIs to even out their liquidity requirements in the financial 
intermediation process (Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Werner, 2014), they have to insure the 
deposits that they intermediate as a safeguard against panic withdrawals and bank runs (Riquet 
and Poursat, 2013). Therefore, deposit insurance is inevitable in the operation of DTMFIs. The 
arrow that extends from the deposit insurance box to the liquidity box illustrates this point.  
Empirical studies also show that a positive link exists between liquidity and financial 
sustainability (Roodman and Quereshi, 2006; Tulchin et al., 2009). This means that liquid 
DTMFIs are usually financially sustainable indicating that short term financial performance 
(liquidity) complements long term financial performance (financial sustainability). This 
relationship is indicated by the arrow that moves from the liquidity box to the financial 
sustainability box. However, the relationship between liquidity and financial sustainability is 
outside the scope of this study. Finally, the arrow that connects the deposit-taking circle and 
the outreach box represents the custom-made deposit products and services such as savings and 
current accounts that DTMFIs create to meet the depositors’ savings needs. 
3.6 Conclusion 
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The primary goal of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations of 
eradicating extreme poverty by the year 2030 through microfinance can only be achieved if the 
microfinance providers are financially sustainable, liquid and reach out to the poorest in their 
vast numbers through deposits and a wide array of financial services profitably. For this reason, 
this chapter reviewed the conceptual, theoretical and empirical literature on these three forms 
of analysing the performance of the LISSA DTMFIs. Financial sustainability focuses on long 
term financial performance and liquidity focuses on short financial performance. Outreach is a 
social performance measure.  
Chapter four, which is next, discusses the research methodology which was employed 
for answering the study’s research questions and objectives that were outlined in Chapter one. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the research methodology section which outlines how the research was 
carried out in addressing the research questions and objectives of the study that were discussed 
in Chapter one. In this chapter, the research methodology is divided into three sections. The 
first section is 4.2 which highlights the data, variables and the econometric method (probit 
model) that were used to examine the first objective of the study: to understand why the 
depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries falls short in attaining financial 
sustainability. Section 4.3 which is next, discusses the data, variables and the random effects 
model that was used for finding answers for the second objective of the study: to assess the 
relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance in the depository microfinance sector of 
the LISSA countries. Section 4.4 is a discussion of the data, variables and the estimation 
technique (System Generalised Method of Moments) that were used for examining the third 
objective of the study: to examine whether there is any evidence of mission drift or trade-off 
in the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector in the pursuit of outreach and financial 
sustainability goals.  Section 4.5 which is last, is a summary of the chapter.  
4.2 Research Approach and Design  
 
The three objectives of the study were quantitative, therefore, the research approach 
followed was also quantitative. The quantitative research approach followed, relied on 
statistical and econometric methods in addressing the research questions or objectives. A 
longitudinal research design was adopted as the study was based on panel data.  
4.3 Examining Deposits and Financial Sustainability of LISSA DTMFIs 
4.3.1 Data 
The first objective of the study was to understand why the depository microfinance 
sector of the LISSA countries falls short in attaining financial sustainability despite having 
huge volumes of deposits.  
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The author relied on two sources of data; the Microfinance Information Exchange 
(MIX) for data on the DTMFI-specific variables and the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) 
for data on the country-specific variable, regulatory quality.  
i. Microfinance Information Exchange 
The first objective of the study utilised an unbalanced panel dataset that spanned the 
period 2006 to 2017, that was extracted from the MIX online database where the data were 
accessed through a periodic subscription. This time period was chosen because this was the 
period when most data were available and this is the time period when the DTMFIs recorded 
phenomenal growth in deposits as explained in section 2.4.4. Data from the MIX are in the 
form of adjusted financial ratios. The MIX data was adopted because it is currently, the most 
available and public source of data on MFIs’ financial and social performance. MFI-specific 
data is not easy to access from the MFIs and the supervisory institutions in their jurisdictions 
as most of the MFIs are private limited companies which are not obligated to publish their 
annual financial statements. The MIX database has been the prime source of data for several 
microfinance studies over the years (Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013; Janda and Zetek, 2014; 
Abdulai and Tewari, 2016; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; D’Espallier et al., 2017). MFIs report 
voluntarily to the MIX. Since it is not mandatory for all MFIs across the globe to periodically 
report to the MIX, the data extracted from this database suffer from self-selection bias as the 
available data are only for voluntary reporting MFIs. Thus, the MIX’s data are not 
representative of all the MFIs across the globe (Lensink et al., 2018).  
The reliability of data from the MIX is enhanced through standardised reporting and 
that most of the world’s largest MFIs with very high outreach numbers and high rating scores 
report to the MIX. Reporting inconsistencies by the MIX-reporting MFIs results in missing 
values in some periods which therefore distorts the quality of the data and this also results in 
unbalanced panel datasets (Barnett, 2011). As Zamore (2018) noted, most of the datasets in the 
microfinance sector suffer from imperfection. Nonetheless, the allowable number of missing 
values of the data of the sampled DTMFIs in this study was set at not-more-than 40 % of the 
data points so as to enhance the validity of the data for the adequacy of the estimated results.  
Figure 4.1 shows trends in the population or total number of the MIX-reporting MFIs 
from SSA by charter type and in total for the years between 2006 and 2017.  
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Figure 4.1: Trends in the number of MIX-reporting SSA MFIs by charter type and in 
total for the years between 2006 and 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the MIX’s annual reports for the years between 
2006 and 2017  
The levels of the troughs and peaks shown in Figure 4.1 that indicate the number of 
MFIs by charter type24 and in total for each year from 2006 to 2017 are explained in Table 4.1 
below which shows the actual numbers on the distribution of the sample over time. The NBFIs 
were the most dominant type between 2006 and 2010 and this could be attributable to their 
increased impetus towards commercialisation (Bayai, 2017). Across all the years between 2006 
and 2017, growth in the number of NBFIs exhibited slight variations when compared to the 
rest of the charter types while the number of rural banks was the lowest across all the years. 
The NGOs are the second dominant type between 2006 and 2010 and were overtaken by the 
CUCs in 2011 until 2016 only to reclaim their initial position in 2017. The number of CUCs 
rose steadily between 2006 and 2008 and dropped in 2009 and 2010 only to rise sharply in 
2011 to become the dominant charter type since then until 2015. Between 2006 and 2016, the 
banks lagged behind the CUCs, NGOs and the NBFIs but in 2017, the banks only overtook the 
CUCs.  
 
24 For additional inferences, explanations on the trends in the number of MFIs by charter type in this section can 
also be compared to those in section 2.4.4.(ii). 
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Table 4.1: Distribution of MIX-reporting SSA MFIs by charter type and in total for the 
years between 2006 and 2017 
Fiscal 
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
BANK 11 14 17 23 23 53 53 53 29 30 27 24 
CUC 23 35 50 36 36 84 84 84 98 67 31 16 
NBFI 43 52 61 60 60 64 64 64 56 57 39 40 
NGO 36 45 55 54 54 54 54 54 36 36 27 32 
RB 6 14 12 8 8 4 4 4 1 2 3 1 
Total 
MFIs 119 160 195 181 181 259 259 259 220 192 127 113 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the MIX’s annual reports for the years between 
2006 and 2017  
In 2006, 119 MFIs from SSA self-reported their financial and social metrics to the MIX. 
The total number of reporting MFIs increased from one year to the next between the years 2006 
and 2008 due to the fusion of organisations such as Greenfield Institutions into the sector as 
explained in section 2.6.4. The slight drop in the total number of MFIs from 195 in 2008 to 181 
in 2009 is attributed to the impact of the Global Financial Crisis which hit the sector as some 
of the MFIs struggled to withstand the global shock (refer to Figure 2.14). As the MFIs were 
coming out of the financial crisis, the total number of MFIs reporting to the MIX skyrocketed 
to 259, the highest total number of MFIs ever reported by the SSA MFIs. The levelling of the 
total number of reporting MFIs (2009 and 2010; 2011 to 2013) is due to the data that were not 
reported in the annual reports for the years 2010, 2012 and 201325. According to the MIX and 
CGAP (2012, p. 4) report, when data is not available in a particular year, “data from the most 
recent prior period is used” for reporting in that period. Using this criterion, Figure 4.1 and 
Table 4.1 show that the total number of MFIs in 2010 was that of the year 2009 and the total 
number of MFIs in 2012 and 2013 was that of the year 2011. The decline in the total number 
of MFIs that reported data to the MIX for the years 2012 and 2013 was not only in experienced 
in SSA but also across the rest of the global subregions (Cloet and Moyaert, 2014). 
Consequently, the total number of SSA MFIs reporting to the MIX dropped to 221 in 2014; 
193 in 2015; 127 in 2016 and to its lowest record of 113 in 2017. 
 
25 This point does not mean that raw data for the sample used in this study could not be obtained from the MIX in 
the years 2010, 2012 and 2013. Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1 are based on the figures extracted from the MIX’s annual 
subregional reports for SSA and not on raw data for the individual financial service providers that were included 
in the sample for this study.  
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Since MIX-reporting MFIs exhibit inconsistencies in the submission of annual financial 
data, Barnet (2011) conducted a comprehensive study that investigated why MFIs in SSA have 
difficulties in submitting annual financial data to the MIX. The study revealed the following 
reasons amongst others: a lot of time spent in preparing different reports in varied formats for 
different stakeholders, differences in applications used for data capturing and synthesis and 
inadequate real time systems for reporting across MFIs’ branch network.  
In light of the background given above, purposive sampling was done so as to obtain 
the sample for the study. The DTMFIs were easily identified by searching for all the MFIs that 
had data on deposits during the period under study. This exercise enabled the researcher to 
distinguish between the DTMFIs which reported data on deposits and the COMFIs which did 
not report data on voluntary deposits26. Additionally, purposive sampling enabled the selection 
of DTMFIs based on the completeness of their data or their high level of information disclosure 
which is measured by a five-point diamond scale. DTMFIs with 3 to 5 diamonds have very 
high levels of information disclosure unlike those with 1 to 2 diamonds. Thus, selecting 
DTMFIs with high information disclosure scores helped to minimise the problem of missing 
values. After purposive sampling, only 64 unevenly distributed DTMFIs from 18 out of 27 
LISSA countries were included in the sample. Therefore, the sample consisted of DTMFIs that 
were consistent in reporting their annual financial statements between the years 2006 and 2017. 
The 18 LISSA countries included in the sample were those countries where the sampled 
DTMFIs operated from. Figure 4.2 shows the sample of the selected DTMFIs by charter type. 
Figure 4. 2: Sampled DTMFIs by Charter Type 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
 
26 The exact number of COMFIs in the population was not determined as these institutions were not the focus of 
the present study. Moreover, it is important to note that where COMFIs report deposits, those deposits are called 
compulsory deposits and not voluntary deposits. The distinction between compulsory and voluntary deposits was 
discussed in section 2.4.1. As indicated earlier, deposits in this study refer to voluntary deposits. 
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Figure 4.2 shows that the sample consisted of 21 CUCs which were the most dominant 
charter type, 18 NBFIs, 18 NGOs and 7 BANKs. No RBs were included in the sample. As 
explained above, the criterion for the DTMFIs to be included the sample was the completeness 
of their data or their high level of information disclosure. The full list of the sampled DTMFIs 
and their additional details such as name, country of origin, sub-region, age and number of 
diamonds are shown in Appendix 4.  
ii. World Governance Indicators 
The study also utilised data from the World Governance Indicators which are aggregate 
and individual governance annual time series indicators for the years 1996 to 2017 for more 
than 200 countries across the world. The data exchange for the WGIs provides six dimensions 
of governance; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. This study 
only focussed on one dimension of governance, regulatory quality for 18 LISSA countries 
whose DTMFIs were included in the sample. The regulatory quality variable was chosen 
because DTMFIs are regulated financial service providers which handle deposits (other 
people’s money or savings which are at risk of being abused or subject to fraudulent or criminal 
activities). Regulatory quality measures how enabling, restrictive and effective are the policies 
formulated by different regulatory authorities worldwide. Regulatory quality is measured using 
estimates of governance that range from -2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance). 
The reliability and validity of the WGIs lies in the fact that they are reported by the World 
Bank and that they are the only currently available, best source of data on governance issues 
across the globe. Hence, some prior microfinance studies also relied on data from the WGIs 
(Cull et al., 2009b; Ahlin et al., 2011; Abdulai, 2017). 
4.3.2 Variables 
i. Financial Sustainability: Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS)  
The outcome variable is Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS), the proxy for financial 
sustainability. Operational self-sufficiency measures the ability of the DTMFIs to cover their 
operational and non-operational costs from the income generated from their normal trading 
operations. Following the prior work of Bogan (2012), Tehulu (2013) and Bayai and Ikhide 
(2018) and in concurrence with the MIX’s definitions, this study treated financial sustainability 
as a dichotomous variable which took the value of 1 if the DTMFI is financially sustainable, 
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and 0 otherwise. The DTMFIs are financially sustainable if the OSS ratio is greater than 100 
% and are not financially sustainable if the OSS ratio is less than 100 %.  
ii.  Scales of Operation: {Small Scale Deposits (SMALL), Medium Scale Deposits 
(MEDIUM) and Large Scale Deposits (LARGE) dummies} 
According to the MIX, the operational scale is divided into two categories, outreach scale 
and institutional scale (MBB, 2000; 2007; MIX and CGAP, 2012). The scale of outreach is 
measured using the total number of borrowers served. Small scale MFIs have less than 10 000 
active borrowers and medium scale MFIs have 10 000 to 30 000 active borrowers and large-
scale MFIs have more than 30 000 borrowers. The institutional scale is measured in terms of 
the volume of the gross loan portfolio which exhibits variations across the 6 MIX’s 
geographical regions. A small-scale MFI has a gross loan portfolio of less than US$2m across 
all regions except in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) where small-scale MFIs have a 
gross loan portfolio of less than US$4m. For medium scale MFIs, the gross loan portfolio 
ranges between US$2m to US$8m except in the LAC where it ranges between US$4m to 
US$15m. A large-scale MFI has a gross loan portfolio which is more than $8m except in the 
LAC where the gross loan portfolio is more than US$15m. In some instances, the institutional 
scale has been measured using the total assets held by the MFIs (Ngo, 2013).  
Prior studies that incorporated institutional scale in their estimation models include Ngo 
et al. (2014), Xu et al. (2016) and Nwachukwu et al. (2018). All these studies used the volume 
of the gross loan portfolio as a measure of the scale of operations. Given the enormous deposit 
volumes that are mobilised by DTMFIs in SSA, this study distinguishes itself from the 
aforementioned empirical works by measuring institutional scale using the volumes of 
deposits. This study followed the MIX’s definitions on the scale of lending operations to define 
the scale of deposit operations. Small scale DTMFIs are those that have less than US$2m worth 
of deposits. Medium-scale DTMFIs have deposit volumes that range between US$2m and 
US$8m. Large scale DTMFIs have deposit volumes in excess of US$8m. Thus, the scales of 
deposit operations were captured using categorical values. Using the scales of deposits 
dummies as the main independent variable was an attempt to explain why the LISSA’s 
depository microfinance sector has been falling short in attaining financial sustainability 
despite the commendable growth in deposits volumes they mobilise. As a robustness check, 
another probit model was estimated using the scale of lending operations based on the gross 
loan portfolio scales which were discussed above. 
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iii. Experience: Number of Years of Operation (AGE)  
Age relates to the number of years the DTMFIs have been operational since their 
establishment. Age is an indicator of experience in deposit-taking. Over time, a couple of 
microfinance studies have considered the age variable in their econometric estimation models 
(Churchill and Marr, 2014; Johnson, 2015; Abdulai and Tewari, 2016; Xu et al., 2016). This 
study postulated a positive relationship between age and financial sustainability.  
iv. Size: Logarithm of Total Assets (lnASSETS) 
The size of the DTMFIs relates to how big these institutions are in terms of their total 
assets (Bassem, 2009; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Tehulu, 2013; Johnson, 2015; Chikalipah, 
2017). According to Wijesiri et al. (2015), the size of the MFIs is indicative of three factors; 
their ability to withstand market competition, the awareness of these institutions and their 
advances in technological development, diversification and investment opportunities. The 
logarithm of total assets (lnASSETS) was expected to impact financial sustainability positively. 
The rationale for using the logarithm of assets is that “the logarithm function normalises the 
distribution” (Johnson, 2015, p. 133). Several prior studies also used the logarithm of total 
assets as the proxy for size (Bogan, 2012; Tehulu, 2013; Johnson, 2015; Xu et al., 2016; Bibi 
et al., 2018; Zamore, 2018).  
v. Charter Type: Legal Status (BANK, CUC, NBFI and NGO)  
The charter type relates to the form of legal entity the MFIs are registered under. The 
MIX categorises MFIs into four main categories of charter type; bank (BANK), Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) and Credit 
Unions/Cooperatives (CU/C). The legal form of the MFIs has implications for deposit 
mobilisation. Cooperatives mobilise high volumes of deposits as they rely on them for equity 
and investment purposes (MIX, 2006; Shaoyan and Duwal, 2012). NGOs are less involved in 
deposit-taking as most governments have traditionally restricted them to do so (D’Espallier et 
al., 2017). For the downscaling BANK-DTMFIs, it is easier to mobilise deposits from the poor 
and the low-income households based on their existing infrastructure when entering this niche 
market. NBFI-DTMFIs are equally able to build a large deposit base. The effect of charter type 
on the financial sustainability of the DTMFIs therefore varies with the form of the legal entity. 
Since the charter type variable was categorical, dummy variables were assigned to each charter 
type. The NGO charter type was adopted as the base category. Previous studies by Quayes 
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(2012), Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013), Johnson (2015), Wijesiri et al. (2015) and Lensink 
et al. (2018) also used the charter type dummies.  
vi.  Efficiency: Operating Expenses to Total Assets (OEA) 
The operating expenses ratio is a reflector of how the providers of microfinance can 
control their administrative costs and personnel costs that arise in the ordinary course of their 
core business. Cost-effective DTMFIs can keep the operating expenses ratio at minimum levels 
to keep the operating revenues and profits at the maximum possible levels. Several previous 
studies measured the operating expenses ratio by comparing the operating expenses to the gross 
loan portfolio because those studies mainly focussed on microlending operations (Cull et al., 
2009b; Lensink et al., 2018; Nwachukwu et al., 2018). Nevertheless, since the DTMFIs 
leverage on their assets in mobilising deposits which they intermediate into loans, it is more 
meaningful to use the operating expenses to the total assets as a proxy for efficiency in 
investigating the relationship between the scales of deposits and financial sustainability. Thus, 
the operating expenses to total assets ratio enables the DTMFIs to compare the yield earned on 
the gross loan portfolio and how much they spend in the intermediation process using their 
total assets (Rosenberg, 2009). Mobilising small, variable and volatile deposits from the 
poorest customers or those residing in hard to access areas such as the most parts of LISSA 
countries is most likely to increase the operating expense ratio. This decreases the DTMFIs’ 
chances of self-sufficiency. A negative a priori sign was therefore assigned.  
vii.  Loan Impairments: Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) 
Based on business discretion, MFIs set aside a fixed or variable percentage of their pre-
operational expenses and tax revenues as a shield against anticipated and unexpected loan 
delinquencies. Hessou et al. (2019) noted that loan loss provisions are amended as business 
cycles change indicating that the institutions that provide microfinance should accumulate 
sufficient loan loss buffers that can enable them to withstand loan defaults during economic 
downturns. Nwachunkwu et al. (2018) reported that increasing the loan loss provisions drives 
MFIs to increase their lending interest rates. This is done so that the MFIs remain profitable 
thereby boosting their financial sustainability. A negative a priori sign was assigned as the loan 
loss provisions are more likely to reduce the likelihood of the LISSA DTMFIs’ self-sufficiency.  
 
 
118 
 
viii.  Coverage: Number of Offices (NOF) 
The distribution of the DTMFIs across their national jurisdictions is reflected by the 
number of offices or branches that they have. An extensive network of offices or branches 
ensures a wider coverage but this is a costly exercise as large amounts are channelled towards 
capital and revenue expenditure in setting up and maintaining the offices. An extensive 
coverage also constrains the productivity of the providers of microfinance as they have to deal 
with enormous volumes of new and unknown or remote clientele at the expense of financial 
and human resources (Twaha and Rashid, 2013). A negative a priori sign was assigned. 
ix.  Financing Costs: Financial Expenses to Total Assets (FETA) 
The financing of corporates comes at a cost to the recipients of the capital funds. 
Evidence from the MIX Market reveals that DTMFIs in SSA are largely financed through 
deposits than any other available or alternative sources of finance such as equity, debt, 
subsidies and donations (MIX, 2019). Deposits are a relatively cheaper source of finance 
because the DTMFIs themselves largely determine the interest rates that they are willing to pay 
the depositors for the use of their funds in the financial intermediation process (Lützenkirchen 
and Weistroffer, 2012). Usually, very low interest rates are paid to the depositors. For this 
reason, a positive a priori sign was assigned in an attempt to explain how the financial expenses 
ratio accounts for the likelihood of the financial sustainability of the LISSA DTMFIs.  
x. Financial Revenue: Real Yield on the Gross Loan Portfolio (YoGP) 
In the provision of financial services and products of relatively micro amounts, interest, 
fees and commissions are charged so that financial revenue is generated. According to the MIX, 
adjustments for inflation are made to the financial revenue generated to obtain the real yield on 
the gross loan portfolio. Financial revenue being the main source of revenue from the normal 
trading operations of the institutions that are involved in the provision of microfinance is 
envisaged to boost their financial sustainability (D'Espallier et al., 2017; Klomp, 2018). A 
positive a priori sign was therefore assigned. 
xi. Risk and Portfolio Quality: Portfolio at Risk > 30 days (PAR) 
Low-income earners and the poor are largely excluded by the mainstream banking system 
partly because they are considered as very risky clients. In low-income countries where 
financial development is very low, it is difficult to obtain information on the creditworthiness 
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of the potential and existing clients as the credit reference agencies are limited or are non-
existent in some cases. Formal documents on assets owned which are considered as bankable 
are in the hands of a few. Sources of income for loan repayments are sometimes abrupt, 
especially for the subsistence farmers. Thus, high default risk is most likely to cripple the 
financial sustainability of the LISSA DTMFIs (Lensink et al., 2018; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua and 
Soumare, 2019). A negative a priori sign was therefore allotted.  
xii.  Regulation: Regulatory Quality (REGQ) 
DTMFIs are regulated institutions, therefore the study incorporated the regulatory quality 
proxy in the empirical model to capture the effectiveness of the regulatory framework of the 
countries under study. However, the scope of the regulation varies across the different DTMFI 
charter types as they are not governed by the same regulatory board (refer to section 2.4.2). 
Therefore, to capture the regulation of the DTMFIs under the same umbrella, the study adopted 
the country level regulatory quality variable since it accommodates all the DTMFIs regardless 
of their charter type and governing body. The impact of regulatory quality varies since in some 
countries, regulation stifles the flexibility of the DTMFIs’ operations and in other countries, it 
provides a level playing field. The regulators themselves may be overburdened when they do 
not have adequate resources to meet the ever-increasing number of DTMFIs and they may not 
be given sufficient discretion to act by their respective national governments. A negative a 
priori sign was therefore assigned. Microfinance studies by El-Maksoud (2016), Nyanzu and 
Perprah (2016) and Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2016) included the regulatory quality variable in 
the estimation models.  
Table 4.2 below provides a summary of the variables used to determine why the 
depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries falls short in attaining financial 
sustainability. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of the variables used to understand why the depository microfinance 
sector of the LISSA countries falls short in attaining financial sustainability 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on literature review 
Variable Measurement
Predicted 
Effect
 Data 
Source
Dependent Variable
Financial Sustainability: 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency (OSS)
Dummy variable [1 = If the DTMFI is financial sustainable, 
and 0 otherwise] MIX
Independent Variables
Operational Scale: 
Dummy variables 
(SMALL, MEDIUM & 
LARGE)
Volume of Deposits or Gross Loan Porftolio: Small Scale: 0  
to US$2m, Medium Scale: US$2m to US$8m and Large 
Scale: over US$8m (base category: Medium Scale) Indeterminate MIX
Experience: Age   Number of years of operation + MIX
S
p
e
c
if
ic
s
Size: Logarithm of the 
Total Assets (lnASSETS)
Natural logarithm of total assets adjusted for inflation and 
subsidized provisioning for loan impairment and write-offs + MIX
D
T
M
F
I Charter Type: Dummy 
variables (BANK, CUC, 
NBFI & NGO)
Classification of DTMFIs according to legal status: BANK, 
CUC, NBFI and NGO (base category = NGO) varies MIX
Efficiency: Operating 
Expenses/Total Assets 
(OEA) Total operating expense compared to average assets - MIX
Loan Impairment: Loan 
Loss Provisions (LLP)
Impairment losses on loans, net of recoveries on loans 
written off, compared to average assets - MIX
Coverage: Number of 
Offices (NOF) Total number of offices or retail outlets - MIX
Financial Revenue: Real 
Yield on Gross Loan 
Portfolio (YoGP)
Adjusted Yield on Gross Portfolio (nominal)-inflation 
rate/(1+inflation rate) + MIX
Financing Cost: Financial 
Expenses/Total Assets 
(FETA) Total financial expenses divided by average assets + MIX
Risk & Portfolio 
Quality: Portfolio at Risk 
> 30 days (PAR)
The portion of loans greater than 30 days past due, including 
the value of all renegotiated loans compared to gross loan 
portfolio. - MIX
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
S
p
e
c
if
ic
Regulation: Regulatory 
Quality (REGQ)
Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate & 
implement sound policies & regulations that permit & 
promote private sector development varies WGI
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4.3.3 Analysis Technique - Probit Regression  
As empirical literature shows, the institutional providers of microfinance products and 
services are either financially sustainable or financially unsustainable (Bogan, 2012; Riquet 
and Poursat, 2013; Boateng et al., 2016; Bayai and Ikhide, 2018). This indicates that the 
financial sustainability of DTMFIs is dichotomous. As Gujarati and Porter (2010, p. 179) noted, 
dichotomous variables “indicate the presence or absence of a quality or attribute”. A DTMFI 
is financially sustainable when it has an operational self-sufficiency ratio of 100 % or more and 
is financially unsustainable when it has an operational self-sufficiency ratio of less than 100 %. 
1 was assigned for a financially sustainable DTMFI and 0 was assigned for a financially 
unsustainable DTMFI. Thus, the probability that a DTMFI is financially sustainable is 
represented as 𝑝 and the probability that a DTMFI is financially unsustainable is represented 
by 1 − 𝑝. According to Gujarati (2004), the econometric models that are appropriate for 
dealing with such dichotomous variables, inter alia, include; the linear probability model, logit 
model and the probit model. These three binary response models estimate the probability that 
the dependent variable (Y) equals one as a function of the explanatory variables (Xi) as shown 
in Equation 4.1:  
                                             𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟 [𝑌 = 1⃒𝑋] = 𝐹(𝑋′𝛽)                                                 (4.1) 
where 𝛽 is a vector of the model coefficients. Katchova (2013) noted that the main differences 
between the aforementioned three models lie in their functional forms. Equation 4.2 shows the 
functional form of the linear probability model: 
                                             𝑝 = 𝑝𝑟 [𝑌 = 1⃒𝑋] = 𝑋′𝛽                                                       (4.2) 
The linear probability model does not limit its estimated probabilities between 0 and 1 
and its disturbances exhibit non-normality and heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 2004).  As a result 
of these limitations, the linear probability model falls short in predicting probabilities in binary 
response econometric modelling. This paves way for the supremacy of the logit and probit 
maximum likelihood regression models that limit the predicted probabilities between 0 and 1. 
Additionally, the predicted probabilities in these models vary in a nonlinear fashion with 𝑋𝑖. 
Gujarati (2004, p. 553) presented these two requirements for the validity of the logit and probit 
models this way:  
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         … “(1) As 𝑋𝑖 increases, 𝑃𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑌 = 1⃒𝑋) increases but never steps outside the 0-1   
         interval, and (2) the relationship between 𝑃𝑖 and is nonlinear, that is, ‘one which  
         approaches zero at slower and slower rates as 𝑋𝑖 gets small and approaches one at  
        slower and slower rates as 𝑋𝑖 gets very large’”.  
The functional form of the logit model is the cumulative distribution function (F) of the 
logistic distribution: 
                                                       𝑃𝑖 =  
1
1+𝑒−𝑍𝑖
                                                                    (4.3)  
where: 
                                                      𝑍𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖                                                              (4.4)  
Thus, as 𝑃𝑖 behaves nonlinearly to 𝑍𝑖  and takes values between 0 and 1,  𝑍𝑖  ranges from 
- ∞ to + ∞. When 𝑃𝑖 represents the probability that a DTMFI is financially sustainable, then the 
probability that a DTMFI is financially unsustainable(1 − 𝑃𝑖) is given as: 
                                                1 − 𝑃𝑖 =  
1
1+𝑒𝑍𝑖
                                                                        (4.5) 
 𝑃𝑖  /1 − 𝑃𝑖 is the odds ratio in favour of a DTMFI being financial sustainable. The log of the 
odds ratio linearises the logistic model. Unlike the logit model which makes use of the logistic 
distribution as the cumulative distribution function (F), the probit model makes use of the 
standard normal distribution as the cumulative distribution function, (ф). Therefore, the 
functional form of the probit model is shown in Equation 4.6 as: 
                                           𝑃𝑖 = ф (𝑋
′𝛽) =  ∫
1
√(2𝜋) 
 ∅(2)𝑑2
𝑋′𝛽
−∞
                                         (4.6) 
∅ is the density function of the standard normal variable. Theoretically, the logistic curve has 
slightly flatter tails than the probit curve (Gujarati, 2004). The differences in the functional 
forms of the logit and probit models make their coefficients differ. Generally, the magnitude 
of the model coefficients for the logit and probit models are not interpreted but their signs. 
More meaningful and acceptable interpretations of the output of the logit and probit models are 
based on the estimation and reporting of the marginal effects.  
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The marginal effects indicate how the probability that (Y = 1) changes for every unit 
change in an explanatory variable and they are estimated either at the means or by average 
effects. The marginal effects at the means estimate the marginal effects at the specified value 
of X, typically the mean value of X. The pitfall of the marginal effects at the means is that there 
may not be such a specified value of X in the sample under consideration (Torres-reyna, 2014). 
There is no specified value or mean in determining the financial sustainability of DTMFIs. It 
is either the DTMFIs are financially sustainable or they are not. The average marginal effects 
are therefore more preferable as they estimate the average of the individual DTMFI marginal 
effects. The preference for either the logit model or the probit model is purely a matter of choice 
because their predictive powers as reflected by the percentage of correct classification largely 
concur with very minor and insignificant variations (Gujarati, 2004). The probit model was 
chosen and used in this study for examining why the deposit-taking programs of the LISSA 
DTMFIs are struggling to achieve financial sustainability.  
Equation 4.7 presents the specified probit model:  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛴𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡  +  𝛴𝛽𝑘𝑌𝑖𝑡 +  𝛴𝛽𝑙𝑍𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                          (4.7) 
Financial sustainability as represented by the operational self-sufficiency was a binary 
outcome variable that took the value of 1 if the DTMFI was financially sustainable, and the 
value of 0 if the DTMFI was financially unsustainable. The regressors were subdivided into 
three categories. The first category of regressors which were captured as 𝑋𝑖𝑡 consists of the 
main explanatory variable, the scale of operations measured using deposits volumes {Small 
Scale (SMALL), Medium Scale (MEDIUM) and Large Scale (LARGE) dummies}. The second 
category of regressors consists of the control DTMFI-specific variables, 𝑌𝑖𝑡. These include the 
number of years of operation (AGE), the natural logarithm of total assets (lnASSETS), the 
charter type dummies; Banks (BANK), Credit Unions/Cooperatives (CUC), Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions (NBFIs) and the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), operating 
expenses to total assets (OEA), loan loss provisions (LLP), number of offices (NOF), real yield 
on the gross loan portfolio (YoGP), financial expenses to total assets (FETA) and portfolio at 
risk greater than 30 days (PAR). The third category of regressors (𝑍𝑖𝑡) consists of a country-
specific macroeconomic variable, regulatory quality (REGQ). 𝛽0 is the constant and 𝛽𝑗, 𝛽𝑘 and 
𝛽𝑙; are the model coefficients to be estimated. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
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Before estimating the probit model, diagnostic tests for multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and endogeniety were carried out to obtain sound results and to aid drawing 
inferences correctly. The problem of multicollinearity where the independent variables are 
dependent was tested using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis and Table 4.3 shows 
the test results. 
Table 4.3: Multicollinearity Test Results using the Variance Inflation Factor: deposits 
and financial sustainability 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ASSETS 8.95 0.111714 
DEP 8.43 0.118658 
OEA 2.70 0.371047 
YoGP 2.65 0.377800 
AGE 1.49 0.678865 
NOF 1.41 0.709536 
REGQ 1.24 0.803222 
FETA 1.17 0.852498 
LLP 1.12 0.890900 
PAR 1.08 0.924090 
Mean VIF 3.02  
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
The VIF scores of the independent variables ranged from 1.08 to 8.95 and were less 
than 10, the cut-off score indicating that the level of multicollinearity amongst the independent 
was very low. Low levels of multicollinearity were further indicated by the mean VIF value of 
3.02 and the tolerance levels (1/VIF) were above 0.1, the cut-off point.  
An additional test for heteroscedasticity was carried out to check if the errors had 
unequal or non-constant variance. For this purpose, the Breusch-Pagan test was carried out. 
According to this test, the null hypothesis is that the errors have constant variance 
(homoscedastic) and the alternative hypothesis is that the errors have non-constant variance 
(heteroscedastic). Failure to reject the null hypothesis (when the p-value is more than 0.05) 
indicates that the errors are homoscedastic. However, the results of the test indicated that the 
null hypothesis had to be rejected as the estimated p-value was 0.0000 which was less than the 
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significance level of 0.05 indicating that the errors were heteroscedastic. Since the problem of 
heteroscedasticity was detected, this problem was corrected by adjusting the standard errors 
for robustness and clustering using the vce(cluster id) command in Stata. 
Another important test that is carried out in binary response models is the test for 
endogeniety of the explanatory variables (Arellano, 2008; Baum, Dong, Lewbel and Yang, 
2012). When it is suspected that one or more of the regressors are correlated with the error 
term, then the problem of endogeneity exists. According to Wooldridge (2012), endogeniety in 
probit models is caused by omitted and time-variant variables and unobserved heterogeneity. 
In the present study, endogeniety of the explanatory variables was tested using the ivprobit 
command in Stata. The ivprobit command fits models with binary dependent variables and 
endogenous independent variables. Both ivprobit options which are the maximum likelihood 
estimator (mle) and the twostep estimator of Newey (1987) were used to test for endogeneity 
in the specified probit model. These two estimators assume that the endogenous explanatory 
variables are continuous and are not appropriate for use with discrete endogenous explanatory 
variables. In this study, the number of branches variable was suspected to be an endogenous 
variable with the logarithm of total assets and the AGE variable. This means that the number 
of branches that the DTMFIs have was suspected to be influenced by the size of their total 
assets and the number of years of operation reflecting their experience, ability to spread their 
wings and withstand competition in deposit mobilisation.  
Using the maximum likelihood estimator option with the ivprobit command, the null 
hypothesis of Wald test of exogeneity was accepted as the p-value of 0.8881 was insignificant 
indicating that the problem of endogeniety did not exist. Additionally, the present study failed 
to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald test of exogeneity using the twostep estimator with the 
ivprobit command. The p-value of 0.8980 was insignificant indicating that endogeniety was 
not a problem in the specified binary response model. Since the problem of endogeneity was 
not found, the standard probit model was used in analysing the relationship between the scales 
of deposit volumes and financial sustainability. 
Robustness checks to confirm the results of the baseline probit model were done by 
estimating the average marginal effects of the logit model. However, it is noted that adopting 
either of the two binary response models in the estimation process and neglecting the other is 
purely a matter of choice as the two models usually yield almost identical results. This was 
indicated earlier in this section.  
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The next section discusses the data, variables and methodology that were used in 
examining the second objective of the study on liquidity and deposit insurance. 
4.4 Assessing the Relationship between Liquidity and Deposit Insurance of LISSA 
DTMFIs 
4.4.1 Data 
The second objective of the study was to assess the relationship between liquidity and 
deposit insurance in the depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries.  Three sources 
of data were used; data from the MIX for the DTMFI-specific variables based on a fixed panel 
dataset of 64 MIX DTMFIs sampled across 18 LISSA countries, the World Development 
Indicators (WDIs) of the World Bank for the country-specific variable and some secondary 
sources for the deposit insurance statistics. The MIX database including the reliability and 
validity of its data was discussed in detail in section 4.2.1, so this section focusses on the WDIs 
and the deposit insurance database. 
The WDIs are published annual national and regional time series data on 
macroeconomic variables since 1960 for 217 countries worldwide. The WDIs were the source 
of data on the macroeconomic variable used in this study, the inflation rate, which was 
measured by the Consumer Price Index for 18 out of 27 LISSA countries. The 18 LISSA 
countries shown in Appendix 4 were included based on the completeness of the MIX reported 
data of the DTMFIs from their respective jurisdictions. Prior microfinance researchers that 
have relied on the WDIs, inter alia, include: Janda and Zetek (2014), Hessou et al. (2019) and 
Bibi et al. (2018). The reliability and validity of the WDIs lies in the fact that they are reported 
by the World Bank and are amongst the currently available and best source of data on 
macroeconomic variables across the globe. 
Data on the state of affairs concerning deposit insurance and capital adequacy standards 
were extracted from three documents; the publication of the 2016 International Monetary Fund 
Regional Economic Outlook for SSA, the published work of Mecagni et al. (2015), the 
comprehensive deposit insurance database published in the reputable works of Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. (2005) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015). These databases are currently the most reliable 
and valid sources of data on deposit insurance and have been relied on by empirical researchers 
(Ngalawa, 2012). According to Bowen (2009), document analysis involves reviewing and 
evaluating printed and electronic documents to deduce meaning, gaining understanding and 
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developing knowledge when conducting research studies. Furthermore, Bowen (2009) 
highlighted the importance of document analysis; providing contextual data for the research, 
deriving questions that may be pivotal in the research work from the documents studied, 
provision of supplementary data required in the research process, tracking change and 
development and to verify or corroborate findings from other sources. According to Cardno 
(2018), one advantage of document analysis is that data can be sought at little or no cost at all. 
Since document analysis is an organised process, some systematic steps have to be followed; 
skimming which involves selecting the appropriate documents for the research; a thorough 
examination of the selected documents through intense reading; and interpretation of the 
reviewed documents.  
4.4.2 Variables 
i. Liquidity: Logarithm of Non-Earning Liquid Assets/Total Assets (lnNELATA) 
In line with Hessou et al. (2019) who used the liquid assets to total assets as a measure 
of liquidity in their study on loan loss provisioning and business cycles, this study uses the 
Non-earning Liquid Assets over Total Assets (NELATA) ratio as a measure of liquidity of 
LISSA DTMFIs. Liquid assets mainly represent cash on hand and demand deposits held with 
the regulators of the DTMFIs (Arteaga and Tejada, 2009). If these liquid assets held by the 
DTMFIs are non-earning, it means that they are not investable assets, therefore, they are readily 
available in providing liquidity in the form of withdrawals on deposits, loan requests and 
paying off other financial and operational commitments of the DTMFIs.  
ii. Deposit Insurance: Dummy variable (DEPINSU) 
In line with Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) who included a deposit insurance dummy 
in their study which investigated whether regulated MFIs achieve better sustainability and 
outreach than the unregulated ones, this study also incorporates a dummy variable which takes 
into account whether the countries included in the sample have deposit insurance or not. As 
mentioned earlier, deposit insurance schemes help to avert the danger of systemic risk or bank 
runs (Riquet and Poursat, 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015; Izaguirre, 2016). Thus, deposit 
insurance was expected to be a positive determinant of the liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs 
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iii. Capital Adequacy: Logarithm of Equity to Total Capital (lnCAR) 
The capital adequacy ratio determines the extent to which depository and non-depository 
financial institutions can absorb expected and unexpected losses which, inter alia, include 
sudden and unexpected withdrawals on demand deposits (Riquet and Porsat, 2013; Boateng et 
al., 2016), operational risks (Klomp, 2018) and other forms of liquidity risks (Zamore, 2018). 
According to Arteaga and Tejada (2009), the capital adequacy ratio links several risks faced 
by MFIs. Therefore, the CAR was expected to be a positive determinant of liquidity of LISSA 
DTMFIs. Many published microfinance studies considered the capital adequacy ratio in their 
estimation models (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Hermes et al., 2011; Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua, 2016; Hessou et al., 2019; Klomp, 2018).  
iv. Basel Implementation: Dummy Variable (BASEL) 
Following the recommendations of the Basel Accords of the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), financial institutions compare the level of their equity to the level of their 
total assets in the determination of their capital adequacy. The empirical model, therefore, 
incorporates a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a DTMFI operates in a country where 
Basel II or III implementation is in progress or has been partly or fully implemented, and 0 
otherwise. A positive a priori sign is expected between Basel II or III implementation and the 
liquidity of depository MFIs in the LISSA countries. The study of Hessou et al. (2019) also 
captured the Basel implementation using a dummy variable. 
v. Financing: Logarithm of Deposit to Loans (lnDTL) 
The deposits to loans ratio is a financing measure that reflects the extent to which deposits 
mobilised by the DTMFIs finance their gross loan portfolios. As financial intermediaries, 
DTMFIs intermediate the deposits they take into loan portfolios (Werner, 2016) thereby 
providing liquidity to their clientele. Therefore, the deposits to loans ratio was expected to 
positively influence the liquidity of DTMFIs. Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) and Klomp (2018) 
used the DTL ratio in their studies. 
vi. Risk: Logarithm of Loan Loss Rate (lnLLR)  
Loan repayments may be uncertain (Mata, 2011) therefore, necessary adjustments are 
made to the gross loan portfolio to accommodate write-offs and recovered loans. The loan loss 
rate provides insight into the process of impairment of loan losses due to irrecoverable debts 
129 
 
(Ahlin et al., 2011) and also takes into account the value of the loans recoverable. To guard 
against high loan loss rates which have a negative bearing on liquidity, MFIs create loan loss 
reserves which act as capital conservation buffers (Okafor, 2016; Hessou et al., 2019). Hence, 
loan loss provisions were expected to be negatively related to liquidity. A recent study by 
Klomp (2018) also factored in the loan loss rate.  
vii. Size: Logarithm of the Gross Loan Portfolio (lnGLP) 
Size is considered as an indicator of how well the MFIs can strategically locate 
themselves amid competition and the rapidly changing business environment using their asset 
base. Thus, MFIs with large asset bases tend to enjoy various economies of scale as they operate 
on a bigger scale and can increase the number of active borrowers, the number of depositors, 
the volumes of deposits and the gross loan portfolio. Many microfinance studies have measured 
size using the natural logarithm of assets (Bogan, 2012; Tehulu, 2013; Xu et al., 2016; Abdulai 
and Tewari, 2016; Chikalipah, 2017). In marked contrast, this study measures the size of the 
sampled DTMFIs using the natural logarithm of the gross loan portfolio following the empirical 
work of Quayes (2012), Bojesson and Hulten (2016) and Bayai (2017). Size was expected to 
be a positive determinant of liquidity. 
viii. Financial Revenue: Logarithm of Real Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio (lnYoGP) 
The yield on the gross loan portfolio represents income that accrues to the revenue base 
of the MFIs in the form of interest income and non-interest income after they have delivered 
financial services and products. The MIX adjusts the nominal yield for inflation to get the real 
yield. Amongst the studies that used this variable are Abdulai and Tewari (2016) and Klomp 
(2018). Inflows of financial revenues increase cash flow availability which helps to keep the 
liquidity of DTMFIs buoyant therefore financial revenue was expected to be a positive 
determinant of liquidity. 
ix. Expenses: Logarithm of Total Expenses to Total Assets (lnTETA) 
Due to the size of the transactions and the type and location of the clientele served by 
MFIs, the total costs of running an MFI tend to be very high. The main contributory costs are 
loan loss provisions (Hessou et al., 2019), operating expenses (Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a) 
and financing costs (Nwachukwu et al., 2018). As noted earlier, the average portfolio at risk 
ratio for the microfinance sector of SSA is above the international benchmark of 5 % resulting 
in high provisions for loan losses (Tehulu, 2013; Hessou et al., 2019; MIX, 2016). 
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Administration costs, selling and distribution costs and prudential regulation costs, also 
contribute towards increases in the total expenses’ ratio. Thus, the total expenses ratio was 
expected to be negative with the liquidity ratio.  
x. Inflation: Logarithm of the Consumer Price Index (lnCPI) 
The general increase in the price level is an obstruction in the flow of funds to DTMFIs. 
Inflation causes a reduction in the flow of cash to DTMFIs as the loan borrowers deliberately 
delay making their loan repayments because they want to do so after their loan balances have 
been eroded by inflation. Also, in fear of loss in the purchasing power of their deposits, 
depositors tend to withdraw their funds and store them in the form of hard currency or physical 
assets. Thus, the combined effect of these activities of borrowers and depositors negatively 
affect the liquidity of DTMFIs. The inflation rate as measured by the CPI has been treated as a 
control or country-specific variable in previous microfinance research work such as Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak (2007), Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013), Janda and Zetek (2014) and Otieno 
et al. (2016) Lensink et al. (2018) and Zamore (2018). Besides inflation, changes in exchange 
rates and interest contribute to the environment within which microfinance operates. However, 
the present study did not account for these macroeconomic variables based on the parity 
theories in international finance which explain the equilibrium interrelationships between the 
inflation rate and exchange rates (Purchasing Power Parity theory) and interest rates (Covered 
Interest Arbitrage theory). Therefore, this study adopted inflation as the only macroeconomic 
variable affecting the liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs. 
Table 4.4 below provides a summary of the variables used for assessing the relationship 
between liquidity and deposit insurance.  
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Table 4.4: Summary of the variables used to assess the relationship between Liquidity 
and Deposit Insurance 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on literature review 
 
Section 4.4.3 discusses the econometric method that was used to determine the 
relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance.
Variable Description/Measurement
Predicted 
Effect Data Source
Dependent Variable
Liquidity: Non Earning Liquid 
Assets/Total Assets 
(lnNELATA)
Logarithm of Adjusted Cash and 
Bank/Adjusted Total Assets MIX
Independent Variables
Deposit Protection: Deposit 
Insurance (DEPINSU)
Dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if a country has an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme, and 0 +
IMF (2016a), Demriguc-
Kunt et al.  (2015) &  
Mecagni et al. (2015)
Capital Adequacy: Capital to 
Assets (lnCAR)
Logarithm of Total Equity/Total 
Assets + MIX
Basel Implentation: Basel 
(BASEL)
Dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 if a country is implementing or 
has implemented Basel II/III, and 0 
otherwise. +
IMF (2016a) &                          
Mecagni et al. (2015)
Financing: Deposit to Loans 
(lnDTL)
Logarithm of Voluntary 
Deposits/Adjusted Gross Loan + MIX
sp
ec
if
ic
Risk: Loan Loss Rate 
(lnLLR)
Logarithm of (Adjusted Write-offs-
Value of Loans Recovered)/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio - MIX
D
T
M
F
I
Size: Logarithm of the Gross 
Loan Portfolio (lnGLP) Logarithm of the Gross Loan Portfolio + MIX
Financial Revenue: Real 
Yield on Gross Loan Portfolio 
(lnYoGP)
Logarithm of the Adjusted Yield on 
Gross Portfolio (nominal)-inflation 
rate/(1+inflation rate) + MIX
Expenses: Total Expenses to 
Total Assets (lnTETA)
Logarithm of Financial+Credit 
Impairment+Operating Expenses/Total 
Assets - MIX
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 S
p
ec
if
ic
Inflation: Consumer Price 
Index (lnCPI)
Logarithm of the Annual percentage 
change in the Consumer Price Index - WDI
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4.4.3 Analysis Technique - Random Effects Approach  
The study employed a random effects framework to analyse the relationship between 
liquidity and deposit insurance of the LISSA DTMFIs. According to Brooks (2008), the general 
panel data model is shown as: 
                                   𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                         (4.8) 
where: Yit is the regressand factor; α is the intercept term, β is a K x 1 vector of parameters to 
be estimated on the regressors; Xit is a 1 x K vector of regressors, for i =1, … N and t = 1, … T. 
µit is decomposed into սi the error term that represents the unobserved effects or individual 
DTMFI effects and vit which represents the idiosyncratic error term.  
                                                    𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖 +  𝜈𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (4.9) 
The idiosyncratic error term is assumed to be identically and independently distributed with a 
zero mean and constant variance, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 ⁓ 𝐼𝐷𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜈2). Panel data models pool data on the 
individual DTMFI dimensions which are represented by subscript i collected over time which 
is represented by subscript t. According to Gujarati (2004) supported by Greene (2012), panel 
data econometrics method has the advantage of pooling both the time series and cross-sectional 
components of datasets than pure time series and pure cross-section data econometrics. In a 
similar vein, Brooks (2008, p. 488) added that with panel data econometrics, more complex 
problems can be addressed “than would be possible with pure time series or cross-sectional 
data” econometrics. Hence, Pillai (2016) added that panel data methods can exert controls on 
heterogeneity across individuals and over time.  Amongst other benefits of panel data 
econometrics, (Baltagi, 2005; Hsiao, 2014) noted the following: highly informative datasets, 
reduction in multicollinearity, increased degrees of freedom and increased efficiency.  
Specifically, the study considered two main panel data econometric methods; the fixed 
effects and the random effects after noticing that panel data methods facilitate accounting for 
the heterogeneity of the DTMFIs under study. Reputable microfinance works that used the 
same econometric methods, inter alia, include; (Bogan, 2012; Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013; 
Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a; da Costa, 2017). Park (2011) 
distinguished the fixed effects approach from the random effects approach based on the 
treatment of dummy variables.  
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The fixed effects model combines the dummy variable with the intercept as shown in Equation 
4.10: 
                                    𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼 +  𝑢𝑖) + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡                                           (4.10) 
The random effects model combines the dummy variable with the error component as shown 
in Equation 4.11:  
                                   𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡)                                                     (4.11) 
Deciding on adopting either the FE approach or the RE approach is mainly based upon 
answering the question; is the unobserved effect սi correlated with the regressors Xʹit? While 
assuming that the explanatory variables Xʹit, are not correlated with the error term սi, the random 
effects method accommodates time-variant features but does not allow for the characteristic 
differences in the selected DTMFIs. The random effects approach uses a common mean value 
for the intercept for the selected DTMFIs. In marked contrast, the fixed effects method assumes 
that the error term սi is correlated with the regressors Xʹit and allows for time-invariant 
characteristics of the sampled DTMFIs in the estimation process. Also, the fixed effects method 
allows the intercept to differ across the DTMFIs and not to vary over time. The Hausman 
Specification Test (refer Table 4.5) was an aid in choosing between the random effects and the 
fixed effects models. According to this test, the null hypothesis is that the random effects model 
is appropriate while the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effects model is appropriate. 
The random effects model is chosen when the p-value is insignificant (Gujarati, 2004).  
Table 4.5: Hausman Specification Test Results 
 
(b)               
Fixed 
(B)            
Random 
(b - B)      
differences 
sqrt(diag(V_b - V_B))    
S.E. 
lnCAR -0.0214812 0.2202193 -0.2417005 0.1860379 
lnDTL -0.0431605 0.0196915 -0.062852 0.0739182 
lnGLP -0.2503368 -0.094004 -0.1563328 0.097578 
lnYoGP -0.1911913 -0.0289048 -0.1622866 0.1809482 
lnLLR 0.1278093 0.0753728 0.0524364 0.0371197 
lnTETA -0.3839253 -0.1667738 -0.2171514 0.2063509 
lnCPI -0.0119737 0.0130675 -0.0250412 0.0374875 
                  chi2(7) = (b – B)'[(V_b – V_B)^(-1)] (b – B) = 8.71 
           Prob > chi2 = 0.2739 
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
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After running the Hausman test, we failed to reject the null hypothesis as the p-value 
of 0.2739 was more than the significance level of 0.05 indicating that the random effects model 
was the most appropriate model for estimating the results. Equation 4.12 shows the linear 
functional model for estimation: 
𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈+ 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐿 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑜𝐺𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡                                          (4.12) 
Before estimating the random effects model, some diagnostic tests were conducted27. 
The multicollinearity test results shown in Table 4.6 were based on the VIF analysis.  
Table 4.6: Multicollinearity Test Results using the VIF analysis for the independent 
variables used for assessing Liquidity and Deposit Insurance 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
YoGP 2.60 0.384960 
TETA 2.40 0.416663 
BASEL 1.42 0.703610 
CAR 1.35 0.740528 
CPI 1.26 0.793888 
DEPINSU 1.25 0.801619 
DTL 1.24 0.808876 
GLP 1.15 0.870722 
LLR 1.10 0.912033 
Mean VIF 1.53  
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
As Table 4.6 shows, the VIF scores for the variables used for analysing the relationship 
between liquidity and deposit insurance ranged from 1.10 to 2.60 indicating that 
multicollinearity levels were very low. The mean VIF for all the explanatory variables was also 
very low at 1.53 and the tolerance levels ranged between 0.3684960 to 0.912033 and were 
within the acceptable level.  
To test for heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan test was used again and the p-value 
obtained was 0.0000 indicating that the null hypothesis was rejected as the errors exhibited 
heteroscedasticity. To correct this problem, all the variables used in the estimation model were 
 
27 This section also utilised the same diagnostic tests that were used in Section 4.2.3 for multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity, except for the White’s robust standard errors, another technique for solving the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. Endogeniety in this section was tested using a different technique as explained below. 
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transformed into logarithm format except for the dummies (DEPINSU and BASEL). 
Furthermore, the estimated model was corrected for White’s robust standard errors.  
Since the random effects model was adopted as the baseline model, this means that the 
unobserved individual effects captured in the error term are not correlated with any of the 
explanatory variables suggesting that there is no problem of endogeniety. Thus, this exogeneity 
assumption must hold if the random effects model is a consistent and efficient estimator. 
According to Qian (2014), the random effects model can be consistently estimated using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Generalised Least Squares (GLS) methods. The GLS method 
is more efficient than the OLS method. However, in the presence of endogeneity, these methods 
are biased and inconsistent due to their assumption that the explanatory variables are 
exogenous. Therefore, to ensure that endogeniety was not a problem in the estimation process, 
the study employed the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) technique as a testing technique using 
the ivregress command in Stata.  
The results of the ivregress command also enabled the study to identify the correct 
model (2SLS or the OLS method) for checking the robustness of the random effects model 
results. In the presence of endogeniety, the 2SLS method is preferred to the OLS method and 
in the absence of the endogeneity, the OLS method is superior to the 2SLS method. The present 
study treated size (lnGLP) as an endogenous variable as this variable was suspected to be 
influenced by financing revenue (lnYoGP) and risk proxied by the loan loss rate (lnLLR). The 
later variables were treated as instrumental variables. The results of the 2SLS method shown 
in Table 4.7 indicated that endogeniety was not a problem suggesting that the OLS method was 
more appropriate than the 2SLS method.  
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Table 4.7: Endogeniety Tests using the 2SLS method 
Test of endogeniety 
(estat endog command) 
H0: Variables are exogenous 
H1: Variables are endogenous 
 
p-values 
Durbin test: 0.8216  
Wu-Hausman test: 0.8265 
The insignificant p-values of the 
Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests 
support that the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected. This led to 
the conclusion that the suspicion 
that size (lnGLP) is an 
endogenous variable influenced 
by financial revenue (lnYoGP) 
and risk (lnLLR) was not 
supported. 
Instruments’ strength 
(estat firststage command) 
H0: Instruments are weak 
H1: Instruments are strong 
 
p-value: 0.0045 
Minimum eigenvalue statistic: 
5.58086 
Though the minimum eigenvalue 
statistic value was low indicating 
that the instruments were weak, 
their p-value was significant 
hence the instrumental variables 
were appropriate for testing the 
endogenous variable. 
Over-identifying restrictions 
(estat overid command) 
H0: Instruments are valid and 
the model is correctly 
specified. 
H1: Instruments are not valid 
and the model is not correctly 
specified. 
 
p-values: 
Sargan test: 0.8326 
Basmann test: 0.8370 
The insignificant values of the 
Sargan and Basmann tests 
supported the null hypothesis that 
instruments set for testing for 
endogeneity was valid and that 
the model was correctly 
specified. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
 As stated above, the GLS method is more efficient than the OLS estimator in checking 
the consistency of the baseline random effects model (Greene, 2012), therefore the study 
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adopted the GLS method for robustness purposes. Using the xtgls command in Stata, the GLS 
method allows estimation in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels, correlation 
amongst the cross sections and heteroscedasticity across the panels. The robustness check 
results of the GLS method are presented in Table 5.8 under section 5.3.3 and the estimated 
regression output showed that the panels were homoscedastic and there was no autocorrelation. 
Since the present study utilised an unbalanced panel dataset, cross sectional correlation across 
the panels was not tested because the panels must be balanced for this test to be carried out.  
 
In the next section, the data, variables and the statistical method that were used for 
answering the third objective of the study are discussed.   
4.5 Investigating the Outreach and Financial Sustainability Nexus in depository 
microfinance 
4.5.1 Data 
 The third objective of the study was to examine whether there is any evidence of 
mission drift and trade-off in the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector in the pursuit of 
outreach and financial sustainability goals. The fixed panel data of the 64 MIX reporting LISSA 
DTMFIs was utilised. The WDIs discussed in Section 4.3.1 were the source for data on the 
country-specific variables. Moreover, an additional sample of 36 DTMFIs sampled across 6 
Non-LISSA countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) was 
included for comparing and contrasting the baseline results. The reliability and validity of the 
MIX database and the WDIs of the World Bank were discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, 
respectively. Appendix 5 provides additional details of the Non-LISSA DTMFIs which were 
considered for robustness check purposes in examining outreach and financial sustainability in 
the depository microfinance sector. The next section discusses the variables used in the 
econometric estimation process. 
4.5.2 Variables 
i. Outreach Depth: Average Deposit Balance per Depositor/Gross National Income per 
Capita (AVDGNI) 
The average deposit balance per depositor is a depth of outreach measure that is reflective 
of the size of the savings that the microdepositors contribute to the deposit base of the DTMFIs 
for a particular period. Rosenberg (2009) stated that deposits that are used for the computation 
138 
 
of this metric are those that have not been withdrawn by depositors. According to Tulchin et 
al. (2009), average balances on deposits are indicative of how responsive the DTMFIs are to 
the needs of their clients. Thus, the low-income level clients and the pro-poor poor who cannot 
benefit from the financial intermediation of commercial banks are given a chance to open 
savings accounts that are appropriate for them by the DTMFIs. The pro-poor clients, therefore, 
prefer to lodge small average balances of their savings with the depository institutions while 
the better-off clients prefer to lodge large average balances of their savings. Thus, the average 
balances on deposits correspond to the income level of the depositors (Churchill and Marr, 
2017). Robinson (2004) argued that larger average balances on deposits enable the DTMFIs to 
run their businesses profitably serving both the very poor and the non-poor. A study by Mata 
(2011) associated larger average deposit balances with DTMFIs that deal with diaspora 
remittances. Dokulilova et al. (2009) justified larger average balances by stating that such 
balances are ideal in certain situations, for instance, saving for a bigger event such as a wedding 
ceremony. Tulchin et al. (2009) recorded that the average deposit balance per depositor cannot 
be the same across different countries, therefore, to accommodate cross country variations, the 
average deposit balance per depositor is divided by the Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita. In complementing this view, Rosenberg (2009) wrote that average balances that are 
below 20 % of their GNI are pointers that consumers of microfinance products are very poor. 
This indicates that DTMFIs that target low income depositors follow the Welfarists approach 
as they serve the pro-poor, the original mission of microfinance provision. Deviation of focus 
from small income depositors to large income depositors indicates mission drift. 
ii. Outreach Breadth: Logarithm of the Number of Voluntary Depositors (lnNODEP) 
Rozas and Erice (2014) argued that the outreach of MFIs that mobilise deposits from the 
poor and the low-income households can only be analysed accurately if the number of 
depositors and their average account balances are considered. In the same vein, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010) noticed that though the sizes of the 
deposits account balances are very small, these institutions serve very significant numbers of 
depositors in some parts of the world. Therefore, the rush to increase the market share drives 
the DTMFIs to cast their nets wide so that they reach as many depositors as possible.  
As the number of the depositors increases, the breadth of outreach increases in quantity. 
This, in turn increases the volume of deposits resulting in positive returns in economies of scale 
which boost profitability. This argument is supported by the Institutionalists’ theorists. Thus, 
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the increase in the number of depositors in the depository microfinance sector in SSA speaks 
to the commendable growth in the volume of the deposits that they mobilise.  At the same time, 
a decrease in the number of depositors may also lead to an increase in the volume of deposits. 
This happens when few depositors lodge very large deposits with the DTMFIs and this is also 
prevalent when the few depositors have multiple accounts within the same DTMFIs.  
iii. Financial Sustainability: Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) 
Operational self-sufficiency is the commonly used measure of financial sustainability in 
empirical studies (Hartarska and Nadolynak, 2007; Zerai and Rani, 2011; Martínez, 2015; 
Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a). As noted above, the relationship 
between outreach and financial sustainability depends on the variables used to measure 
outreach (Yeshi, 2015) and on the goals of focus established by the institutions that provide 
microfinance services and products (Churchill and Marr, 2017). After a careful examination of 
empirical studies, it was postulated in this study that: following the Welfarists’ approach yields 
a negative relationship between outreach depth and financial sustainability; and following the 
Institutionalists’ approach yields a positive relationship between outreach breadth and financial 
sustainability. 
iv. Gender: Percentage of Women Clientele (POW) 
The pioneer microfinance programs such as the Grameen model mainly focused on lending 
to women for some reasons. The percentage of women borrowers, therefore, was a proxy that 
reflects the relative proportion of the total number of women to the total number of clients 
served by the DTMFIs. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, a high percentage of the proportion of 
women clientele reflects that the DTMFIs are deepening their outreach (Marr and Awaworyi, 
2012). A declining focus towards lending to women is a sign that the DTMFIs are inclining 
their programs to those of the commercial banks who mainly focus on men who work or are 
entrepreneurial and have savings accounts (Briere and Szafarz, 2014). The percentage of 
women clientele variable was expected to be positive in the depth of outreach model and 
positive in the breadth of outreach model. Prior studies also considered the percentage of 
women clientele in their estimation models (Hermes et al., 2011; Kipesha and Zhang, 2013; 
Janda and Zetek, 2014; Nyanzu and Perprah, 2016; Abdulai and Tewari, 2016).  
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v. Financing and Financial Intermediation: Deposits to Total Assets (DTA) 
The deposits to assets ratio indicate the extent to which the deposits finance the total assets 
portfolio of the DTMFIs. According to the MIX, the deposits to assets ratio is not only a 
measure of deposit financing but is also a measure of the level of financial intermediation by 
the DTMFIs (MIX, 2009). A deposit to assets ratio greater than 20 % indicates high levels of 
financial intermediation, a deposit to assets ratio less than 20 % reflects low levels of financial 
intermediation and a deposits to assets ratio of 0 % indicates that there is no financial 
intermediation. Following the empirical findings of Bayai and Ikhide (2016b) on financing 
structure and outreach of SADC MFIs, the deposits to assets variable was expected to be 
positive with both the depth and breadth of outreach.    
vi. Productivity: Depositors per Staff Member (DEPSTAME) 
The depositors per staff member ratio compares the total number of depositors to the total 
number of personnel working in the DTMFIs. According to the MIX, the depositors per staff 
member is an indicator of how many depositors can an employee handle at a particular period. 
In other words, the depositors per staff member is a productivity ratio. Given that the numbers 
of depositors exceed the number of active borrowers for the DTMFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the impression is that the personnel in these depository establishments are highly productive. 
A positive a priori sign was therefore assigned for both outreach depth and breadth measures.  
vii. Experience: Number of Years of Operation (AGE) 
Age relates to the number of years the DTMFIs have been operational since their 
establishment. Over time, a couple of microfinance studies have considered the age variable in 
their econometric estimation (Johnson, 2015; Xu et al., 2016; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; 
Churchill and Marr, 2017). Vanroose and D’Espailler (2013) observed that as MFIs age, their 
success rate varies, some being viable and increasing outreach, and others are ailing and folding 
up thereby decreasing outreach. A net positive impact of age was therefore expected on both 
models.   
viii. Size: Logarithm of Total Assets (lnASSETS) 
Size in the microfinance sector is traditionally measured using the natural logarithm of the 
total assets held by the MFIs (Ahlin et al., 2011; Bogan, 2012; Marr and Awaworoyi, 2012; 
Johnson, 2015; El-Maksoud, 2016; Bayai, 2017; Tadele et al., 2018). The size proxy represents 
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the ability of the MFIs to strategically position themselves in fighting competition, adapting to 
technological revolutions, and seizing diversification and investment opportunities (Wijesiri et 
al., 2015). Therefore, this study assigned a positive a priori sign between the natural logarithm 
of total assets variable and the depth and breadth of outreach measures. 
ix. Risk: Portfolio Risk > 30 days (PAR) 
Default risk is inevitable in the operation of a microfinance business given that some of the 
microloan beneficiaries have seasonal, irregular and very low flows of income thereby 
affecting their ability to repay the borrowed funds. Portfolio at Risk (PAR>30 days) represents 
the proportion of the total gross loan portfolio that is overdue for repayment by 30 days and 
also the portion of the gross loan portfolio that has been renegotiated. Chances are high that 
overdue payments and renegotiated loans will not be repaid resulting in the deterioration of the 
loan portfolio quality thereby stifling the depth and breadth of the outreach of the DTMFIs. A 
negative a priori sign was therefore assigned accordingly. The PAR>30 days variable was 
included amongst the explanatory variables in this study following the empirical work of other 
researchers (Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a; Caro, 2017; Tadele et al., 
2018).  
x. Competition: Commercial Bank Branches (ComBB) 
The existence of commercial banks in the financial development landscape as measured by 
the number of commercial bank branches per 100 000 adults poses competition upon the MFIs. 
A negative sign was assigned for the interaction of the commercial bank branches with both 
the depth and breadth of outreach. Prior studies that incorporated the commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults include Al-Azzam et al. (2012), Cull et al. (2013) and El-Maksoud 
(2016). 
xi. Location: Percentage of Rural Population (RPOP) 
The 2017 WDIs show that more than 50 % of the population in Low-Income Sub-Saharan 
Africa resides in rural areas. Janda and Zetek (2014) noted that vastly populated rural areas 
indicate that there is a high demand for microfinance products; therefore, MFIs are envisaged 
to cater for their financial needs. This study expected a positive relationship between the 
percentage of the rural population and the depth and breadth of outreach.   
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xii. Regional Factors: Sub-regions (CA, WA, EA and SA) 
 Sub-regional differences across Sub-Saharan Africa have an impact on the different 
characteristics and performance of microfinance providers (Mokaddem, 2009; Sainz-
Fernandez et al., 2015; Wijesiri et al., 2015; Tadele et al., 2018). In this study, location was a 
dummy variable which constituted four sub-regions; Central Africa (CA), Western Africa 
(WA), Eastern Africa (EA) and Southern Africa (SA). These four sub-divisions of Sub-Saharan 
Africa are based on the 2018 statistics of the UNCTADs’ classification of countries by sub-
regions. This classification eliminated the LISSA DTMFIs from Southern Africa as this region 
has no LICs. The a priori expectations varied across the sub-regions. The default sub-regional 
dummies were Eastern Africa for the LISSA DTMFIs and Southern Africa for the Non-LISSA 
DTMFIs. As noted in section 2.2, Eastern Africa is an outlier sub-region in the development 
of microfinance in the African continent so the present study had to treat this sub-region as a 
default category so that the baseline findings of the study are not affected. Nonetheless, in the 
robustness check results for the Non-LISSA DTMFIs, Southern Africa was the default category 
as there was only one DTMFI in the sample to represent this sub-region (refer to Appendix 5). 
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the variables used. 
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Table 4.8: Summary of the variables used to analyse the relationship between Outreach 
and Financial Sustainability 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on literature review
Variable Description/Measurement
Predicted 
Effect
Data 
Source
Dependent Variable (s)
Model 1: Depth of Outreach: Average 
Deposit Balance per Depositor/Gross 
National Income per Capita (AVDGNI)
Average deposit  balance per depositor 
compared to local GNI per capita MIX
Model 2: Breadth of Outreach: Number 
of Depositors  
Natural logarithm of the number of 
individuals who currently have funds on 
deposit with the financial institution. MIX
Independent Variables
Financial Sustainability: Operational Self-
Sufficiency  (OSS)
Financial Revenue/Financial Expenses + 
Impairment Losses on Loans + 
Operating Expenses
positive with 
AVDGNI & 
negative with 
lnNODEP MIX
Gender: Percentage of Women Clientele 
(POW)
Number of female borrowers as a 
percentage of total borrowers at period + MIX
Financing & Financial Intermediation: 
Deposits to Total Assets (DTA)
Voluntary Deposits/Adjusted Total 
Assets + MIX
Productivity: Deposit per Staff Member 
(DEPSTAME)
Total number of depositors divided by 
total personnel. + MIX
sp
ec
if
ic
s
Experience: Age                                                          
(Dummy Variable) (AGE) Number of years of operation + MIX
D
T
M
F
I 
Size: Logarithm of the Total Assets 
(lnASSETS)
Total Assets adjusted for inflation and 
subsidized provisioning for loan 
impairment and write-offs + MIX
Risk: Portfolio at Risk (PAR)
The portion of loans greater than 30 
days past due, including the value of all 
renegotiated loans compared to gross 
loan portfolio. - MIX
Competition: Commercial Bank Branches 
(ComBB)
Commercial bank branches per 100 000 
adults - WDI
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
sp
ec
if
ic
Location: Percentage of Rural Population 
(RPOP)
The difference between total population 
and urban population. - WDI
R
eg
io
n
 
sp
ec
if
ic Sub-regions: Central Africa (CA), Western 
Africa (WA), Eastern Africa (EA) and 
Southern Africa (SA)
Dummy variables categorizing DTMFIs 
and their countries of origin into four 
LISSA sub-regions  varies
MIX & 
United 
Nations
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Section 4.5.3 which is next, outlines the econometric method that was used for 
investigating the outreach and financial sustainability nexus in the LISSA’s depository 
microfinance sector. 
4.5.3 Analysis Technique - System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM)  
Panel data models are preferred for pooling together the cross-sectional components 
and the time series components of datasets and also for reducing collinearity amongst the 
regressors (Brooks, 2008). Despite these advantages, general panel data estimation models 
exhibit endogeneity, a problem which has ignited a growing focus on dynamic panel data 
estimation models in microfinance studies (Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Kar and Swain, 2014; 
El-Maksoud, 2016; Tchakoute-Tchuigona, 2016; Amin et al., 2017; Churchill and Marr, 2017; 
Chikalipah, 2017, 2018; Hessou et al., 2019; Lensink et al., 2018) and across different research 
disciplines (Nzimande and Ngalawa, 2017; Vengesai and Kwenda, 2018). 
In dynamic panel data analysis, the endogeneity problem is caused by measurement 
errors, omitted variables and reverse causality. The pooled OLS method is an inefficient 
estimator in addressing the endogeneity problem because the individual heterogeneity though 
not directly observable, correlates with the regressors. This method is used when the individual 
heterogeneity is assumed to be non-unobservable. According to Nickell (1981), the within 
group estimator removes the individual fixed-term effects but falls short in addressing the 
endogeneity problem as it produces inconsistent estimates. The first differencing technique 
which eliminates the individual fixed-term effects still does not address the endogeneity 
problem due to inconsistency. Another alternative, the Instrumental Variable (IV) technique 
by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), does not make use of all the moment conditions and has 
problems that are associated with identifying the instruments. As such, the Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) which was first developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and later on 
refined in the works of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) evade the 
endogeneity problem.  
Dynamic panel data models incorporate a lagged dependent variable as one of the 
explanatory variables. This introduces dynamic bias or the endogeneity problem as the lagged 
dependent variable correlates with the time invariant fixed effect error term which allows for 
individual heterogeneity. Mairesse and Hall (1996) noted that incorporating all the valid 
instruments of the lagged endogenous variable makes the GMM superior to estimators such as 
the pooled OLS, first differencing, the within group estimator and the instrumental variables 
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technique in addressing the endogeneity problem. Additionally, the dynamic panel data models 
can deal with the Nickel bias in fixed effects and have been applied as a valuable estimation 
technique in dynamic partial adjustment microfinance studies (Hessou et al., 2019). This study, 
therefore, employed dynamic panel data modelling in linking the depth and breadth of outreach 
deposit-taking measures of the LISSA DTMFIs to the financial sustainability measure. A 
dynamic panel data model is appropriate for this study as the dataset used has a small T (12 
years) and a large N (64 DTMFIs) (Baum, 2013; Bun and Safaradis, 2013). The general form 
of a dynamic panel data model is shown in Equations 4.13 and 4.14 as follows: 
                             𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡; |𝛾| < 1                                                     (4.13)                                                   
                             𝜖𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                          (4.14) 
where; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the regressand factor, 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged regressand, |𝛾| < 1 is the intercept and 
is less than one; 𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is a 1 x k vector of regressors; 𝛽 is k x 1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated on the regressors for i = 1, … N and t = 1, … T. 𝜇𝑖 denotes the time invariant 
individual heterogeneity and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic error component. 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IDD) with a zero mean and constant 
variance (0, 𝜎2) and are exogenous to each other hence, 
                         ∈ (𝜇𝑖𝑡) = (𝜀𝑖𝑡) = (𝜇𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0                                                                (4.15)  
According to Rozas and Erice (2014), the outreach of MFIs that mobilise deposits can 
only be analysed accurately if the number of depositors and their average account balances are 
considered. Therefore, the study adopted two dependent variables in the estimation process. 
𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁 +
𝜇𝑖 +  𝜕𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                    (4.16)         
𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡−1+ 𝛽2𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜕𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                      (4.17)         
Equation 4.16 above is the empirical model for outreach depth following the Welfarists’ 
approach where the dependent variable is the average deposit balance per depositor/GNI per 
capita, 𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡. Equation 4.17 above specifies the empirical model for the outreach breadth 
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following the Institutionalists approach where the dependent variable the natural logarithm of 
the number of depositors, 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡. 𝐴𝑉𝐷𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 is the one period lagged dependent 
variable for outreach depth. 𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the one period lagged dependent variable for 
outreach breadth. 𝛽 represents the estimation parameters. The lagged dependent variables were 
considered as endogenous variables. Financial sustainability captured as 𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the main 
explanatory variable and was treated as a weakly exogenous variable. The three categories of 
controls were assumed to be strictly exogenous variables; DTMFI specific (𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡, 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡), macroeconomic (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡) and 
the sub-regional dummies (CA, WA, EA and SA). The error component was broken down into 
the unobservable individual DTMFI heterogeneity effects, 𝜇𝑖; the time varying effects, 𝜕𝑡; and 
the idiosyncratic term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  
Equations 4.16 and 4.17 above incorporated the outreach measures AVDGNI and 
lnNODEP as lagged independent variables. It was assumed that the dataset contains an 
autoregressive process, therefore, lagging the dependent variable(s) amongst the independent 
variables accommodates how the past outreach performance influences the current outreach 
performance. The endogeneity problem was addressed by assuming that the unobservable 
individual heterogeneity or fixed effects of the sampled DTMFIs are correlated with the 
DTMFI specific variables. Specifically, the SGMM estimator was employed as it makes use of 
additional instruments of the lagged dependent variables thereby improving efficiency and 
averting the problems of weak instruments associated with the Difference Generalised Method 
of Moments (DGMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). According to Blundell et al. 
(2011), the SGMM imposes mild restrictions on the initial condition process and it has more 
asymptotic efficiency than the non-linear GMM in finite sample properties. Thus, the SGMM 
utilises the one period lagged regress and as instruments in levels in Equation 4.13 (which is 
the first SGMM equation), thereby ensuring no correlation between the endogenous DTMFI 
specifics and the error term. The first differenced equation which is the second SGMM 
equation, which provides additional instruments to increase efficiency of the model. The 
instruments proliferation problem is addressed through the collapse option.  Moreover, since 
the study utilised unbalanced panel data, the SGMM is appropriate because it can handle 
unbalanced data through orthogonal deviations thereby minimising loss of observations. 
To ensure consistency of the SGMM estimation technique, the estimated econometric 
model must pass two tests which were utilised in this study (Roodman, 2009). Firstly, the 
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instruments must be valid and this is tested using the Sargan-Hansen test for identifying over 
restrictions or instruments’ proliferation. According to the null hypothesis of this test, the 
instruments must be uncorrelated with the error term, that is, the instruments must be valid. 
Therefore, when tabulating the SGMM results, the number of instruments reported must be 
lower than the number of cross-sectional units and the p values of the test must be insignificant. 
In this study, the estimated models passed this test except for the outreach depth model in the 
robustness checks (refer to the lower panel of Table 5.10). 
 The second diagnostic test utilised was the Arellano-Bond (AR) test for checking 
autocorrelation of the residuals. The null hypothesis is that there is no second order serial 
correlation (AR(2)) in the residuals but first order serial correlation (AR(1)) is likely to occur 
due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable. This means that the estimated SGMM 
model is correctly specified if the AR(2) test is insignificant. In this study, the robustness of 
the SGMM models estimated was evidenced by failure to reject the null hypotheses in both the 
Sargan-Hansen and Arellano-Bond (AR) tests (refer to the lower panel of Table 5.10). 
Additional diagnostic tests for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity were also 
carried out. To test for multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor Analysis (VIF) was 
employed and the results are shown in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: Multicollinearity Test Results using the VIF analysis for the independent 
variables used for assessing Outreach and Financial Sustainability 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
DTA 1.71 0.584916 
DEPSTAME 1.60 0.626211 
ASSETS 1.51 0.663464 
RPOP 1.41 0.710460 
POW 1.39 0.721109 
AGE 1.34 0.745397 
ComBB 1.32 0.759970 
OSS 1.14 0.874304 
PAR 1.08 0.922376 
Mean VIF 1.39  
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
The test scores ranged between 1.08 and 1.71 indicating very low levels of 
multicollinearity.  
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The null hypothesis test of the Breusch-Pagan test that the errors are homoscedastic was 
rejected indicating that the data utilised suffered from heteroscedasticity. The robust option of 
the dynamic data model estimated corrected this problem (Roodman, 2009). 
For robustness purposes, the study changed the sample and considered the Non-LISSA 
DTMFIs but maintained the same econometric methodology used for obtaining the baseline 
results which is the SGMM method. It is common practice in most empirical studies to conduct 
robustness checks for the baseline results by using different estimation techniques (Bogan, 
2012; Mersland and Strøm, 2010), but there has been a diversion by a few empirics who 
considered the use of different variables or samples while maintaining the same estimation 
techniques used for obtaining the baseline results (Kipesha and Zhang, 2013; Abduali and 
Tewari, 2017). In this study, the former approach of varying the analysis technique was not 
followed but the latter approach of varying the sample (36 DTMFIs sampled across 6 Non-
LISSA countries; Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) was 
adopted due to the following reasons.  
Firstly, since the SGMM method is superior to all other panel econometric methods in 
solving the problem of endogeniety and in capturing the dynamic nature of the data of the Non-
LISSA DTMFIs, it was plausible to maintain the SGMM approach in the robustness checks. 
Secondly, according to the 2017 World Development Indicators of the World Bank, the Non-
LISSA DTMFIs operate in economies which have higher levels of the national income of US$1 
026 and above as measured by the GNI per capita, than those in the LISSA countries whose 
national income levels are US$1 025 or less. This entails that residents of the Non-LISSA 
countries have higher levels of disposable income indicating that they have larger savings (in 
absolute terms) that they lodge with DTMFIs thereby increasing the size of the average deposit 
balance per depositor/GNI per capita. Additionally, the high levels of disposable incomes also 
indicate that the number of people that lodge deposits in the Non-LISSA countries are more 
than those in the LISSA countries as their chances of savings surplus cash resources are high. 
Accordingly, this has implications for mission drift and trade-offs in the pursuit of the social 
mission (depth and breadth of outreach) and financial mission (financial sustainability) of the 
Non-LISSA DTMFIs, concurrently. Therefore, the sample of the Non-LISSA DTMFIs was 
chosen to compare and contrast the results of the LISSA DTMFIs so that any similarities and 
differences may be identified thereby enhancing the inferences and generalisations across the 
whole region of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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4.6 Ethical Considerations  
 
In line with the university requirements of carrying out research studies, ethical 
considerations were taken into account. Before conducting the study, ethical clearance was first 
sought and obtained from the university. However, the study did not involve interactions with 
human beings because secondary data were utilised.  
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined the research methodology that was adopted in answering the 
study’s research questions and objectives. A detailed description of the nature and types of data 
used and their sources were also given, together with the details of the sample and the sampling 
procedure. Furthermore, the chapter provided an in-depth discussion of the econometric 
techniques that were used in the estimation process and the variables that were incorporated in 
the specified empirical models. Chapter five, which is next, presents and discusses the research 
findings of the three objectives of the study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the research findings in three sections 
in line with the three objectives of the study. In each section, the results are presented and 
discussed through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and empirical analysis. Section 5.2 
presents and discusses the results for the first objective of the study that investigated why the 
depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries falls short in attaining financial 
sustainability despite having huge deposit volumes. Section 5.3 presents and discusses the 
results for the second objective of the study that analysed the relationship between liquidity 
and deposit insurance in the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector. Section 5.4 presents and 
discusses the results for the third objective of the study which examined whether the outreach-
financial sustainability nexus in the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector exhibits a trade-
off or mission drift. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter through a summary. 
5.2 Results for Deposits and Financial Sustainability 
 
This section discusses the results of the first objective of the study in three categories; 
descriptive statistics, pairwise correlations and probit regression. 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for the variables used  
Table 5.1 below shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used for examining the 
relationship between scales of deposit volumes and financial sustainability. The mean value 
for operational self-sufficiency of 99.97 % is close to 100 % giving the impression that on 
average, the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector is financially sustainable. However, 
empirical studies show that this is not the case for all the LISSA DTMFIs when they are looked 
at as individual firms (Riquet and Poursat, 2013; Abdulai and Tewari, 2017a; Bayai and Ikhide, 
2018). On average, the LISSA DTMFIs are 16.7 years old, with the average youngest LISSA 
DTMFI being 7 years old and the most mature LISSA DTMFI is 41 years old.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for the variables used (Deposits and Financial 
Sustainability) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) 99.968 32.626 0.38 228.12  
Deposits (DEP) 12613879.89 26658591.65 12386 161328275 
Age (AGE) 16.90018 6.603735 7 41 
Assets (ASSETS) 20949463 35129888 157185 214144887 
Operating expenses to total assets 
(OEA) 
23.78416 17.26236 2.85 164.14 
Loan loss provisions (LLP) 1.604674 2.16688 -8.33 13.32 
Number of offices (NOF) 24.17174 33.00483 1 164 
Yield on the gross loan portfolio 
(YoGP) 
26.79577 16.24464 -16.06 80.13 
Financial expenses to total assets 
(FETA) 
2.875534 3.607388 -33.46 35.13 
Portfolio at risk (PAR) 6.865012 7.964409 -14.57 97 
Regulatory quality (REGQ) -0.6211033 3776209 -1.59 .67 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange  
Overall, the statistics for the AGE variable suggest that the LISSA DTMFIs are 
experienced deposit-taking financial service providers. However, the LISSA DTMFIs 
experience challenges in controlling their overhead costs as indicated by the high average 
operating expenses ratio of 24 % which on average, erodes almost 89 %28 of the real yield 
generated on the gross loan portfolio. The average yield on the gross loan portfolio during the 
period under study for the sample was 27 %. In the worst-case scenario, an average DTMFI 
recorded 164 % as the maximum value of the operating expenses to assets ratio. Despite the 
very low mean value of the loan impairments (1.60 %), the average portfolio at risk value of 
 
28 89 % was derived by comparing the average operating expenses ratio to the average yield on the gross loan 
portfolio. Analysing the operating expenses ratio enables a quick comparison between the yield on the gross 
loan portfolio with the staff and administrative costs, that is, how much the loan earns versus how much was 
spent to generate and monitor the loan (Rosenberg, 2009). 
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6.86 % is greater than the international benchmark of 5 % implying that financial sustainability 
is negatively affected by decreasing the loan portfolio quality (MIX, 2019). The regulatory 
quality variable mean value of -0.62 implies that on average, the quality of the regulatory 
processes in the region under consideration is of a low standard.  
 As deposits are the main source of funding in the depository microfinance sector in the 
LISSA countries (MIX, 2019), the financial expenses ratio has a very low average of 2.88 %. 
This suggests that the low financial expenses improve financial sustainability. In terms of 
geographical coverage, average LISSA DTMFIs have approximately 24 offices per country 
indicating wide coverage. At minimum, some DTMFIs only have one office implying very low 
coverage while on the other extreme, some DTMFIs have a maximum of 164 offices indicating 
extensive distribution. Though an extensive coverage is good in terms outreach breadth, it 
comes along with capital and revenue expenditures that retard the chance of the LISSA 
DTMFIs in reaching the financial sustainability threshold with ease. In terms of size, an 
average DTMFI has total assets of US$20 949 463 suggesting that an average DTMFI is a 
medium-sized firm. 
5.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.2 shows the correlation analysis output for the variables used in examining the 
link between scales of deposit operations and the financial sustainability of LISSA DTMFIs. 
Small-scale deposit operations are negatively related to financial sustainability suggesting that 
transaction costs of these types of deposits dwindle the operating income (de Sousa-Shields 
and King, 2005). The medium-scale deposits and large-scale deposits have a positive 
association with financial sustainability suggesting that there are efficiency gains of dealing 
with these types of deposit scales (Ngo et al., 2014). The operating expenses ratio is negative 
with large-scale deposits indicating that failure to control rising operational costs as the scale 
of operations increases, erodes the benefits that are associated with increasing returns to scale 
(Rai and Rai, 2012). The result is that the chance of attaining financial sustainability is reduced. 
While ageing shows a positive relationship with self-sufficiency, operating with either small-
scale or medium-scale deposits is negatively associated with the ageing of the DTMFIs. 
Nonetheless, operating on a large-scale is positive with ageing.  
The asset variable is significant with financial sustainability, and with the BANK and 
CUC charter types suggesting that investment in real and other assets by these DTMFI 
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modalities helps their deposit mobilisation programs to be profitable. The loan loss provisions, 
portfolio at risk and regulatory quality are all negative with operational self-sufficiency 
indicating that failure to put a reasonable check on these variables erodes the profits that 
contribute towards attaining financial sustainability (refer to the descriptive statistics discussed 
above). Interest costs (FETA) is negative with financial sustainability and for CUCs and NGOs. 
This is unexpected since the financial structure of the DTMFIs is mainly characterised by cheap 
deposit financing (Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). Another unexpected relationship is 
that of the interest income (YoGP) with self-sufficiency, the CUCs and NBFIs, which is 
negative. Interest income is expected to improve financial sustainability (Nwachunkwu et al., 
2018). The BANKs and the NGOs were positive and significant with interest income. The 
BANKs and NBFIs which are mainly profit-oriented institutions have a negative relationship 
with financial sustainability while the CUCs and NGOs which are less profit-oriented 
institutions have a positive relationship with financial sustainability. The correlations between 
financial sustainability and the profit-oriented institutions were unexpected as these financial 
institutions take a leading role in the search for financial sustainability than the non-profit 
oriented institutions (Lützenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). Overall, the correlation matrix 
shows that the relationships between the variables are weak indicating that there are low levels 
of multicollinearity. 
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Table 5.2: Correlation Analysis Output for the variables used for analysing Deposits and Financial Sustainability 
 OSS  SMALL MEDIUM LARGE BANK CUC NBFI NGO AGE ASSETS OEA LLP NOF YoGP FETA PAR REGQ 
OSS  1.0000                 
SMALL -0.2740 1.0000                
MEDIUM  0.0696   -0.5478 1.0000               
LARGE 0.2390  -0.5792 -0.3647 1.0000              
BANK -0.0986  -0.2488   0.0329    0.2449 1.0000             
CUC 0.1021  -0.1598   0.0181    0.1602 -0.2458 1.0000            
NBFI -0.0814    
 
0.2341 -0.0718   -0.1905 -0.2112 -0.4184 1.0000           
NGO 0.0397    
 
0.1236   0.0256     -0.1626 -0.2293 -0.4544 -0.3904 1.0000          
AGE 0.1722 -0.2142 -0.0166    0.2545 -0.1057    0.4562 -0.3544 -0.0540 1.0000         
ASSETS 0.2129    -0.5130 -0.1701 0.7392   0.1877  0.2028 -0.1961 -0.1477   0.3117 1.0000        
OEA -0.3361   0.2493 -0.0907   -0.1892   0.0824   -0.4137   0.0836 0.2872 -0.2056 -0.2545 1.0000       
LLP -0.1386   0.0399   -0.0897    0.0424    0.0821   -0.1278   0.1170 -0.0350   -0.1010   -0.0015    0.0897 1.0000      
NOF 0.0745 0.4365   0.0775    0.4060   0.0233 - 0.2246 -0.1962 -0.0570    0.3265   0.5389 -0.1877 -0.0533 1.0000     
YoGP -0.1234    0.1098   -0.0491   -0.0752    0.1607 -0.4285 -0.1626 0.4793  -0.1942 -0.1512   0.7156  0.1644 -0.1068 1.0000    
FETA -0.0115   0.1534   0.0652    0.1062    0.1439 -0.1279 0.1358 -0.0994      -0.2220 0.1021   -0.0319 0.2044   0.0836    0.0329 1.0000   
PAR -0.0862    0.0228   -0.0506    0.0250   -0.0449    0.1347 -0.0680 -0.0374    0.0482    0.0308    0.0050    0.2381 -0.0522    0.0030 -0.0011 1.0000  
REGQ -0.1094    0.0477   -0.0844    0.0291    0.1747 -0.3773   0.3263 -0.0472   -0.3840   0.0831    0.1354   0.0504    0.0845    0.1074 0.0949   0.0468 1.0000 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange
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5.2.3 Probit Regression Results 
Table 5.3 presents the empirical results obtained from the baseline probit model.  
Table 5.3: Baseline Probit Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Financial Sustainability)  
Variables Average Marginal Effects Standard errors 
Small scale deposits (SMALL) -0.1858238*** 0.0708996 
 
Large scale deposits (LARGE) 0.1514733* 0.0831693 
 
 
Banks (BANK) -0.2330464** 0.1064675 
 
 
Credit Union/Cooperatives 
(CUC) 
-0.1457813 0.096051 
 
 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFI) 
-0.0184364 0.1220781 
 
 
Experience (AGE) 0.0083692 0.0076451 
 
 
Size (lnASSETS) -0.0005532 0.0050372 
 
 
Efficiency (OEA) -0.015211*** 0.0044688 
 
 
Loan impairments (LLP) -0.0271963** 0.0125206 
 
 
Coverage (NOF) -0.0027004*** 0.0008474 
 
 
Financial Revenue (YoGP) 0.006436** 0.0028816 
 
 
Financial expenses (FETA) -0.0098208 0.0111249 
 
 
Risk and portfolio quality (PAR) -0.0089337* 0.0053325 
 
 
Regulatory quality (REGQ) -0.1272487 0.0909883 
 
 
Predicted probability 0.5662  
 
 
Percentage of correctly classified 
results 
75%  
 
 
       
Significance levels: *** 1 %, ** 5 % and * 10 %. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
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The adequacy of the results obtained was guaranteed by conducting diagnostic tests (refer to 
section 4.3.3) that enabled the study to correct for problems which were detected prior to 
estimation. 
i. Scale of Deposits and Financial Sustainability 
The probit regression results show that the different scales of operations based on deposit 
volumes affect the likelihood of the LISSA DTMFIs in attaining financial sustainability in 
different ways.  
Firstly, the results in Table 5.3 reveal that operating with small-scale deposits reduces the 
likelihood of the LISSA DTMFIs’ financial sustainability by 19 %. This result is in line with the 
findings of Bogan (2012) who found a negative relationship between the deposits to assets ratio 
and operational self-sufficiency. This may be attributed to the huge transaction costs inherent with 
mobilising and administering many small deposit balances from a market niche that is sparsely 
populated or residing in the inconveniently located areas in the LISSA countries (de Sousa-Shields 
and King, 2005; WDIs, 2017). Another possible explanation could be that the returns to scale for 
small-scale deposits are negative (Zacharias, 2008). Related findings were reported on the 
microlending front by Kinde (2012) who found that administering small average balances of loans 
constrain the attainment of financial sustainability. Moreover, small-scale deposits are likely to be 
highly transitory or demand deposits that are called up at any time suggesting that they are highly 
volatile (Bertrand, 2011). This means that small scales of deposits are not always readily available 
for financing the operations and the loan portfolio indicating that they generate less interest income 
for boosting financial sustainability. Therefore, the estimated result on small-scale deposits and 
financial sustainability limits the strength of the theory of financial intermediation that financial 
intermediaries leverage on deposits that they mobilise to meet the financial needs of deficit units 
through advancing lines of credit (Werner, 2014; 2016). Thus, in terms of scales of deposits, small-
scale deposits are the chief reason why the LISSA DTMFIs fall behind in attaining financial 
sustainability.  
Secondly, the likelihood of financial sustainability is positive and significant when the 
scale of the operations involves large-scale deposits. The estimated probit model shows that large-
scale deposits increase the chance of attaining financial sustainability by 15 %. This indicates that 
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mobilising few large deposits is less costly and comes along with positive returns to scale. This 
finding supports Bayai and Ikhide’s (2016a, p. 21) conclusion that “deposits attraction augments 
financial sustainability” and is also consistent with the work of Ngo et al. (2014) who found that 
MFIs that increase their scale of lending operations are financially sustainable. Moreover, this 
finding is in line with the Institutionalists’ theory, as it suggests that the large-scale deposits are 
most likely to be the deposits of large average balances from the conveniently located and better-
off poor folk or the owners of micro-enterprises whose businesses generate profits and surplus 
cash flows which are then placed in custody with the DTMFIs. Thus, the large-scale deposits are 
time or term deposits which are held up to maturity hence they are stable deposits that can be 
intermediated into loans which generate interest income that boosts financial sustainability (Brom, 
2009; 2012). The studies of Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) and Mwizarubi et al. (2016) also reported 
a positive relationship between deposits and financial sustainability. However, their studies did 
not consider the scales of deposit volumes as they measured deposits using the deposits to assets 
and deposits to loans. In addition, contradictory evidence was reported by Tehulu (2013), Bhanot 
and Bapat (2014) and Bayai and Ikhide (2018) as they did not find deposits being a significant 
contributor towards the attainment of financial sustainability. The relationship between medium-
scale deposits and the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability was not reported as this scale 
of deposits was treated as the base category in the estimated probit model. 
ii. DTMFI characteristics and Financial Sustainability 
Several DTMFI specifics incorporated in the estimated probit model further shed light on 
why the depository microfinance sector in the LISSA region falls short in attaining financial 
sustainability. The econometric results presented in Table 5.3 above show that the average 
marginal effects for the operating expenses ratio, loan loss provisions, number of offices and the 
portfolio at risk; all reduce the probability of financial sustainability as they are all negative and 
significant. The negative average marginal effects of the operating expenses ratio reduce the 
likelihood of financial sustainability by 1.5 %. This finding is in line with the findings of Cull et 
al. (2009b), Rai and Rai (2012) and Tehulu (2013). This could be reflective of a decreasing trend 
in the average deposit balances that are mobilised by the LISSA DTMFIs as shown in Figure 5.1. 
This entails that mobilising very small deposit balances is embedded with high transaction and 
administration costs that increase the operating expenses (de-Sousa-Shields and King, 2005). As 
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a result, a high operating expenses ratio depletes the operating revenues that contribute to financial 
sustainability.  
In line with the findings of Ayayi and Sene (2010) as well as Tehulu (2013) and the MIX’s 
annual reports, it is not surprising that the probit regression results show that deteriorating loan 
portfolio quality (portfolio at risk > 30 days) decreases the likelihood of attaining financial 
sustainability of the LISSA DTMFIs by 0.9 %. Earlier MIX evidence revealed that between the 
years 2006 and 2010, the portfolio at risk > 30 days ratio for the MFIs in SSA was the highest 
when compared to that of other world’s regions (MIX and CGAP, 2012). Recent MIX evidence 
also shows that the portfolio at risk > 30 days ratio for the years 2014 to 2018 in SSA was much 
higher than the international benchmark of 5 % especially in the years 2014 and 2015 (MIX, 2014; 
2015; 2016; 2019). Thus, the estimated result suggests that because of the high portfolio at risk > 
30 days ratios, the LISSA DTMFIs are forced to readjust their loan loss provisions upwards. As a 
result, the loan impairment provisions decrease the probability of the LISSA DTMFIs in achieving 
self-sufficiency by 2.7 %. Contrary to the findings of this study, the empirical work of 
Nwachunkwu et al. (2018) found that readjusting loan loss provisions upwards exerts upward 
pressure on the lending interest rates which boost financial sustainability. Subsequently, another 
supporting study by Hessou et al. (2019) advocates that adjustments for loan loss provisions in the 
microfinance sector should be done with careful regard as business cycles change.  
The number of offices reduces the likelihood of financial sustainability by 2.7 %. The study 
of Awaworyi and Marr (2014) also reported a negative relationship between the number of offices 
and financial sustainability. As reported in the descriptive statistics in Table 5.1, an average 
DTMFI has 24 offices indicting that too much financial, human and material resources are spent 
in their establishment in the form of capital and revenue expenditure. As a result, the incremental 
working capital expenditures for running and maintaining these offices are costly and erode the 
operating revenues generated thereby reducing the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability 
(Twaha and Rashid, 2013).  
Of the charter types’ dummies, only the average marginal effects for the BANKs are 
significant but negative. This could be attributed to failure to downscale operations profitably. As 
BANK-DTMFIs stretch their hands to reach the previously unbanked poor and the rural LISSA 
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populations, they suffer from hefty operational costs that follow the exercise. This decreases their 
interest revenues thereby chocking the chances of attaining financial sustainability.  
The average marginal effects for the CUC and NBFI charter type dummies were found to 
be insignificant in expounding the chance of attaining financial sustainability. Nonetheless, 
Shaoyan and Duwal (2012) found contrasting results as they reported that CUC DTMFIs are 
financially sound due to their dependence on deposits as their main source of financing operations, 
investments and boosting equity. The NGO-DTMFIs dummy variable was the base category. 
The average marginal effects for the real yield on the gross portfolio were positive and 
significant in explaining the chance of attaining financial sustainability by 0.6 % thereby 
supporting the empirical work of Rai and Rai (2012), Bayai and Ikhide (2018) as well as 
Nwachunkwu et al. (2018). This indicates that the interest earned from the lending operations of 
the LISSA DTMFIs increases the prospects of attaining financial sustainability.  
Experience in deposit-taking as reflected by the AGE average marginal effects was 
insignificant in explaining the performance of LISSA DTMFIs in terms of financial sustainability. 
However, the earlier work of Ndambu (2011) showed that ageing contributes to financial 
sustainability. This means that proficiency in handling and administering deposits from the poor 
and the low-income clientele is gained with the increasing number of years in business. The study 
of Wijesiri et al. (2015) reported a negative and significant relationship between age and financial 
sustainability thereby contradicting Ndambu (2011) as well as the findings of this study.  
The average marginal effects for the log of assets and financial expenses ratio were 
insignificant in explaining the likelihood of the financial sustainability of the LISSA DTMFIs. The 
descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 above indicated that an average LISSA DTMFI has an average 
total assets size of US$20 949 463. Thus, the obtained probit regression results suggest that these 
financial service providers are not benefiting from the economies of scale that are derived from 
operating with a large asset base (Ndambu, 2011; Mwizarubi et al., 2016). However, Bhanot and 
Bhapat (2014) found that leveraging on the size of the gross loan portfolio augments the attainment 
of financial sustainability. The insignificant average marginal effects of the financial expenses’ 
ratio are not in line with the a priori expectations in explaining the likelihood of the LISSA 
DTMFIs’ financial sustainability. Since deposit financing is relatively cheaper than the alternative 
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sources of finance, it was expected that the average marginal effects for the financial expenses’ 
ratio are a positive contributor to the likelihood of the LISSA DTMFIs’ financial sustainability.  
iii. Country-Specific and Financial Sustainability 
The macroeconomic variable (regulatory quality) was found to be negative but was 
statistically insignificant with financial sustainability in line with the findings of El-Maksoud 
(2016). This was against the a priori expectation of a negative influence of regulatory quality in 
working towards achieving financial sustainability. Regulation of DTMFIs is inevitable as the 
microdepositors cannot themselves, monitor the use of their savings by these institutions (Christen 
et al., 2003; CGAP, 2012). As noted in empirical evidence, regulation which is the safeguard for 
microdepositors, is embedded with compliance costs that erode the operating revenues thereby 
stifling attainment of financial sustainability (Cull et al., 2009b). On the contrary, Nyanzu and 
Perprah (2016) found a positive relationship between regulatory quality and financial 
sustainability.  
iv. Predicted Probability and Correctly Classified Results 
The predicted probability from the estimated probit model shows that on average, only                 
57 % of the LISSA DTMFIs are financially sustainable. This means that 43 % of the LISSA 
DTMFIs are lagging behind in achieving financial sustainability. This finding concurs with the 
empirical work of Ek (2011) that financial sustainability is hardly achieved by African MFIs 
despite their rampant efforts to achieve this financial objective. The percentage of correctly 
classified results which indicates the predictive power of the estimated probit model was very high 
as it stood at 75 %. 
iv. Robustness Check 
As a robustness check, Table 5.4 presents robustness regression results for the scales of 
deposits using the logit model. The robustness check results corroborate the baseline results as the 
signs and the levels of significance of the estimated average marginal effects were the same for all 
the variables except for the regulatory variables.  
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Table 5.4: Robustness Check Logit Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Financial 
Sustainability) 
Variables Average Marginal Effects Standard errors 
Small scale deposits (SMALL) -0.1799337*** 0.0611969 
 
Large scale deposits (LARGE) 0.1500104** 0.0765552 
 
 
Banks (BANK) -0.2304067*** 0.0857004 
 
 
Credit Union/Cooperatives 
(CUC) 
-0.1530044 0.079784 
 
 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFI) 
-0.0121201 0.0787389 
 
 
Experience (AGE) 0.0084481 0.005314 
 
 
Size (lnASSETS) -0.0010109 0.0042523 
 
 
Efficiency (OEA) -0.0155632*** 0.0026063 
 
 
Loan impairments (LLP) -0.0270151** 0.0128665 
 
 
Coverage (NOF) -0.0026565*** 0.0008884 
 
 
Financial Revenue (YoGP) 0.0066038** 0.0024309 
 
 
Financial expenses (FETA) -0.0098343 0.0099021 
 
 
Risk and portfolio quality (PAR) -0.0078102* 0.0046015 
 
 
Regulatory quality (REGQ) -0.1246008* 0.0766673 
 
 
Predicted probability 0.5660  
 
 
Percentage of correctly classified 
results 
74.32%  
 
 
       
Significance levels: *** 1 %, ** 5 % and * 10 %.  
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
The regulatory quality variable was insignificant in the baseline probit results but it was 
negative and significant in explaining the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability in 
robustness check logit results. This was contrary to findings of Nyanzu and Perprah (2016) who 
162 
 
found a positive relationship between regulatory quality and financial sustainability indicating that 
effective and efficient regulatory quality promotes financial sustainability. The predicted 
probabilities and the percentage of correct classified results in the baseline model of 0.5662 and 
75.00 %, respectively, and those for the robustness check models were 0.5660 and 74.32 %, 
respectively. Thus, these results were almost similar as only slight variations were observed in line 
with the theory on binary response models. 
The next section discusses the estimated results for examining the second objective of the 
study on liquidity and deposit insurance.  
5.3 Results for Liquidity and Deposit Insurance 
 
This section discusses the results of the second objective of the study in three categories; 
descriptive statistics, pairwise correlations and random effects regression. 
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.5 presents the overall summary statistics for the variables used in the study.  
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics for the variables used (Liquidity and Deposit Insurance) 
Variable   Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Non-earning liquid assets to total 
assets (NELATA) 
22.338 14.835 -.95 84.54 
Capital adequacy (CAR) 62.67 63.239 -149.8 463.93 
Deposits to loans (DTL) 43.07 42.828 -9.26 711.57 
Gross loan portfolio (GLP) 13638761.2 22034670.9 3646 152156829 
Yield on Gross loan portfolio 
(YoGP) 
26.796 16.245 -16.06 80.13 
Loan loss rate (LLR) 1.604 3.168 -9.83 21.54 
Total expenses to total assets 
(TETA) 
28.360 18.580 -8.48 173.73 
Consumer price index (CPI) 6.779 7.002 -8.97 44.36 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
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The mean for the liquidity ratio (NELATA) is 22.34 % suggesting that on average, the 
LISSA’s depository microfinance sector as a whole is liquid. However, this is not the case with 
individual DTMFIs as reflected by the minimum NELATA value of -0.95 indicating that liquidity 
is a cause for concern across individual institutions. The maximum NELATA value of 84.54 % is 
an indicator that some of the LISSA DTMFIs have too much liquidity which is tied up in non-
earning assets resulting in losses due the opportunity cost of holding excess liquid reserves.  
The standard deviation of the CAR ratio is 63.24 % and that of the DTL is 42.83 % while 
their means are 62.67 % and 43.067 % respectively, indicating that there is very high variation in 
capital adequacy and financing of the sampled DTMFIs relative to their means. The high mean of 
the CAR variable may be a direct regulation effect that MFIs should have high CARs than banks 
since they deal with high-risk clients (Berger, 2010). The high mean for the DTL ratio may be 
explained by the high volumes of the voluntary deposits mobilised by the DTMFIs in LISSA.  
The standard deviations of liquidity (NELATA), financial revenue (YoGP), loan portfolio 
risk (LLR) and the inflation rate (CPI) ranged from 3.168 % to 16.25 % indicating very minimal 
variations in the observations of these variables. The minimum value of the inflation rate is -8.97 
% indicating that some of the countries of the sampled DTMFIs experience deflation while the 
maximum value of the inflation rate is 44.36 % indicating that some of the countries of the sampled 
DTMFIs suffer from a persistent rise in the general price level. The descriptive statistics for size 
(GLP) were an outlier as its absolute values were unlike the other variables which were expressed 
in percentage terms.  
5.3.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.6 presents the results of the pair-wise correlations for the variables that were used 
to examine the relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance. Most of the correlations in 
the correlation matrix do not show evidence of severe multicollinearity since they are all less than 
the cut-off point of 0.70 (Kennedy, 2008). The relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance 
is weak but positive. Nonetheless, this suggests that designing and implementing deposit insurance 
packages helps to avert exposure to liquidity risk amongst the sampled DTMFIs. This result is 
further reinforced by the positive and much stronger relationship between liquidity and capital 
adequacy which is a prudential regulation requirement and the BASEL dummy (Berger, 2010). 
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Thus, deposit protection measures help to curb the risk that the DTMFIs may fail to honour their 
obligations to depositors. 
Table 5.6: Correlation Analysis for the variables used for analysing Liquidity and Deposit 
Insurance 
 NELATA DEPINSU CAR BASEL DTL GLP YoGP LLR TETA CPI 
NELATA 1.000          
DEPINSU 0.1145 1.000         
CAR 0.3503 -0.0752   1.000        
BASEL 0.1440 -0.2057   0.0581    1.000       
DTL 0.1293 -0.0786 -0.3451   0.1377  1.000      
GLP -0.0823   0.0426    0.0912 -0.2537 -0.0467    1.000     
YoGP 0.0786  0.2110 -0.1829   0.3733   0.1781 -0.1486  1.000    
LLR 0.1325   0.0686    0.1287   0.1545   0.0654   -0.0498    0.2268 1.000   
TETA 0.0012    0.1403 -0.1657   0.3051   0.1172 -0.2354   0.7106 0.1702 1.000  
CPI 0.1900   0.0677    0.0643    0.2569   0.0709   -0.2261   0.0670 0.0851 0.2566 1.000 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange  
The risk associated with loan book losses, deposit financing and the general price level, 
also have a positive and weak relationship with liquidity. Size as measured by the GLP variable 
has a negative and weak relationship with liquidity. This shows that magnifying the volume of the 
gross loan portfolio by disbursing larger long-term loans using smaller short-term deposits exposes 
the DTMFIs to liquidity risk due to asset and liability mismatches (Bruett, 2004; Mata, 2011; Ogol, 
2011; Mucheru et al., 2018). The positive relationship between the loan loss rate and capital 
adequacy suggests that maintaining adequate equity to total assets ratios helps to absorb bad debts 
in the loan book. The positive relationship between the loan loss rate and the yield on the gross 
loan portfolio gives the impression that decreases in loan losses result in increases in interest 
income thereby boosting liquidity. 
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5.3.3 Random Effects Regression Results  
 
Table 5.7 below presents the estimated results based on the baseline random effects panel 
framework. The adequacy of the results was confirmed by conducting diagnostics (refer to section 
4.4.3) that enabled the study to correct for problems which were detected prior to estimation. 
Table 5.7: Regression Results from the Random Effects Model 
Variables Coefficients Robust standard errors 
Deposit insurance (DEPINSU) 0.5787688*** 0.207658 
 
Capital adequacy (lnCAR) 0.2202193** 0.106039 
 
 
Basel implementation (BASEL) 0.3948125* 0.2053999 
 
 
Financing (lnDTL) 0.0196915 0.1073799 
 
 
Size (lnGLP) -0.094004* 0.0544958 
 
 
Financial revenue (lnYoGP) -0.0289048 0.1853313 
 
 
Risk (lnLLR) 0.0753728 0.0652687 
 
 
Expenses (lnTETA) -0.1667738 0.2304719 
 
 
Inflation (lnCPI) 0.0130675 0.0406344 
 
 
Constant 3.790338*** 1.231483  
sigma_u 0.49151681   
sigma_e 0.60018813   
Rho 0.40143391   
R-squared 0.1638   
Wald statistic: chi(7) 31.00   
                      Prob>chi2 0.0003   
       
 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, respectively. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
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The results show that at the 1% level of significance, deposit insurance is a positive and 
highly significant determinant of liquidity for the depository microfinance sector in the LISSA 
countries. This result is in line with the a priori expectations as well as the correlation analysis 
results. Deposit insurance therefore boosts liquidity or guarantees the short-term survival of the 
depository microfinance sector when faced with runs on deposits. This finding is consistent with 
the arguments of the founders of the theory of deposit insurance (Diamond and Dybvirg, 1983) 
that the presence of deposit insurance schemes can stimulate the confidence of the depositors in 
encouraging them to lodge their savings with DTMFIs (Ngalawa, 2012). This leads to an 
improvement in the level of liquid resources available for DTMFIs. 
Assured safety of deposits through insurance cover ensures continual cash inflows that 
improve the liquidity of the DTMFIs as new depositors are attracted, the run-away depositors are 
called back and the existing depositors are maintained. This way, deposit insurance benefits both 
the DTMFIs and the depositors as their liquidity preferences will be not be threatened. In addition, 
it means that the LISSA DTMFIs will be able to even out the supply of liquidity; meeting 
withdrawals, interest on deposits and extending lines of credit in line with the provision of the 
liquidity arm of the theory of financial intermediation. On the contrary, the empirical work of 
Ngalawa (2012) on deposit insurance and banking instability found that the vulnerability of the 
banking systems to bank runs and insolvency in low-income countries where deposit insurance 
schemes are minimal are not so marked than the vulnerability of the counterpart banking systems 
in non-low-income countries. Furthermore, that study also found that the effects of deposit 
insurance schemes are country-specific.  
The findings of this study on the relationship between liquidity and deposit insurance are 
supported by the empirical work of Anginer et al. (2013) who found that the adoption of deposit 
insurance minimises exposure of banking institutions during times of financial crises. Contrary to 
the findings of this study, Anginer et al. (2013) found that the adoption of deposit insurance during 
the pre-crisis era resulted in increased bank risk. After combining the pre-crisis and the during 
crisis results, the net effect of deposit insurance was negative. This means that deposit insurance 
cover has the potential to expose DTMFIs to liquidity risk to the detriment of the depositors 
especially when moral hazard outweighs the benefits of the insurance cover (Carroll and 
Takayama, 2010). Hence, empirical writers warn that deposit-taking financial institutions trigger 
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moral hazard problems when they abuse deposit insurance schemes by engaging in high-risk 
transactions leveraging on the insurance cover as the fallback (McCoy, 2007; Carroll and 
Takayama, 2010; Hughes and Mester, 2013; Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016).   
As per the a priori expectation and congruent with the correlation analysis results, the 
capital adequacy ratio and the BASEL dummy are positive determinants of liquidity of the LISSA 
DTMFIs at the 5 % and 1 % levels of significance, respectively. These results show that with 
adequate equity to total assets levels, DTMFIs in the LISSA region can be able to withstand 
liquidity risk. This finding is consistent with Hessou et al. (2019) who found that capital adequacy 
shields MFIs from risks associated with loan loss provisions thereby improving their liquidity and 
guaranteeing their short-term survival. In another study, Zamore (2018) found that by absorbing 
risks faced by MFIs, capital adequacy guarantees their survival in the long term. Nonetheless, in a 
study by Mecagni et al. (2015), it was reported that only 7 out of 27 LISSA countries had 
implemented the Basel framework capital adequacy standards by the year 2015. This indicates that 
non-implementation of the Basel’s recommendations on capital adequacy exposes the LISSA 
DTMFIs to liquidity risk which thwarts their ability to honour their obligations to low-income 
depositors.  
The deposits to loans coefficient which measures the extent to which the mobilised deposits 
(internal funds) finance the gross loan portfolio are positive but statistically insignificant despite 
that the deposit volumes outweigh the gross loan portfolio in the LISSA countries (MIX, 2015). 
Internal funding through deposits to finance the loan book is expected to positively influence 
liquidity due to the few conditions attached to them, their comparatively low cost and the less 
managerial implications (Roodman and Quereshi, 2006; Ledgerwood et al., 2006; Lützenkirchen 
and Weistroffer, 2012). Moreover, Kipesha (2012) found that reliance on external funding than 
internal funding to finance loan portfolios and other operations erodes liquidity.  
The coefficient of size as measured by the logarithm of the gross loan portfolio was found 
to be statistically significant but negatively related to the NELATA ratio at the 10 % level of 
significance. This result contradicted the a priori expectations but verified the results in the 
correlation matrix in Table 5.6. This indicates that size is a negative determinant of liquidity due 
to diseconomies of scale which are associated with huge establishments and operational costs of 
expanding the gross loan portfolios as the DTMFIs spread their wings through extensive branch 
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networks. Contrary to the findings of this study, Wambui and Wanjiru (2016) found that the 
liquidity of microfinance banks is positively affected by the intensity of their loans. Moreover, 
Laureti and Szafarz (2016) found no evidence of size in influencing the liquidity premium of 
banking institutions and MFIs. Nonetheless, Bayai (2017) found a negative link between the gross 
loan portfolio and long-term financial performance. Therefore, this gives the impression that when 
measured using the gross loan portfolio size has a negative association with both short-term 
financial performance (liquidity) and long-term performance (financial sustainability). Financial 
revenue measured using the real yield on the gross loan portfolio is negative and insignificant with 
liquidity indicating that interest and non-interest income earned does not significantly contribute 
to cash availability. Unlike the study of Wambui and Wanjiru (2016) which found that losses on 
the loan portfolio erode liquidity of MFIs, this study found that the loan loss rate coefficient was 
negative but statistically insignificant in explaining liquidity. Based on the findings of Wambui 
and Wanjiru (2016), the negative sign of the loan loss rate coefficient may indicate that impairment 
of loans and unrecovered bad debts erode liquidity due to a reduction in cash inflows.  
The inflation rate coefficient was found to be positive but statistically insignificant in 
explaining the liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs. This finding is contrary to the study of Chikoko 
and Kwenda (2013) as well as that of Bichanga (2016) which found that inflation influences the 
liquidity of MFIs. In the correlation matrix in Table 5.6, the inflation rate was found to have a 
positive relationship with liquidity. Based on the findings of Bichanga (2016) who found a positive 
link between the inflation rate and the gross loans and advances to customer deposits, the results 
of this study may indicate that the poor and the low-income households are borrowing less from 
the DTMFIs as the repayment interest rates are raised by the inflation premium. Less borrowing 
results in the reduction of cash outflows and ultimately, improvement in the liquidity position. On 
the deposit-taking side, the positive inflation rate coefficient may reflect that the DTMFIs guard 
against withdrawals of deposits by offering high returns or that their deposit portfolios mainly 
consist of term deposits which are largely withdrawn upon maturity. This keeps the liquidity 
position immune from inflationary pressures. 
i. Endogeneity Test Regression and Robustness Check Results 
Table 5.8 shows the regression results from the 2SLS and OLS methods which were used 
for testing for endogeneity and the robustness check results using the GLS method. 
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Table 5.8: Endogeneity Test Regression Results (2SLS vs OLS) and Robustness Check 
Results (GLS) 
Variables 2SLS OLS GLS 
Deposit insurance 
(DEPINSU) 
0.6155607*** 
(0.2228636) 
0.6180795*** 
(0.193474) 
 
0.6180795*** 
(0.2157771) 
  
Capital adequacy 
(lnCAR) 
 
0.3961102*** 
(0.1018761) 
 
0.3881079*** 
(0.099158) 
 
0.3881079*** 
 
(0.095772)  
Basel implementation 
(BASEL) 
0.4282132** 
(0.1821896) 
0.4138962** 
(0.1874703) 
0.4138962** 
 
(0.186475)  
Financing (lnDTL) 
 
0.1511954 
0.1518473 
        0.124481 
(0.1210152) 
0.124481 
 
(0.103302) 
 
Size (lnGLP) -0.0350885 
(0.164141) 
-0732644* 
(0.0403552) 
-0.07362644* 
 
(0.0428482)  
Financial revenue 
(lnYoGP) 
 0.0533835 
(0.1629462) 
0.0533835 
 
(0.1830697)  
Risk (lnLLR)  0.0036274 
(0.0514208) 
0.0036274 
 
(0.0492469)  
Expenses (lnTETA) 0.0117432 
(0.1867782) 
-0.0620286 
(0.2103749) 
-0.062086 
 
(0.2002215)  
Inflation (lnCPI) -0.0063267 
(0.0614483) 
-0.0017448 
(0.0531195) 
-0.0017448 
 
(0.0639043)  
Constant 1.100097 1.873315 1.873315 
 
 (3.614094) (1.245233) (1.213018)  
Root MSE 0.79156 0.81364   
R-squared 0.1844 0.1883   
F Statistic  7.70   
Wald statistic: chi(7) 36.76  39.91  
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
     
 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. The OLS column reported robust standard errors.  
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results 
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Since endogeniety of the suspected explanatory variable (size proxied by the logarithm of 
the gross loan portfolio – lnGLP) was not found, the OLS method was preferred as it is more 
superior to the 2SLS method under no endogeniety situations. Furthermore, Table 5.8 shows 
results of the OLS regression and the GLS regression. As indicated in section 4.4.3, the GLS 
regression results were considered as a robustness check for the baseline random effects regression 
results since the GLS method is a more efficient and consistent estimator than the OLS method. 
Table 5.8 also shows that the results in the columns for the OLS and GLS methods both 
corroborated the results of the baseline probit regression results shown in table 5.7 in terms of the 
significant variables and their signs, except for the magnitude of the coefficients. In the column 
for the 2SLS regression results, the results for the financial revenue (lnYoGP) and risk (lnLLR) 
variables were not reported as these variables were treated as instrumental variables in the test for 
endogeniety. The size variable (lnGLP) which was treated as an endogenous variable was not 
significant in explaining the liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs contrary to the baseline random 
effects, OLS and GLS models’ regression results. However, the 2SLS regression results for the 
deposit insurance, capital adequacy and Basel implementation variables were in line with baseline 
random effects regression results and those of the OLS and GLS methods.  
The next section discusses the results for addressing the third objective of the study.  
5.4 Results for Outreach and Financial Sustainability 
 
This section discusses the results of the third objective of the study on outreach and 
financial sustainability in three categories; descriptive statistics, pairwise correlations and dynamic 
panel data regression, the System Generalised Method of Moments.  
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
i. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables used  
Table 5.9 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables that were used in the study.  
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Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics for the variables used (Outreach and Financial 
Sustainability) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average deposit balance per 
depositor/GNI (AVDGNI) 
39.058 70.946 0 691 
Number of Depositors (NODEP) 78958.59 139880.5 40 1148561 
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) 99.848 32.758 0.38 228.12 
Percentage of Women Borrowers 
(POW) 
61.557 25.782 0 100 
Deposits to Total Assets (DTA) 41.889 24.051 0 103.77 
Depositors per Staff Member 
(DEPSTAME) 
340.542 304.229 0 2280 
Number of Years (AGE) 16.900 6.604 7 41 
Assets (ASSETS) 2094946.7 35134719.8 157185 214144887 
Portfolio at Risk (PAR) 6.865 7.964 -14.57 97 
Commercial Bank Branches 
(ComBB) 
2.762 1.485 0.36 9.46 
Rural Population (RPOP) 69.713 12.210 42.9 90.38 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
The average deposit balance per depositor/GNI in the LISSA region is 39.06 % and is very 
small. This gives the impression that the LISSA DTMFIs are socially oriented institutions that 
mobilise small average deposit balances which deepen their outreach goal. The mean value of the 
number of depositors is 78 959 indicating the size of the scale of operations of an average LISSA 
DTMFI. The wide disparity between the minimum and maximum values of the number of 
depositors, 40 and 1 148 561 respectively, suggests that some DTMFIs operate on a very small-
scale with very few depositors and others operate on a large-scale with many depositors. The mean 
value of operational self-sufficiency of 99.85 % depicts that on average, the LISSA DTMFIs are 
self-sufficient institutions as this value is equal to 100 % when rounded up. Based on these 
descriptive statistics, it means that these depository institutions should be able to cover their 
operational and financial costs with ease.  
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The deposits to assets variable averaged 41.89 % over the period suggesting that the LISSA 
DTMFIs are adequately financed using deposits and are effective in intermediating deposits into 
loans since the mean value doubled the 20 % threshold. The maximum value of the deposits to 
assets variable of 103.77 % is in line with the MIX’s annual reports that the microfinance sectors 
in SSA is largely financed through the huge deposit volumes that they mobilise. In terms of 
productivity, the personnel who work in the LISSA DTMFIs serve 341 depositors on average. The 
AGE variable statistics show that on average, the depository microfinance sector in the LISSA 
countries is largely composed of young and mature DTMFIs. These AGE statistics are in line with 
the empirical works of Bogan (2012) and Bayai and Ikhide (2016a) who applied the life cycle 
theory to the financing of the MFIs as they age.  
The portfolio at risk variable average of 6.89 % which is above the international benchmark 
of 5 % shows that declining loan portfolio quality cripples the efficiency of the depository 
microfinance sector in the LISSA region in outreach performance. The proliferation of commercial 
banks of 3 branches per 100 000 adult population is an indicator of competition for customers. The 
average value of the rural population percentage variable of 69.71 % shows that there are vast 
masses of people that reside in the rural areas in the LISSA countries. 
ii. Descriptive Statistics on the Average Deposit Balance per Depositor/Gross 
National Income per Capita 
Figure 5.1 below shows the mean values of the average deposit balances divided by their 
GNI per capita of the DTMFIs from the sub-regions of LISSA (Central Africa, Western Africa 
and Eastern Africa) between the years 2006 and 2017. At the onset of the period under 
consideration, Figure 5.1 shows that the highest AVDGNI was recorded by Central Africa 
DTMFIs. The lowest AVDGNI was recorded by Western Africa DTMFIs at the outset of the 
period. Figure 5.1 also shows that there were sharp upward and downward swings in the AVDGNI 
for Central Africa DTMFIs between 2006 and 2016 depicting an unstable trend. The steep 
increases in the level of the AVDGNI between 2007 and 2009 for the Central African DTMFIs 
indicate their shift of focus from the pro-poor depositors whose deposit balances are small, to the 
better off depositors who lodge large deposit sizes (MIX, 2007). The sharp decrease in the 
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AVDGNI in 2007 and 2013 of the Central African DTMFIs depict intensification of their deposit 
outreach programs to the pro-poor whose savings were of small average balances. 
Figure 5.1: Average Value for the Average Deposit Balance per Depositor/Gross National 
Income per Capita for LISSA’s Sub-regions between 2006 and 2016 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
The changes in the AVDGNI for Eastern Africa and Western Africa DTMFIs over time 
were very small as the variations were not very significant. According to the MIX and CGAP 
(2011), the small average balances on deposits across these two sub-regions as from the year 2013 
reflect the emphasis by the DTMFIs on serving the poorest depositors.  
iii. Descriptive Statistics on the Number of Depositors 
Figure 5.2 shows the mean in the number of depositors of DTMFIs from LISSA’s sub-
regions between the years 2006 and 2017.  
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Figure 5.2: Average Value for the Number of Depositors for LISSA’s Sub-regions between 
2006 and 2017 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
In line with the overall growth trends for the entire SSA depository microfinance sector, 
Figure 5.2 shows that there were upward trends in the growth of the number of depositors for all 
the LISSA’s sub-regions over time (MIX and CGAP, 2010; MIX, 2014, 2015, 2016). The 
phenomenal growth in the number of depositors is attributed to the tireless efforts of the LISSA 
DTMFIs in serving the poor and the low-income households with micro-financial services. 
However, the Central Africa DTMFIs recorded declines between 2012 and 2014 and in 2016. The 
number of depositors from Western Africa DTMFIs skyrocketed after 2014 and reached maximum 
of 335 822 depositors in 2017 which was 2.76 times greater than the number of depositors from 
Eastern Africa DTMFIs.   
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5.4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.10 shows the results of the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the study. 
Table 5.10: Correlation Analysis for the variables used for analysing Outreach and Financial Sustainability 
 AVDGNI NODEP OSS PFB DTA DEP 
STAME 
AGE ASSETS PAR ComBB RPOP CA EA WA 
AVDGNI 1.0000              
NODEP -0.0192 1.0000             
OSS 0.1117 0.0574 1.0000            
POW -0.3253 -0.1214 -0.0935 1.0000           
DTA 0.3727 0.4072 0.1175 -0.3244 1.0000          
DEPSTAME -0.1303 0.5561 0.2072 0.0811 0.3289 1.0000         
AGE 0.0694 0.2353 0.2631 -0.0866 0.1939 0.1847 1.0000        
ASSETS 0.3162 0.6452 0.1506 -0.1781 0.3539 0.2363 0.3117 1.0000       
PAR 0.0048 0.0082 -0.0968 -0.1705 0.1409 0.0101 0.0482 0.0308 1.0000      
ComBB 0.2108 0.2548 0.0645 -0.0442 0.1715 0.2264 -0.0243 0.1949 0.1349 1.0000     
RPOP -0.0903 -0.1618 0.0139 0.0093 -0.2260 -0.0352 -0.1365 -0.3067 -0.0286 -0.2734 1.0000    
CA 0.4481 -0.0768 0.0616 0.1253 -0.1040 -0.0988 0.0917 0.0565 -0.0461 -0.4568 -0.2029 1.0000   
EA -0.1262 -0.1035 -0.0452 -0.2503 0.0218 -0.1811 -0.3197 -0.2496 -0.0420 -0.1165 0.6988 -0.3127 1.0000  
WA -0.1463 0.1507 0.0108 0.1776 0.0413 0.2418 0.2700 0.2195 0.0693 0.3838 -0.5887 -0.2714 -0.8294 1.000 
Source: Compiled by the author using data from the Microfinance Information Exchange 
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The operational self-sufficiency variable is positive with the depth of outreach 
(AVDGNI) indicating the presence of mission drift suggesting a move towards focusing on the 
better-off depositors who save large amounts of their funds periodically (Churchill and Marr, 
2017). According to Robinson (2004), larger average deposit balances result in increased 
profits which boost financial sustainability. The correlation matrix also shows a positive 
relationship between financial sustainability and the number of depositors (NODEP) 
suggesting that there is no trade-off in outreach breadth. Thus, reaching out to as many 
customers as possible boosts financial sustainability. 
Focus on women clientele is negative with deposit financing, financial sustainability, 
breadth and depth of outreach. However, theory suggests that focusing on women is a positive 
indicator of the depth of outreach (Ann and Tam, 2013). Deposit financing and intermediation 
is positively correlated with the two outreach dimensions and with financial sustainability. 
Productivity, as indicated by the depositors per staff member variable, is negative with outreach 
depth indicating that processing small amounts of deposits from the poorest clientele stifles the 
proficiency of the deposit-taking personnel. The productivity of the deposit-taking staff 
members, however, is positive with the breadth of outreach which gives the impression that 
there is a direct relationship between the depositors per staff member variable and the number 
of depositors served. Experience is positively related to outreach depth and breadth self-
sufficiency, productivity and financing. While portfolio quality is weakly related to outreach 
depth and breadth, size has much stronger relationships with outreach depth and breadth.  
The proliferation of commercial banks is positively related to outreach depth and 
breadth suggesting that these institutions prefer large deposit balances as they reach out to a 
vast number of depositors. The percentage of rural dwellers is negative with outreach depth 
and breadth suggesting that serving this target group is very costly. The sub-regional dummies 
have varying relations with outreach depth and breadth. The signs, either positive or negative, 
suggest that the sub-regional factors pose opportunities or threats to the existence of the 
DTMFIs in the financial inclusion agenda of increasing financial access to the poor and low-
income households to get them out of their poverty level. 
5.4.2 System Generalised Method of Moments Regression Results 
 
Table 5.11 shows the estimation results of the SGMM technique for the two outreach 
models.  
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Table 5.11: System Generalised Method of Moments Results for LISSA and Non-LISSA 
DTMFIs (Dependent Variables: AVDGNI and lnNODEP) 
  LISSA DTMFIs     Non-LISSA DTMFIs 
 1 2 3 4 
Variables AVDGNI lnNODEP AVDGNI lnNODEP 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.3220842* 0.5985122*** 0.5886173* 0.4300257* 
[0.191] [0.194] [0.297] [0.256] 
Financial sustainability (OSS) 
-0.0120457 -0.0028037** -0.0061762 -0.0013667 
[0.087] [0.001] [0.099] [0.002] 
Financial intermediation (DTA) 
0.8370487** 0.0006808 0.0039353 0.008721 
[0.410] [0.003] [0.121] [0.006] 
Productivity (DEPSTAME) 
-0.090919*** 0.0015744** 0.0192184 0.0000713 
[0.036] [0.001] [0.034] [0.0004] 
Experience (AGE) 
-0.1560299 -0.0048697 -0.6788366 0.0172496 
[0.491] [0.009] [0.794] [0.032] 
Gender (POW) 
0.1437431 -0.001912 0.2353173 0.0039261 
[0.141] [0.003] [0.313] [0.009] 
Size (lnASSETS) 
3.094286 0.2623647* 3.970207 0.4261237** 
[2.691] [0.142] [2.935] [0.190] 
Risk and portfolio quality (PAR) 
-0.7854077 0.0001223 0.5436917 -0.0227735 
[0.813] [0.005] [0.651] [0.022] 
Competition (ComBB) 
3.885022* -0.2344905 0.0948781 -0.3309803 
[2.208] [0.159] [2.916] [0.276] 
Location (RPOP) 
1.801151*** -0.019813 -0.6370262 0.0210591 
[0.609] [0.013] [0.396] [0.017] 
Central Africa (CA) 
40.61682*** -0.7826032* 26.45515 -1.841606** 
[15.878] [0.450] [17.478] [0.916] 
Western Africa (WA) 
28.38413*** -0.417262* -.28.49342* 1.12536 
[11.181] [0.221] [15.500] [0.798] 
Eastern Africa (EA)     17.30637* -1.029407** 
      [7.657] [0.461] 
Number of Observations 172 185 111 112 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Groups 53 55 30 30 
Number of Instruments 43 36 29 29 
GMM Instrument Lag 1 1 1 1 
AR(1) 0.004 0.063 0.223 0.077 
AR(2) 0.224 0.379 0.292 0.229 
Hansen Test 0.126 0.267 0.054 0.294 
***, ** and * denotes 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level, respectively. The figures in 
brackets are robust standard errors. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on estimation results  
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The adequacy of the results obtained was ensured by conducting diagnostic tests (refer 
to section 4.5.3) that enabled the study to correct for problems which were detected prior to 
estimation. A cursory look into Table 5.11 shows that it presents the results for the LISSA 
DTMFIs which are the baseline results and the results for the Non-LISSA DTMFIs which are 
a robustness check. In both sets of results, the regression output comes from two models, one 
for the depth of outreach, where the average deposit balance/GNI per capita (AVDGNI) was 
the dependent variable and the other for breadth of outreach, where the logarithm of the number 
of depositors (lnNODEP) was the dependent variable. The lagged dependent variables in 
Columns (1) to (4) are positive, significant and less than one at 10 % significance level except 
in Column 2 where the significance level is 1 %. This shows that the estimated system 
generalised method of moments’ models are consistent with dynamic stability. The positive 
and significant lagged dependent variables indicate that the DTMFIs are persistent in 
increasing outreach depth and breadth through deposits. This means that their past deposits 
outreach programs have a positive bearing on their current and future ones. In other words, 
DTMFIs that deepen and broaden their current levels of outreach will continue intensifying 
them in the future. This is explained by the policies imposed by the national governments to 
catalyse financial access by the poor and marginalised populations through microfinance 
provision. However, Muriu (2011) argued that DTMFIs should be cautious that, persistence in 
increasing financial access is successful and profitable only if the outreach programs are cost 
efficient. 
i.  Results for the LISSA DTMFIs (Baseline Results) 
Column (1) of Table 5.10 presents the baseline results the depth of outreach model. No 
significant relationship was found between financial sustainability and the average deposit 
balance per depositor/GNI per capita. This result is consistent with the findings of Mersland 
and Strøm (2010) as well as Bassem (2012). This entails that the self-sufficiency of the LISSA 
DTMFIs does not have any bearing on the deposit size scaled by the GNI per capita. The 
implication is that the LISSA DTMFIs can accept deposits of any size from any depositors 
regardless of their poverty status. This finding therefore, supports the Welfarists’ theory as the 
pro-poor clientele who lodge small average deposit balances will not be left out by the LISSA 
DTMFIs. Thus, it can be said that no trade-off exists and mission drift has not occurred in the 
depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries. Similarly, Mersland and Strøm (2010), 
Zerani and Rani (2011) and Martínez (2015) did not find existence of mission drift and trade-
off on the microcredit lending side. According to Abdulai and Tewari (2017a), such results are 
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indicative of the fact that the outreach of the microfinance providers is not driven by their level 
of self-sufficiency. Thus, both outreach and financial sustainability can be pursued 
concurrently without the depth of outreach goal straining the quest for attaining operational 
self-sufficiency.  
Contrary to the findings of this study, Hermes et al. (2011), as well as Xu et al. (2016), 
found the existence of mission drift and the trade-off between financial performance and 
outreach depth on the microlending front. Nonetheless, de Sousa-Shields and King (2005) 
argued that deepening outreach through mobilising small average deposit balances is done at 
the expense of achieving financial sustainability because administering many small deposit 
sizes is costly and erodes the operating income thereby stifling financial sustainability. Any 
deviation from small average balances reflects a change in the market segment served and 
improves financial sustainability; therefore, a focus towards the better-off poor who deposit 
large amounts is profitable (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2011). Therefore, this may suggest that 
the LISSA DTMFIs ought to focus on both the pro-poor and the well-off poor as well so that 
profits earned from serving the well-off poor can subsidise the losses on serving the pro-poor 
(Robinson, 2004). However, the LISSA DTMFIs may work with different segments of the 
market as they also provide credit as well. The LISSA DTMFIs can have different policies in 
terms of credit which may restrain access to credit by the poorest segments as they are less 
profitable and riskier or there may be interest rate caps in place. Under such circumstances, 
there might be signs of mission drift in the access to credit as found by Hermes et al. (2011) 
and Xu et al. (2016). However, Dokulilova et al. (2009, p. 2) argued that “the poor are viable 
customers as long as their financing is appointed in the right way” implying that mission drift 
may be absent for both deposits and microcredit if the LISSA DTMFIs are efficient in the 
financial intermediation process.  
The deposits to total assets variable was positive and significant at the 5 % level of 
significance indicating that the LISSA DTMFIs are effective in the mobilisation of 
intermediated deposits from their market segments. The number of depositors per staff member 
variable was negative and significant with the average deposit size/GNI per capita at the 1 % 
level of significance giving the impression that administering small-scale deposit balances 
reduces the productivity of the personnel handling them. Similar to the study of Johnson (2015) 
this study did not find any significant relationship between age and outreach depth but Hermes 
et al. (2011) found that ageing reduces the efficiency of MFIs in their outreach programs. The 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of women clientele and outreach depth is 
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further evidence that no mission drift has occurred in reaching out to the LISSA residents 
through small average deposit balances. Reichert (2018) also reported that focusing on women 
clientele does not exhibit trade-offs. El-Maksoud (2016) also did not find evidence of mission 
drift occurring as a result of increased focus on women by the MENA MFIs.  
The coefficient of size measured by logarithm of total assets was insignificant in 
explaining outreach depth of the LISSA DTMFIs. However, Wijesiri et al. (2015) found that 
size significantly influences the decisions of mature MFIs in achieving outreach and financial 
sustainability. In line with the findings of Xu et al. (2016), this study did not find a significant 
relationship between risk and portfolio quality and outreach depth. This confirmed the findings 
of Reichert (2018) that risk as measured by portfolio at risk results in fewer microfinance trade-
offs.  
The effect of the macroeconomic variables, commercial bank branches and the 
percentage of rural population on outreach depth is positive and significant at 10 % and 1 % 
levels of significance, respectively. The coefficient of the commercial bank branches may 
indicate that competition posed by commercial banks encourages the DTMFIs to re-strategise 
their deposit-taking programs to further deepen their outreach as they try to fight-off their 
rivals. Cull and Morduch (2017) argued that the pressure from commercial banks makes 
microfinance providers of various types to alter their methodologies in pursuing their outreach 
mission. The coefficient of the rural population percentage suggests that the deposit-taking 
programs of the LISSA DTMFIs are in line with the financial inclusion agenda of expanding 
financial access to the rural and marginalised areas. Contrary to the findings of this study, Xu 
et al. (2016) found no significant relationship between rural population and outreach depth.  
The coefficients of the sub-regional dummies (Central Africa and Western Africa) are 
positive and significantly related to outreach depth at the 1 % level of significance. This gives 
the impression that the sub-regional differences positively influence the size of the deposits 
accepted by the LISSA DTMFIs. This finding concurs with Sainz-Fernandez, Torre-Olmo and 
Lόpez-Gutiérrez (2015) who noticed that regional differences influence the size of micro-
financial services delivered by MFIs. Eastern Africa was the default category in both outreach 
depth and breadth models. No DTMFIs were sampled from Southern Africa as this sub-region 
has no low-income countries based on the classification of countries reported in the 2018 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. 
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Column (2) of Table 5.11 presents the baseline results for the outreach breadth model. 
Financial sustainability is negative and significant at the 5 % level of significance with the 
outreach breadth indicator, the logarithm of the number of depositors. This result is in marked 
contrast to the outreach depth model results where financial sustainability was insignificant 
with the average deposit size. Thus, a percentage decrease in financial sustainability stifles the 
growth rate in the number of depositors that the LISSA DTMFIs can reach by 0.28 % thereby 
contradicting the Institutionalists’ theory. Therefore, a trade-off exists in achieving outreach 
breadth and financial sustainability in the LISSA’s depository microfinance sector. Related 
findings were reported on the microlending side by Nyamsogoro (2010), Kipesha and Zhang 
(2013) as well as Amin et al. (2017) who found that outreach breadth as measured by the 
number of borrowers has a negative and significant relationship with financial sustainability. 
However, the findings of this study did not support those of Zerai and Rani (2011) who found 
a positive relationship between financial sustainability and outreach breadth proxied by the 
number of borrowers. Similarly, Lam et al. (2019) also found that financial performance 
contributes positively to social performance for profit-oriented MFIs.  
The trade-off between outreach breadth and financial sustainability of the LISSA 
DTMFIs may be attributed to decreasing returns to scale that for every increase in the number 
of depositors, the profit from the trading activities is reduced by the costs of dealing with those 
depositors. Thus, inefficiency in dealing with increasing numbers of depositors in the name of 
financial inclusion in depository microfinance strains financial sustainability (Tehulu, 2013). 
Inefficiency as a result of the use of deposit mobilisation strategies such as extensive branch 
networks is embedded with exorbitant costs which have negative repercussions on attaining 
financial sustainability. Therefore, based on the findings of Ngo, Mullineux and Ly (2014), it 
means that there should be an optimal scale of the number of depositors that enable the LISSA 
DTMFIs to achieve their social and financial performance goals simultaneously. The trade-off 
between outreach breadth and financial sustainability of the LISSA DTMFIs may also imply 
that these institutions are not using in the best way, the funds available through deposits and, 
hence, are not maximising income generation of these funds through the provision of 
microcredits or deposits in other financial institutions.  
Unlike the outreach depth model results, the outreach breadth model results present a 
positive but insignificant relationship between deposits to total assets and the number of 
voluntary depositors. While the number of depositors per staff member variable was negative 
and significant in outreach depth, the outreach breadth model presents a positive and significant 
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relationship between the depositors per staff member and the breadth of outreach at the 5 % 
level of significance. This finding is consistent with Abdulai and Tewari (2017b) who found 
that highly productive loan officers contribute positively towards increased outreach breadth. 
This gives the impression that the personnel handling depositors’ accounts in the LISSA region 
are very productive in serving a significant number of depositors but their productivity is 
slowed down when the deposit size is small. 
Unlike the outreach depth results, the coefficient of size is positive and significant with 
outreach breadth at the 10 % level of significance. This result is supported by findings of 
Wijesiri et al. (2015) who discovered that size significantly influences the outreach and 
financial performance of MFIs. In addition, the study of El-Maksoud (2016) also found that 
size is positive and significant with both outreach depth and outreach breadth. This shows that 
the LISSA DTMFIs leverage on their assets to tap as many depositors as possible. The 
descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 indicated that most of the LISSA DTMFIs are mature 
institutions that are most likely to have acquired tangible assets over the years. For these large 
and mature DTMFIs, experience and intangible assets such as goodwill also catalyse the 
process of reaching out to vast numbers of depositors. Differentiating deposit products is 
another contributing factor that comes along with leveraging on the assets held by the DTMFIs 
in expanding their breadth of outreach to vast numbers of depositors.  
Similar to the outreach depth model results, no significant results are found for some 
DTMFI specific variables; age, percentage of women clientele and portfolio at risk. The 
macroeconomic controls are also insignificant in explaining outreach breadth contrary to the 
outreach depth results. Tran (2017) also found no significant influence of country-specific 
macroeconomic controls on the performance of MFIs. On the contrary, Ahlin et al. (2011) 
found out that country-specific macroeconomic controls have a bearing on their outreach 
activities. Therefore, this means that the influence of the macroeconomic variables on the social 
performance of microfinance providers varies across different locations. 
The coefficients of the sub-regional dummies of Central Africa and Western Africa 
were both negative and significant at 10 % level of significance. This finding is not consistent 
with the findings on the outreach depth model where the coefficients of the sub-regional 
dummies are positive. As shown in Figure 5.2, the number of depositors from Western Africa 
LISSA DTMFIs rose steadily on an annual basis between the years 2006 and 2013 but rose 
sharply after the year 2014. The negative coefficient between the number of depositors and the 
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Western Africa sub-regional dummy may, therefore, indicate that the DTMFIs from this sub-
region are not coping well with the very sharp increases of the number of depositors since the 
year 2014. The negative coefficients may, therefore, indicate that the DTMFIs from Central 
Africa and Western Africa are not coping well with sharp increases in the number of depositors.  
ii. Results for the Non-LISSA DTMFIs (Robustness Check) 
As a comparison and to make the baseline results robust, the study also estimated the 
depth and breadth of outreach models for 36 Non-LISSA DTMFIs sampled across 6 countries. 
In the robustness check models (Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.11), the lagged dependent 
variables for both outreach depth and breadth are positive and significant at the 1 % level of 
significance. This finding is consistent with the baseline results indicating that the Non-LISSA 
DTFMIs are also persistent in their deposit-taking programs.  
In line with the baseline outreach depth results, the robustness check results in Column 
(3) show no significant relationship between financial sustainability and the average deposit 
size indicating that neither a trade-off nor a mission drift has occurred in the depository 
microfinance sector of the Non-LISSA countries. The results of the other explanatory variables 
largely concur with those found in the baseline models except for deposits to total assets, 
depositors per staff member, competition, location and the sub-regional dummies. The Western 
Africa dummy is negative and significant with outreach depth at the 10% level of significance 
contrary to the baseline results. The Eastern Africa dummy is positive and significant with 
outreach depth at the 10 % level of significance in line with the sub-regional dummies in the 
baseline outreach depth model. Southern Africa is the default category in both outreach depth 
and breadth models. 
 In line with the breadth of outreach model for the LISSA DTMFIs, both models for the 
Non-LISSA DTMFIs have positive and significant coefficients for size with financial 
sustainability. This reflects that the Non-LISSA DTMFIs are effective in using their assets to 
reach the poorest depositors in their vast numbers. Similar to the results of the LISSA DTMFIs, 
some DTMFI specific variables were not significant in both models; AGE, POW, DEPSTAME 
and PAR. The country-specific macroeconomic variables were also insignificant in both 
models.  
In the outreach breadth results, the robustness check results in Column (4) are not in 
line with the baseline results as financial sustainability is insignificant in explaining the number 
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of depositors. This indicates that there is no trade-off in outreach breadth amongst the Non-
LISSA DTMFIs. The results of most of the explanatory variables largely concur with those of 
the baseline outreach results except for the productivity variables and the Western and Eastern 
African sub-regional dummies. The negative and significant relationship at the 5 % level of 
significance between the sub-regional dummies (Central Africa and Eastern Africa) and the 
log of number of depositors suggests that locational factors have the potential to inhibit the 
deposit mobilisation strategies of the Non-LISSA DTMFIs. Such locational factors may 
include the existence of informal, widely dispersed and inaccessible settlements which 
constrain the ability of these DTMFIs to reach out to as many depositors as possible.   
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on the presentation and discussion of the research findings which 
were obtained using three econometric methods in addressing the three objectives of the study. 
Form the results obtained through probit regression, this chapter concludes that the 
scale of deposit operations spurs financial sustainability when it consists of large-scale deposits 
only. Relying on this scale of deposit operations, the permanence of the LISSA DTMFIs as 
tools for fighting extreme poverty and in increasing financial access is guaranteed. However, 
the likelihood of attaining financial sustainability in the depository microfinance sector of the 
LISSA countries is pulled down by operations consisting of small-scale deposits only, high 
operating expenses, unfavourable loan loss provisioning, deteriorating loan portfolio quality 
and costly wide coverage.  These factors, therefore, reduce the life span of the LISSA DTMFIs 
in serving their niche market. Unexpectedly, the BANKs which are counted as experienced in 
deposit mobilisation are not bailed out by their ageing experience in the financial sustainability 
drive. The financial expenses ratio, the size of the DTMFIs, regulatory quality and the 
remainder of the charter types (CUCs and NBFIs) were not found to be significant in 
accounting for the probability of the LISSA DTMFIs’ financial sustainability.  
The results of the random effects panel methodology pointed out that deposit insurance 
schemes help to boost the liquidity positions of the LISSA DTMFIs in repaying depositors’ 
funds, meeting loan requests and other operational costs. It was also discovered that having 
and maintaining the capital adequacy ratio above the stipulated thresholds and in line with the 
Basel recommendations positively influence liquidity in depository microfinance. Thus, 
deposit protection through deposit insurance, prudential regulation and Basel guidelines on 
capital adequacy, is crucial in influencing the cash inflows, cash outflows and cash reserves of 
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deposit-taking institutions in the microfinance sector. However, the size of the DTMFIs when 
measured using the gross loan portfolio was found to be a negative determinant of liquidity. 
The financing, loan loss rates, interest income of the LISSA DTMFIs were found to have no 
significant influence on liquidity. The price level as captured by the consumer price index was 
also found to have no significant influence on the liquidity of the LISSA DTMFIs. 
Through the System Generalised Method of Moments, this chapter found that there is 
no significant relationship between the depth of outreach and financial sustainability of the 
LISSA DTMFIs thereby suppressing the mission drift argument. Thus, both outreach and 
financial sustainability can be pursued concurrently without the depth of outreach goal 
straining the quest for operational self-sufficiency as no trade-off exists. However, a negative 
and significant relationship between the breadth of outreach and financial sustainability of 
LISSA DTMFIs was found, depicting that a trade-off exists in pursuing these two dual goals 
in microfinance provision concurrently. Pursuing one of the goals harms the other. From the 
significance of the deposits to assets ratio in the outreach depth model, it was concluded that 
the LISSA DTMFIs are active in balancing the needs of surplus and deficit units in 
microfinance provision. However, this is done at the expense of the productivity of the 
personnel that handles the deposits as outreach is deepened. In marked contrast, the deposit-
taking staff members are productive as outreach is broadened.  Further conclusions are that the 
country-specific controls and sub-regional factors positively influence the outreach depth. 
However, in outreach breadth, the number of depositors is not affected by the macroeconomic 
factors but is stifled by sub-regional influence especially in Central and Western Africa. 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that the current efforts for eradicating extreme 
poverty through microfinance provision in the LISSA countries as stipulated in the SDGs are 
possible only if the LISSA DTMFIs are financially sustainable, operate with adequate levels 
of liquidity and reach out to the vast numbers of the poor in their different degrees of poverty 
profitably. 
The next chapter highlights the summary of the main conclusions of the whole study, 
its contributions, the recommendations to different microfinance stakeholders, and lastly, the 
areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter provides a summary of the main findings of the study that were 
presented and discussed in Chapter five. The contributions of the present study to the body of 
existing microfinance literature are then given next; followed by the recommendations of the 
study to different microfinance stakeholders to aid their decision-making processes and inform 
policy formulation. Lastly, the limitations of the study and the areas for further study are 
highlighted.  
6.2 Summary of the main findings of the overall study 
 
This thesis analysed the financial and social performance of 64 DTMFIs that were 
sampled from 18 countries across Low Income Sub-Saharan Africa. An unbalanced panel 
dataset which spanned the period, 2006 to 2017 was utilised. The data for the DTMFI specific 
variables were obtained from the MIX, an online database of self-reporting MFIs from different 
countries across the globe. The data for the macroeconomic variables were obtained from three 
sources; World Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators and the deposit 
insurance database. The performance of the LISSA DTMFIs was analysed using three 
measures; financial sustainability, a gauge for long-term financial performance; liquidity, a 
barometer for short-term financial performance; and outreach, an indicator for social 
performance. This study assumed that successful DTMFIs that perform satisfactorily both in 
the short-term and long-term, guarantee their continued social performance in the form of 
outreach breadth and depth in the persistent fight against extreme poverty and financial 
exclusion in the LISSA countries.  
The findings of the study which were presented and discussed in Chapter five are 
summarised in sub-sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 
6.2.1 Findings on Deposits and Financial Sustainability – A Brief Summary 
The first objective of the study sought to understand why the LISSA DTMFIs fail to 
achieve financial sustainability despite having commendable deposit volumes as shown by 
statistics from the MIX’s annual reports. The common ground in empirical literature is that 
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deposits spur financial sustainability as they do not erode operating income since the interest 
amount that is paid on deposits is very low when compared to the interest amount payable to 
other sources of financing operations and the loan book (Brom, 2009; Dokulilova et al., 2009; 
Ek, 2011; Hulme and Aran, 2011; Millson, 2013; Kaloo, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016a). 
However, this is not the case in some of the LISSA countries as there has been cases of DTMFIs 
crumbling and folding (Riquet and Poursat, 2013; Boateng et al., 2016). Against this 
background and given the need to build sound, sustainable and inclusive depository 
microfinance systems that have lasting effects in alleviating poverty, this study regressed scales 
of deposit volumes against the financial sustainability measure, operational self-sufficiency, 
using the probit regression technique. The results were interpreted using the signs and 
magnitude of the average marginal effects.  
The results showed that small-scale deposit operations militate against the likelihood 
of attaining financial sustainability due to negative returns to scale that are associated with 
mobilising small-scale deposits. This shows that small-scale deposit operations are choked by 
the regulatory compliance costs and operational costs of mobilising deposits and these costs 
hold back attainment of financial sustainability. Moreover, small-scale deposits are mostly 
transitory deposits or demand deposits that are called up at any time suggesting that they are 
volatile deposits. This means that this scale of deposits is not always readily available for 
financing the operations and the loan portfolio indicating that less interest income is generated 
for boosting financial sustainability. Thus, small-scale deposits largely account for the reason 
why the LISSA DTMFIs do not attain financial sustainability as envisioned. Nonetheless, 
positive returns to scale were linked to large-scale deposit operations as they were found to 
upsurge financial sustainability. This is confirmed by the work of Ngo et al. (2014) who found 
that MFIs that increase their scale of lending operations are financially sustainable. Thus, the 
large-scale deposits are most likely to be time or term deposits which are held up to maturity 
hence they are stable deposits that can be intermediated into loans which generate interest 
income that boosts financial sustainability. 
Failure to attain financial sustainability by the LISSA DTMFIs was also linked to some 
DTMFI specifics; high operating expenses ratio, unfavourable adjustments for loan loss 
provisions, high number of branches and high loan portfolios at risk. The inference is that 
inefficiency in managing these DTMFIs features in the ordinary course of the normal trading 
activities is inversely related to attaining financial sustainability. 
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As Abdulai and Tewari (2016) noted, efficiency in running microfinance businesses is 
a prerequisite for attaining financial sustainability. Inspite of being experienced in deposit 
mobilisation, the coefficient of the bank charter type was also found to be negatively related to 
financial sustainability indicating that cost inefficiency cripples this deposit-taking modality. 
The study also found that the yield on the gross loan portfolio improve the likelihood of the 
LISSA DTMFIs’ financial sustainability. The remainder of the DTMFI specific variables; age, 
the logarithm of total assets, and the financial expenses ratio, were insignificant in explaining 
the likelihood of financial sustainability of the LISSA DTMFIs. Based on the logit robustness 
check results, failure to attain financial sustainability in the depository microfinance sector of 
the LISSA countries is attributed to the country's macroeconomic variable, a regulatory quality 
which is largely poor in most of the LISSA countries. The average marginal effects for this 
variable were significant. The baseline results and the robustness check results were largely 
congruent with only slight variations in magnitude of the coefficients.  
6.2.2 Findings on Liquidity and Deposit Insurance -A Brief Summary 
The second set of results was based on the second objective of the study which linked 
liquidity and deposit insurance through the random effects panel framework. This objective 
was motivated by two notable trends in the depository microfinance sector of the low-income 
countries in SSA. Firstly, the fact that microfinance depositors are the victims of liquidity risk 
as the DTMFIs default in repaying their deposits during withdrawal periods, wholly or 
timeously (Riquet and Poursat, 2013; Boateng et al., 2016). Secondly, only a limited number 
of LISSA countries have designed and implemented deposit insurance schemes which 
safeguard against defaulting DTMFIs (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2015; Mecagni et al., 2015; IMF, 
2016a).  
The logarithm of the non-earning liquid assets to total assets ratio was the proxy for 
liquidity and deposit insurance was captured as a dummy variable. A positive and significant 
relationship was found between liquidity and deposit insurance indicating that adopting deposit 
insurance schemes that embrace microfinance deposits improves the liquidity situation in the 
depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries. In addition, adhering to prudential 
regulation standards through maintaining good capital adequacy standards as prescribed by the 
Basel Committee has a positive bearing on the liquidity of LISSA DTMFIs (BCBS, 2010). 
Thus, microfinance deposits and operating with prescribed capital adequacy levels is a hedge 
against liquidity risk and a depositor confidence booster in depository microfinance. Thus, 
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deposit protection augments the financial inclusion of small and poor savers from the low-
income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa as it provides a safety net for their microdeposits. Size, 
as captured by the logarithm of the gross loan portfolio, constrains maintaining adequate 
liquidity levels. The blame can be put on deteriorating loan portfolio quality as the portfolio at 
risk ratio in the LISSA countries exceeds the internationally tolerable levels. No significant 
relationships were established between liquidity and the logarithms of the financing variable 
(deposits to loans), the risk variable (loan loss rate), the revenue variable (yield on the gross 
loan portfolio) and the country-specific variable (inflation rate as measured by the consumer 
price index). The robustness check Generalised Least Squares method results corroborated the 
baseline random effects regression results. 
6.2.3 Findings on Outreach and Financial Sustainability – A Brief Summary 
The third objective of the study investigated the relationship between financial 
sustainability and outreach depth and breadth using deposit-taking social performance 
measures to ascertain whether a trade-off exists or mission drift has occurred in depository 
microfinance. Given the commendable number of depositors that exceed the number of 
borrowers in the provision of microfinance products and services in SSA, the need to examine 
the outreach-financial sustainability relationship in the context of depository microfinance was 
inevitable. Empirical evidence has only explained the relationship from a lending perspective. 
The System Generalised Method of Moments was employed. Results were categorised into 
two groups. The baseline results were based on the fixed panel of 64 DTMFIs drawn across 18 
LISSA countries. The robustness check results were based on a sample of 36 DTMFIs drawn 
across 6 Non-LISSA countries.  
The lagged dependent variables in the baseline results for both outreach depth and 
breadth models were positive and significant indicating that the LISSA DTMFIs are persistent 
inclusive financial systems in outreach depth and breadth. This means that their past deposits 
outreach programs have a bearing on their current and future ones. The depth of the outreach 
model found no significant relationship between financial sustainability and the average 
deposit balance/GNI per capita implying that the deposit size scaled by the GNI per capita does 
not have any bearing on self-sufficiency. Thus, neither a trade-off exists nor mission drift has 
occurred in outreach depth in the depository microfinance sector of the LISSA countries. The 
deposits to total assets variable was found to be positive and significant with outreach depth 
indicating that the LISSA DTMFIs are effective in the mobilisation of intermediated deposits.  
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The depositors per staff member coefficient was negative and significant with outreach 
depth giving the impression that the productivity of staff members in dealing with depositors 
is stifled by handling small average deposit balances. No significant relations were found 
between outreach depth and the number of years of operation, percentage of women borrowers, 
logarithm of total assets, and portfolio at risk. The country-specific controls, commercial bank 
branches and the percentage of rural population clientele, and the sub-regional factors 
positively influence outreach depth.  
Outreach breadth proxied using the logarithm of the number of depositors was negative 
and significant with financial sustainability. Thus, financial sustainability is reduced as the 
number of depositors increases. Therefore, a trade-off exists in outreach breadth in the pursuit 
of the double bottom-line objectives. Contrary to the outreach depth model results, no 
significant relationship was found between the deposits to total assets and outreach breadth. 
Unlike the depth of outreach model, productivity of staff members was positive and significant 
with outreach breadth giving the impression that the personnel handling depositors’ accounts 
in the LISSA region are very productive in serving a significant number of depositors but their 
productivity is slowed down when the deposit size is small. The coefficient of size was positive 
and significant with the log of the number of depositors indicating that the LISSA DTMFIs 
leverage on the goodwill they generate through their infrastructural development and extensive 
branch networks in tapping many depositors. Congruent with the outreach depth model, no 
significant results were found for the number of years of operation, percentage of women 
clientele and risk and loan portfolio quality. Moreover, the study found that outreach breadth 
is not affected by the macroeconomic factors but is stifled by sub-regional influences. 
On robustness checks, no significant relationships were found between financial 
sustainability and outreach depth or breadth. Thus, both results suggest that there is no 
existence of a trade-off or presence of a mission drift amongst Non-LISSA DTMFIs. On the 
contrary, the baseline results only found insignificant relations in the depth of outreach model 
and significantly negative relations in the breadth of the outreach model.  
6.3 Originality and contribution of the present study 
 
To best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is original as none of the previous 
regional microfinance studies in Sub-Saharan Africa have:  
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i. looked at the performance of DTMFIs that are solely drawn from the Low-Income 
Countries. The World Development Indicators of the World Bank show that Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole is the world’s poorest region and poverty is more extreme 
amongst its Low-Income Countries than in the Low Middle-Income Countries, Upper 
Middle-Income Countries and the High-Income Countries. Hence, this study assumed 
that microfinance provision is greatly needed in the Low-Income Countries of SSA as 
a developmental tool for fighting extreme poverty by increasing financial access 
through providing formal and safe deposit facilities for the savings of the poor and the 
low-income households. In turn, the DTMFIs intermediate the mobilised deposits into 
loans thereby increasing financial access through microcredit as well.  
ii. delved into why the DTMFIs of the LISSA countries fall short in attaining financial 
sustainability when they can leverage on their huge and commendable deposit 
volumes to finance their operations and the loan book. Furthermore, the previous 
studies have not used a different proxy for deposit mobilisation besides the deposits 
to assets in analysing the relationship between deposits and financial sustainability. In 
marked contrast, this study proxied deposited mobilisation using scales of deposits. 
iii. examined the relationship between the liquidity of the DTMFIs and explicit deposit 
insurance, a means of protecting the deposits lodged by the poor and the low-income 
households when the DTMFIs fail to honor their withdrawals. 
iv. have explained the outreach-financial sustainability relationship in the context of 
deposit-taking outreach variables. 
This study contributes to the existing body of literature as explained in sub-sections 6.3.1 to 
6.3.3. 
6.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The theoretical contributions of this study are based on the strength of the applied 
theories in explaining the interrelationships and determinants of the main variables of this study 
which were financial sustainability, liquidity and outreach. Thus, the study did not contribute 
something new to the applied theories, but there was an appreciation of the applicability of the 
theories in explaining the objectives and findings of the study. Adopting the theory of financial 
intermediation of deposits and the Institutionalists’ theory of financial sustainability in the first 
objective of the study enabled the study to find and explain the root causes of the failure of the 
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LISSA DTMFIs in attaining full financial sustainability. In applying the provision of liquidity 
arm of the theory of financial intermediation of deposits and the deposit insurance theory in 
second objective of the study, the study established that explicit deposit insurance schemes are 
inevitable in improving liquidity and safeguarding deposits in the depository microfinance 
sector of the LISSA countries. The study found complementarity and substitutability between 
the Welfarists’ theory (outreach approach) and Institutionalists’ theory (financial sustainability 
approach) in explaining the third objective which looked at the outreach-financial sustainability 
nexus. Complementarity of the theories was explained by the absence of mission drift and 
trade-off in outreach depth while substitutability of the theories was explained by the existence 
of a trade-off in outreach breadth. 
6.3.2 Methodological Contributions 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the methodological contributions of the 
present study are that, it adopted certain variables in the estimation process which had not been 
used in other studies in explaining the interrelationships and determinants of the main variables 
under study. In the first objective, adopting the scales of deposits dummies as the proxy for 
deposit mobilisation in explaining financial sustainability was distinct from the previous 
studies which relied on the deposits to assets and deposits to loans ratios as indicators of deposit 
mobilisation. In the second objective of the study on liquidity and deposit insurance, adopting 
the deposit insurance variable in explaining liquidity is not common in microfinance literature. 
In the third objective of the study, making use of deposit-taking outreach variables in linking 
outreach depth and breadth to financial sustainability distinguished the current study from the 
prior ones which mainly focussed on micro-lending outreach variables in capturing outreach 
depth and breadth.  
6.3.3 Practical and Policy Contributions 
The practical and policy contributions of the study are explained below. 
i. The study has established that the failure of DTMFIs in the LISSA countries to attain 
financial sustainability is directly linked to the scales of operation of their deposit 
volumes (specifically the small-scale deposits) and institutional factors (inefficient 
operations, impairment of losses, poor loan portfolio quality, a wide branch network 
and the bank charter type). However, large-scale deposit operations spur the likelihood 
of attaining financial sustainability. 
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ii. The study has shown that deposit insurance is a positive determinant of liquidity of 
DTMFIs in the LISSA countries. Additionally, the study also found that adherence to 
the capital adequacy standards of the Basel framework compliments deposit insurance 
schemes in ensuring that the LISSA DTMFIs are hedged against liquidity risk thereby 
boosting the confidence of the depositors in making withdrawals.  
 
iii. The study also filled the literature gap on the outreach-financial sustainability 
relationship explained from a depository microfinance perspective and concluded that 
in depository microfinance, there is neither a trade-off nor mission drift in outreach 
depth but a trade-off exists in outreach breadth based on deposit-taking outreach 
variables. 
6.4 Recommendations 
  
Following the commendable growth in the deposit volumes and the number of 
depositors in the depository microfinance sector of SSA which was not matched by pleasing 
short-term and long-term financial performance, this study examined the sector’s financial 
sustainability, liquidity and outreach. The findings showed that in the LISSA countries’ 
depository microfinance sector: (1) financial sustainability is still a problem and is linked to 
small-scale deposit mobilisation and inefficiency in managing operational and non-operational 
costs; (2) adoption of deposit insurance schemes reduces liquidity risk and; (3) neither a trade-
off exists nor mission drift has occurred in outreach depth but a trade-off exists in outreach 
breadth. Based on these findings, this section provides recommendations for policy formulation 
and for the running of financial sustainable, liquid and outreach-conscious DTMFIs.  
Recommendation 1: Promoting financial sustainable and cost-efficient large-scale deposit 
mobilisation programs  
To improve on financial sustainability, it is recommended that instead of spreading 
wings through extensive branch networks which are a costly exercise, the LISSA DTMFIs can 
leverage on agent banking and the advances in mobile phone technologies for increasing 
financial access thereby increasing the chances of tapping large deposit volumes from their 
existing and potential niche markets. Through the use of agents and the mobile phone in 
financial services provision, existing and potential depositors are enabled to save on transport 
costs, and these savings on transport expenses are most likely to be added to the initial deposits. 
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This increases the average deposit balances from small-scale to large-scale without any 
implications for mission drift. Moreover, the previously unbanked small-scale communal 
farmers and the entrepreneurial poor who will now have easy access to formal savings facilities 
are most likely to deposit their earnings in large amounts. With large scales of deposits, the 
LISSA DTMFIs can benefit from economies of scale which result in cost savings. However, 
the deposit mobilisation programs have to be cost efficient if they are to be sustainable. 
Therefore, the LISSA DTMFIs should be cautious that increased focus on large scale deposits 
leads to mission drift, hence there is need to balance the quest for financial sustainability with 
outreach goals. Furthermore, leveraging on agent banking and mobile phone technologies also 
enables the LISSA DTMFIs to balance the number of operational DTMFIs’ offices or branches 
and the high numbers of depositors that they serve. This helps the DTMFIs to save on the 
required huge initial capital outlays which are usually embedded with recurrent expenditures 
such as rental payments and staff salaries for maintaining these outreach outlets. In doing this, 
the operational expenses ratio can be reduced to efficient, profitable and sustainable levels.  
Loan portfolio quality has to be improved in the LISSA’s depository microfinance 
sector as the average portfolio at risk of 6.87 % is above the international benchmark of 5 %, 
thereby eroding operating profits which reduces the likelihood of attaining financial 
sustainability. Rescue packages should therefore incorporate effective pre and post 
disbursement checks which, inter alia, include; operationalisation of collateral registries and 
increasing the proliferation of credit reference bureaus so as to help minimise the chances of 
recording high portfolio at risk ratios, default risk and making upward adjustments for loan 
loss provisions as business cycles change (Hessou et al., 2019).  
Regulatory quality ought to improve amongst the LISSA countries by giving the 
regulators sufficient resources and discretion to act on the basis of business consideration. This 
also entails that the regulators ought to guard against extensive licencing of small, 
incapacitated, undercapitalised and inexperienced COMFIs into DTMFIs under the banner of 
promoting financial inclusion of the vast poor and marginalised low-income households 
through deposit products and other micro-financial services.  
Recommendation 2: Designing and implementing explicit deposit insurance schemes that 
embrace depository microfinance to minimise liquidity risk 
Since the study concluded there is a positive and significant relationship between 
liquidity and deposit insurance, the LISSA regulators ought to design and implement explicit 
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deposit insurance schemes that safeguard against liquidity risk, runs on deposits and systemic 
risk. On 26 July 2019, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe placed Lion Microfinance Bank under 
curatorship due to viability and corporate governance concerns. The Deposit Protection 
Corporation of Zimbabwe was appointed as the curator so as to safeguard depositors’ funds 
and to maintain financial stability. Explicit deposit insurance schemes are highly recommended 
especially in the depository microfinance sector in the WAEMU region where they have not 
been implemented at all and this is where most of the depositors have lost their savings to 
DTMFIs. According to the reputable works of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005; 2015), explicit 
deposit insurance schemes should state; the types of institutions (commercial banks and other 
deposit-taking financial institutions-the DTMFIs), the extent and amount of coverage, the types 
of deposits (local currency deposits, nostro accounts, vostro accounts, interbank deposits, 
foreign currency deposits) and how the explicit deposit insurance pools are to be funded.  
Since deposit insurance schemes ignite the danger of moral hazard either from the 
excessive risk-taking behaviour of the banks on asset side or the reluctant behaviour of the 
depositors on the liability side of the DTMFIs’ balance sheets, proactive measures have to be 
taken to minimise this unwanted deterrent. Supervisors have to educate the depositors through 
the Core Client Protection Principles to protect themselves and to be guided on how the 
depositors hold or move their savings within the insured DTMFIs. Furthermore, supervisors of 
DTMFIs have to strike a balance between stifling business innovations and investment gains 
through restricting certain activities and transactions of the insured DTMFIs and allowing the 
DTMFIs to seize opportunities that yield high returns on investments using the insured 
depositors’ funds based on tolerable levels. 
Explicit deposit insurance packages have to be reinforced by adherence to the 2010 
Basel Committee’s recommendations or principles for supervising non-mainstream banking 
financial institutions that tap deposits. These include Principle 6 that covers capital adequacy 
standards and Principle 14 that highlights the importance of liquidity risk management 
strategies and contingency plans. Active liquidity management practices such as asset and 
liability management are also encouraged to be proactive in the LISSA’s depository 
microfinance sector.  
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Recommendation 3: Differentiated or diversified marketing and retailing of deposit 
products and increased focus on cost-efficient outreach deposit-taking operations 
Since the study concluded that neither a trade-off exists nor mission drift has occurred 
in outreach depth, it implies that the LISSA DTMFIs can tap savings from any surplus units 
regardless of their poverty status. This entails that the deposit portfolios can comprise both 
small and large average deposit balances. It is therefore recommended that the LISSA DTMFIs 
segment their markets and develop deposit products that are appropriate for each market 
segment so that the requirements of the different types of depositors are met more precisely 
and fully. This will intensify deposit inflows from all the market segments thereby suppressing 
the chances of mission drift. The chances of attaining financial sustainability will be increased 
as the efficiency gains earned from profitable market segment can be leveraged on to offset the 
loss-making ones. 
Furthermore, as the study concluded that a trade-off exists in outreach breadth, it is 
recommended that the LISSA DTMFIs formulate cost cutting measures in their deposit-taking 
programs as the numbers of both the pro-poor and the better-off depositors increase. This will 
help boost financial sustainability. As mentioned above, the LISSA DTMFIs should leverage 
on cost-efficient deposit-taking methods such as hiring commission based mobile agents or 
adjunct stationed agents. The technological revolution on the use of the mobile phone in Kenya 
which has demonstrated that even the poorest individual can afford to possess a simple mobile 
phone is one of the plausible solutions. Therefore, mobile phone deposit-taking platforms 
should be adopted but they should be followed by reduction or subsidisation of mobile phone 
transaction costs. Also, the LISSA DTMFIs have to guard against free account opening as some 
of the accounts may be empty accounts in perpetuity; avoid promising to pay high interest rates 
on deposits which are unsustainable as they attempt to increase their market share; and not to 
have many clustered office networks as they are embedded with exorbitant costs which have 
undesirable repercussions on realising financial sustainability.  
6.5 Study limitations and areas for further study 
6.5.1 Limitations of the Study 
 
The main limitation of the study stems from the principal data that were used in the 
study. Data were obtained from the MIX, a web-based platform that promotes information 
disclosure by MFIs globally. MIX reporting DTMFIs do so voluntarily thereby inducing self-
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selection bias in the dataset used in this study since it is not obligatory for all the universal 
DTMFIs to report to the MIX. Voluntary reporting to the MIX also entails that the datasets 
extracted are not representative of the whole microfinance sector globally. Also, DTMFIs and 
COMFIs from SSA do not report consistently and periodically to the MIX. This is caused by 
their untimely entry and exit in the MIX database. Barnett (2011) blamed the numerous and 
varied external reporting formats and templates by MFIs from SSA to various microfinance 
stakeholders as the cause of the less contribution in the MIX database. Therefore, the MIX 
datasets are marred by missing values in some years thereby giving birth to unbalanced panels. 
As data quality was of prime importance in this study, most of the DTMFIs that could have 
been included in the sample were left out due to the incompleteness of their data. Furthermore, 
some LISSA countries that could have been included in the sample were left out because their 
MIX reporting DTMFIs had data which was of poor quality or some LISSA countries have no 
DTMFIs reporting to the MIX. Despite all these dataset limitations encountered in the study, it 
is imperative to note that the MIX datasets are the premier datasets on the financial and social 
performance of MFIs that are currently available. It is in this regard that numerous and 
reputable microfinance published works have relied on the MIX platform datasets over the 
years (Ahlin, Lin and Maio, 2011; Bogan, 2012; Quayes, 2012; Vanroose and D’Espailler, 
2013; Janda and Zetek, 2014; Johnson, 2015; Bayai and Ikhide, 2016b; Abdulai and Tweari, 
2017a, 2017b; Cull and Morduch, 2017; Hessou, Lensink, Soumare and Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 
2019; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua and Soumare, 2019).  
6.5.2 Areas for further study 
Four areas of further research are proposed by the present study: 
Firstly, there is need to investigate whether the DTMFIs can diversify their financing 
options to include structured finance products in an attempt to improve financial sustainability. 
The current studies that have examined the capital structure or financing of MFIs have shown 
that MFIs have entered the capital markets since the initial public offering (IPO) of Banco 
Compartamos of Mexico in 2007 which marked a paradigm shift in the financing structure of 
MFIs. However, scanty literature exists on whether the MFIs have gone beyond the 
conventional financial markets to include re-engineered capital market instruments in the 
structured finance markets. 
Secondly, there is need to investigate whether it is possible to establish an inter-
microfinance market where the DTMFIs can borrow and lend each other in a bid to satisfy their 
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funding and liquidity needs using a typical benchmark interest rate; the microfinance agreed 
interest rate. Such a reference interest rate for the microfinance sector can replicate the 
calculation methodologies of the already existing ones that are used in the main banking 
stream; the Johannesburg Interbank Average Rate (JIBAR), the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR). Participation in the inter-
microfinance market may also incorporate the big, financial sustainable and adequately 
capitalised COMFIs. Moreover, there is need for the LISSA regulators to assess if their 
DTMFIs can also be included as part of their Domestic, Systematically Important Banks 
(DSIBs) as their failure can also cause problems such as loss of depositor confidence.   
Thirdly, there is need to deepen the knowledge on savings access and use, and its role 
on replacing or complementing microcredit and other micro-financial services in a bid to 
increase financial access to low income populations sustainably.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Low-Income Sub-Saharan Africa (LISSA) Countries with (GNI per 
Capita of US$1 025 or less) 
 LISSA Countries CODE Sub-region Lending 
Category 
Other 
1 Benin BEN WA IDA HIPC 
2 Burkina Faso BFA WA IDA HIPC 
3 Burundi BDI EA IDA HIPC 
4 Central African Republic CAF CA IDA HIPC 
5 Chad TCD CA IDA HIPC 
6 Comoros COM EA IDA HIPC 
7 Congo, Democratic Republic ZAR CA IDA HIPC 
8 Eritrea ERI EA IDA HIPC 
9 Ethiopia ETH EA IDA HIPC 
10 Gambia, The GAM WA IDA HIPC 
11 Guinea GNI WA IDA HIPC 
12 Guinea-Bissau GNB WA IDA HIPC 
13 Liberia LBR WA IDA HIPC 
14 Madagascar MOZ EA IDA HIPC 
15 Malawi MWI EA IDA HIPC 
16 Mali MLI WA IDA HIPC 
17 Mozambique MOZ EA IDA HIPC 
18 Niger NER WA IDA HIPC 
19 Rwanda RWA EA IDA HIPC 
20 Senegal SEN WA IDA HIPC 
21 Sierra Leone SLE WA IDA HIPC 
22 Somalia SOM EA IDA HIPC 
23 South Sudan SSD EA IDA HIPC 
24 Tanzania TZA EA IDA HIPC 
25 Togo TGO WA IDA HIPC 
26 Uganda UGA EA IDA HIPC 
27 Zimbabwe ZWE EA Blend - 
Key: CA - Central Africa, EA - Eastern Africa, SA - Southern Africa, WA - Western Africa, 
IDA - International Development Association and HIPC - Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
Source: Author’s compilation using the 2017 World Development Indicators, World Bank List 
of Economies as at June 2018 and the 2018 United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development Handbook of Statistics. 
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Appendix 2: Implementation of the Basel Recommendations in Sub-Saharan Africa as of 
2014 
LISSA Countries Basel II 
Implementation 
Non-LISSA 
Countries 
Basel II 
Implementation 
Benin Not yet Angola Not yet 
Burkina Faso Not yet  Botswana In progress 
Burundi In progress Cameroon Not yet 
Central African Republic Not yet Congo, Republic Not yet 
Chad Not yet Cape Verde In progress 
Comoros In progress Cote d’Ivoire Not yet 
Congo, Democratic Republic Not yet Equatorial Guinea Not yet 
Eritrea N/A Gabon Not yet 
Ethiopia Not yet Kenya Parts of II & III 
Gambia, The Not yet Lesotho Not yet 
Guinea Not yet Mauritius Basel II 
Guinea-Bissau Not yet Namibia Parts of II 
Liberia In progress Nigeria In progress 
Madagascar Not yet Sao Tome & Principe In progress 
Malawi Basel II South Africa Basel III 
Mali Not yet Sudan N/A 
Mozambique Basel II Swaziland Not yet 
Niger Not yet Zambia Not yet 
Rwanda In progress Zambia Not yet 
Senegal Not yet   
Sierra Leone Not yet   
Somalia N/A   
South Sudan Not yet   
Tanzania Not yet   
Togo Not yet   
Uganda Not yet   
Zimbabwe In progress   
Source: Adapted from International Monetary Fund (2016a, p. 60) and Mecagni et al. (2015, 
p. 28) 
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Appendix 3: Explicit Deposit Insurance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
LISSA Countries Explicit 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Non-LISSA Countries Explicit 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Benin No Angola No 
Burkina Faso No Botswana No 
Burundi No Cameroon Yes 
Central African, Republic Yes Congo, Republic Yes 
Chad Yes Cape Verde No 
Comoros No Cote d’Ivoire No 
Congo, Democratic Republic No Equatorial Guinea Yes 
Eritrea No Gabon Yes 
Ethiopia No Kenya Yes 
Gambia, The No Lesotho No 
Guinea No Mauritius No 
Guinea-Bissau No Namibia No 
Liberia No Nigeria Yes 
Madagascar No Sao Tome & Principe No 
Malawi No South Africa No 
Mali No Sudan No 
Mozambique No Swaziland No 
Niger No Zambia No 
Rwanda No   
Senegal No   
Sierra Leone No   
Somalia No   
South Sudan No   
Togo No   
Tanzania Yes    
Uganda Yes   
Zimbabwe Yes   
Source: Compiled by author based on Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015), International Monetary 
Fund (2016a) and Mecagni et al. (2015) 
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Appendix 4: Characteristics of the Sampled LISSA DTMFIs   
 
Source: Compiled by author based on literature review 
DTMFI Country and Code SSA Sub-regionCharter Type Age Diamonds
1 ACFB Benin (BJ) West Africa NGO 13 4
2 ALIDE Benin (BJ) West Africa NGO 11 4
3 CMMB Benin (BJ) West Africa CU/C 20 4
4 FECECAM Benin (BJ) West Africa CU/C 20 3
5 PADME Benin (BJ) West Africa NGO 24 3
6 PEBCO Benin (BJ) West Africa NGO 21 4
7 VITAL FINANCE Benin (BJ) West Africa NGO 19 4
8 GRAINE SARL Burkina Faso (BF) West Africa NBFI 25 3
9 PAMF Burkina Faso (BF) West Africa NBFI 12 3
10 CECAD Burundi (BI) East Africa CU/C 10 3
11 CECM Burundi (BI) East Africa CU/C 22 3
12 COSPEC Burundi (BI) East Africa CU/C 16 3
13 DIFO SA Burundi (BI) East Africa NBFI 7 4
14 DUKUZE Burundi (BI) East Africa NBFI 7 3
15 FSTE Burundi (BI) East Africa CUC 32 3
16 RECECA INKISI Burundi (BI) East Africa NBFI 9 3
17 TURAME COMMUNITY FINANCEBurundi (BI) East Africa NBFI 13 3
18 WISE Burundi (BI) East Africa NBFI 10 3
19 UCEC/MK Chad (TD) Central Africa CU/C 24 4
20 ADVANS BANQUE Congo, Democratic Republic (CD) Central Africa BANK 9 3
21 COOPEC CAHI DRC Congo, Democratic Republic (CD) Central Africa CUC 41 3
22 COOPEC CAMEC INKISI Congo, Democratic Republic (CD) Central Africa CU/C 20 3
23 FINCA Congo, Democratic Republic (CD) Central Africa NGO 14 4
24 HEKIMA Congo, Democratic Republic (CD) Central Africa NGO 14 4
25 PROCREDIT Congo, Democratic Republic (CD) Central Africa BANK 13 4
26 ESHET Ethiopia (ET) East Africa NBFI 17 3
27 PEACE Ethiopia (ET) East Africa NBFI 18 3
28 WASASA Ethiopia (ET) East Africa NBFI 17 3
29 RELIANCE Gambia (GM) West Africa NBFI 11 3
30 CRG Guinea (GN) West Africa BANK 28 3
31 CEFOR Madagascar (MG) East Africa NGO 16 3
32 MICROCRED Madagascar (MG) East Africa NBFI 11 3
33 ONG VAHATRA Madagascar (MG) East Africa NGO 21 4
34 PAMF Madagascar (MG) East Africa NBFI 11 3
35 TIAVO Madagascar (MG) East Africa CU/C 21 4
36 CUMO Malawi (MW) East Africa NGO 14 3
37 MLF Malawi (MW) East Africa NGO 25 3
38 OIBM Malawi (MW) East Africa BANK 15 3
39 RMCR Mali (ML) West Africa NGO 17 3
40 AFRICAWORKS Mozambique (MZ) East Africa NGO 10 4
41 BOM Mozambique (MZ) East Africa BANK 11 4
42 FDM Mozambique (MZ) East Africa NGO 21 3
43 HLUVUKU Mozambique (MZ) East Africa NGO 16 3
44 MECREF Niger (NE) West Africa CU/C 21 3
45 NIYYA Niger (NE) West Africa CU/C 16 3
46 AMASEZERANO Rwanda (RW) East Africa NBFI 11 3
47 DUTERIMBERE Rwanda (RW) East Africa NBFI 12 4
48 LETSHEGO Rwanda (RW) East Africa NBFI 13 4
49 URWEGO BANK Rwanda (RW) East Africa BANK 20 3
50 ACEP Senegal (SN) West Africa CU/C 30 4
51 CAUIRE MICROFINANCE Senegal (SN) West Africa CU/C 12 3
52 DJOMEC Senegal (SN) West Africa CU/C 18 4
53 MICROCRED Senegal (SN) West Africa NBFI 11 4
54 PAMECAS Senegal (SN) West Africa CU/C 22 5
55 U-IMEC Senegal (SN) West Africa CU/C 12 3
56 ACCESSBANK Tanzania (TZ) East Africa BANK 10 4
57 BRAC Tanzania (TZ) East Africa NGO 11 3
58 OPPORTUNITY Tanzania (TZ) East Africa NBFI 10 3
59 VISION Tanzania (TZ) East Africa NGO 21 4
60 FECECAV Togo (TG) East Africa CU/C 22 3
61 FUCEC Togo (TG) East Africa CU/C 34 4
62 MGPCC DEKAWOWO Togo (TG) East Africa CU/C 17 4
63 MUTUELLE AKABA Togo (TG) East Africa CU/C 18 4
64 BRAC Uganda (UG) East Africa NGO 11 4
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DTMFI Country and Code SSA Sub-regionCharter Type Age Diamonds
1 A3C Cameroon Central Africa NGO 21 3
2 ADVANS CAMEROON Cameroon Central Africa NBFI 10 4
3 CAMCULL Cameroon Central Africa CUC 49 3
4 CEC Cameroon Central Africa CUC 23 3
5 ID GHANA Ghana West Africa NGO 19 4
6 KSF Ghana West Africa NGO 21 3
7 NWABIAGY Ghana West Africa BANK 30 3
8 OISL Ghana West Africa NBFI 13 3
9 VISIONFUND Ghana West Africa NGO 17 3
10 WWB Ghana West Africa NBFI 29 3
11 ADVANS CIV Ivory Coast Eastern Africa NBFI 8 3
12 AE & I Ivory Coast Eastern Africa NBFI 14 3
13 FIDRA Ivory Coast Eastern Africa NBFI 11 3
14 MICROCREDIT CIV Ivory Coast Eastern Africa NBFI 8 3
15 BIMAS Kenya Eastern Africa NGO 20 3
16 ECLOF-KEN Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 23 3
17 EQUITY BANK Kenya Eastern Africa BANK 33 4
18 FAULA MFB Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 25 4
19 JUHUDI KILIMO Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 8 4
20 KWIFT Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 35 4
21 MUSONI Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 7 3
22 OPPORTUNITY KENYA Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 5 3
23 PWADEP Kenya Eastern Africa NGO 13 3
24 SIDIAN BANK Kenya Eastern Africa BANK 30 3
25 SMEP MFB Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 20 4
26 VISIONFUND KENYA Kenya Eastern Africa NBFI 17 4
27 AB MFB Nigeria West Africa BANK 9 3
28 ACCION MFB NIGERIA Nigeria West Africa BANK 11 4
29 BABURA Nigeria West Africa BANK 12 4
30 DEC Nigeria West Africa NGO 30 3
31 FORTIS Nigeria West Africa BANK 10 4
32 GROOMING CENTRE Nigeria West Africa NGO 11 3
33 HASAL MFB Nigeria West Africa BANK 9 4
34 LAPO NGR Nigeria West Africa BANK 30 4
35 SEAP Nigeria West Africa BANK 19 4
36 CAPITEC BANK South Africa Southern Africa BANK 16 4
